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ABSTRACT 
The war in Iraq is neither won, nor lost.  To achieve US objectives in Iraq it 
is critical to understand not only the Iraqi Sunni components of the ongoing 
conflict, but also the Salafi-Jihadist elements as well.  This thesis uses a social 
mobilization approach to study of the Salafi-Jihadi insurgent group, Al Qaeda in 
Iraq (AQI) describing the group’s political opportunities, mobilizing structures, 
frames and repertoires of action.  The result of this analysis shows an 
internationally-supported ideologically-motivated, militant group with few Iraqi-
specific political or social strengths.  This thesis applies this knowledge to 
established counterinsurgency methods to highlight organizational strengths and 
weaknesses in comparison to a normative counterinsurgency effort.  This 
relational analysis views the conflict through a six-dimensional framework to 
examine where the insurgents have significant strength and where they are 
vulnerable to counterinsurgency actions.  We then examine the current status of 
the counterinsurgency operations and stabilization effort in Iraq.  Trend-analysis 
tracks changes in key indicators through time underscoring areas for concern 
and areas of positive movement.  Based on the nature of AQI and the current 
trends, this thesis will draw general conclusions and provide recommendations 
based on the AQI threat designed to undercut its strengths and exploit its 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. BACKGROUND AND THESIS QUESTION 
The Iraqi insurgency is not a classic insurgency in the sense of a single 
coherent and systematic Maoist “people’s war” in ideology and organization.  
Neither is it a Che Guevara-type foco war, pitting a small band of dedicated 
revolutionaries against a despised central government.  Instead, the situation in 
Iraq is a collection of multiple insurgencies; a chaotically diverse threat 
environment, with at least 40 named insurgent groups, each with their own 
politico-religious ideology, constituency, and objectives.  These groups include 
apolitical and opportunistic criminals, former regime Ba’athists, Sunni tribalists 
and religiously motivated militias.  While the vast majority of the insurgents are 
Iraqis with specific, nationally orientated goals, this study will center on a single 
and much smaller group led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.  It will focus on the 
internationally-supported Salafi-Jihadist group Tanzim al-Qa'ida fi Bilad al-
Rafidayn (Al Qaeda Organization in the Land of the Two Rivers {also referred to 
as either Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia or Al Qaeda in Iraq}). 
Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) is important to understand because they pose a 
unique and particularly difficult counterinsurgency challenge.  While the majority 
of Iraqi insurgent groups are nationalist and can be potentially defeated or 
demobilized by a coherent political, military and economic counterinsurgency 
strategy, such as that outlined in the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq,1 AQI 
draws much of its strength from a larger international Salafi-Jihadi movement, 
making it very resistant to the direct effects of Iraq-centric tactics.  In addition, 
although AQI represents a very small percentage of Iraq’s insurgent population - 
Sunni insurgents are thought to number approximately 15,000 to 20,000 and the 
foreign Jihadists are estimated in the low hundreds,2  to as many as 2,0003 - this 
                                            
 1 National Security Council (NSC), “National Strategy for Victory in Iraq” (Washington D.C. 
US Government Printing Office, November 2005), 1-2. 
 2 Ahmed S. Hashim, “The Insurgency in Iraq”, Small Wars and Insurgencies, vol 14, no 3, 
(Autumn 2003), 8; Andrew Krepinevich, “How to Win In Iraq”, Foreign Affairs, (Sep-Oct 2005), 2. 
2 
small number of dedicated Jihadist insurgents achieving a destabilizing effect 
disproportionate to the size of their organization. According to Army Major 
General Richard Zahner, the senior United States military intelligence officer in 
Iraq, AQI constitutes the dominant force within the insurgency and poses the 
greatest threat to US objectives in Iraq.4  In addition, instrumental cross-group 
cooperation allows other insurgent groups to leverage AQI’s destabilizing 
operations to further their nationalist goals.  So long as AQI remains mobilized, 
stability in Iraq will be elusive. 
Speaking before Congress, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld 
described the United State’s objectives for operations in Iraq and defined 
success in terms of the character of Iraq as "free, democratic and peaceful."5  
The nation would moreover abstain from certain behaviors, specifically that Iraq 
"will not provide aid to violent extremists; it will not plot the assassination of 
American presidents; it will not invade or fire missiles at its neighbors; and it will 
not use chemical weapons on its neighbors or its own people."6  These are lofty 
and, perhaps, unattainable objectives.  When US-led Operation Iraqi Freedom 
(OIF) deposed Saddam Hussein in a lightning three-week invasion during the 
Spring of 2003, these worthy goals appeared within reach.   
Unfortunately, post-conflict operations were far less well coordinated.  The 
Iraqi governmental structure, the police, the army, and most civil services 
collapsed. This meant the US coalition would be required to, but was unprepared 
to, immediately perform critical functions of governance. Into this vacuum arose 
widespread lawlessness, looting, and critical infrastructure damage.  This chaotic 
environment provided the opportunity for insurgent groups to mobilize, recruit, 
and conduct initial operations against the coalition and against each other.   
                                            
 3 Michael O’Hanlon & Nina Kamp, Iraq Index, Brookings Institution, Updated 21 Nov 2005, 
http://www.brookings.edu/iraqindex. 
 4 Bradley Graham, Zarqawi Hijacked Iraqi Insurgency, Washington Post (28 Sep 2005), 1. 
 5 Rumsfeld, Testimony Before the House Armed Services Committee (23 Jun 2005), 2. 
 6 Rumsfeld, Testimony Before HASC (23 Jun 2005), 2. 
3 
The future of Iraq is not yet determined. There are several possible 
trajectories, as follows:  
1) the insurgents can be defeated and the pre-war goals attained;  
2) the new constitution could effectively divide the state into three 
individual and feuding sub-states;  
3) one of the insurgent groups could emerge as a dominant group, force 
the coalition out, and impose its rule; 
4)  or, finally, the state could fail and fall into an ethno-sectarian civil war.  
This final trajectory is the least desirable. It would generate uncontrollable 
regional instability among neighboring states who have incompatible objectives in 
Iraq.  Civil war may lead to regional inter-state war through either direct interstate 
war or war-by-proxy within Iraq.  Regional conflict will severely disrupt the global 
oil market and the international economy in general. As the leading power in a 
globalized system that is dependent on access to Middle Eastern oil, the United 
States national interest is to prevent Iraq’s descent into civil war.  The insurgency 
must be defeated or demobilized. 
This thesis addresses the following questions: What is the Salafi Jihadist 
Al Qaeda in Iraq insurgent group?  What counterinsurgency strategies hold the 
greatest promise of defeating of demobilizing them? 
B. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis conducts a study of the Salafi-Jihadist insurgent group Al 
Qaeda Organization in the Land of the Two Rivers (AKA Al Qaeda in Iraq – AQI) 
to establish a threat profile and then applies known counterinsurgency models to 
this threat profile.  This relational analysis should highlight organizational 
strengths and weaknesses in comparison to both the current and a normative 
counterinsurgency effort.  The goal is to recommend positive strategies that may 
weaken the insurgency and recommend against practices that strengthen it. 
Chapter II describes AQI.  There are three methodologies available to 
analyze the origins, organization, and operations of contentious groups.  These 
4 
are structural theory, rational choice theory, and social mobilization theory (SMT).  
Structural theory focuses on the overarching national/international structures and 
the ways they constrain or shape group decision-making.  At the other end of the 
spectrum, rational choice theory theorizes group behavior as largely a product of 
coldly logical choices made by key individuals.  Social movement theory steers a 
middle course and is primarily concerned with group dynamics.  It addresses 
group interaction with individuals and how groups are influenced by and, in turn, 
influence the larger national/international environment.   
Social movement theory provides an appropriate framework within which 
we can analyze how insurgent groups coalesce, mobilize, gain resources and 
conduct operations against a central power.  This theory is informed by the 
interaction of four functional areas: 
1.  Political Opportunity:  Political opportunity is the functional space 
opened by some act or operation.7  Political opportunity spaces can be 
deliberately created through planned political policy, social reform, or legal 
rulings.  They can also be opened unintentionally by sudden regime change, 
external invasion, casualty of war, socio-economic crisis, or rising popular 
dissatisfaction.8  Political opportunities shape environmental conditions in which 
a group is born, develops, and matures. 
2.  Mobilization Structures:  Mobilizing Structures provide the resources 
necessary to sustain the political opposition and include sources of manpower, 
finances, and material resources as well as an informational forum for 
disseminating the group’s message.9  Preexisting mobilizing structures include a 
disaffected population base, sympathetic support groups, and a convincing 
                                            
7 McAdam et al,. "Introduction: Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Framing Processes - 
toward a Synthetic, Comparative Perspective on Social Movements." In Comparative 
Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural 
Framings, edited by McAdam, et al, 1-20. New York: Cambridge University Press, (1996), 2. 
8 Quinton Wiktorowicz, Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach (Bloomington 
Ind, Indiana University Press, 2004), 6-7. 
9 Wiktorowicz, Islamic Activism, 9-13. 
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ideology.  Mobilizing structures are the engine which drives the movement in the 
face of opposition. 
3.  Frames:  Frames are the “interpretive schemata that offer a language 
and cognitive tools for making sense of experiences and events in the “world out 
there”.10  The most effective frames concurrently persuade the heart, mind and 
emotions (ethos, logos and pathos) and resonate with a large constituency.  
Narratives are the stories that motivate the group, define what the group is, what 
its goals are, and why it is superior to the opposition.  It provides a worthy self-
identification in contrast to the unworthy opponent.  Narratives provide a sense 
that the group’s objectives are worthy of sacrifice and the goals are attainable.11   
4.  Repertoires of Action:  Action repertoires are the patterns of violent or 
non-violent actions conducted in pursuit of group goals.  These actions may be 
instrumental in materially advancing the groups interests or may be symbolic 
actions used to support the group frames of identity, worth and victory.12  
Chapter III analyzes how AQI has exploited political opportunities, 
leveraged its mobilizing structures, formulated its narratives and conducted 
actions in order to identify ways that counterinsurgency techniques can counter 
them and defeat or demobilize the threat.  This analysis will consider processes 
from across the counterinsurgency spectrum.  It will include the three most often 
applied dimensions of counterinsurgency strategy – the political, military and 
economic dimensions.  Unfortunately, AQI is mobilized and draws support from 
an international Salafi-Jihadist movement.  AQI’s transnational, militant, and 
puritanical character renders counterinsurgency efforts within these dimensions 
much less effective.   
This does not mean that military, political and socio-economic processes 
do not promote a more stable state – they probably will.  Conducting a parallel 
counterinsurgency effort against the nationalist Iraqi insurgents is critical to 
                                            
10 Wiktorowicz, Islamic Activism, 15. 
11 Wiktorowicz, Islamic Activism, 16. 
 12 Enrique Pumar, Social Forces and the Politics of Transition: Lessons from the Cuba 
Experience, ASCE, (1997), 160. 
6 
indirectly undercutting the Salafi-Jihadists, but unfortunately, it will be problematic 
to demobilize this internationalized insurgency by these methods alone.  A 
broader counterinsurgency effort is required. 
This paper will also explore less-commonly addressed dimensions of 
counterinsurgency - the cultural-ideological, psychological and international 
dimensions.  These less-obvious dimensions provide additional tools which can 
support the overarching counterinsurgency effort and may have a proportionately 
greater effect on defeating the Salafi-Jihadists.   
This thesis will consider the applicability of historical precedents.  No 
single counterinsurgency strategy is applicable in all cases, but by understanding 
the experience gained by governments faced with insurgent challenges, we gain 
a useful set of lessons of favorable or counter-productive responses which inform 
our actions.  The challenge is to determine which lessons, ideas, and policies 
can be transferred from their original context and applied in a new situation.13 
Chapter IV will examine the current status of the insurgency as of 
December 2005.  It will use a six dimensional framework for analysis.   
Chapter V will present prioritized recommendations, and provide a 
projection of the expected effectiveness of these recommendations in 
demobilizing AQI.  Finally, this chapter will highlight areas not addressed by this 
thesis that would benefit from additional study. 
The methodology used in this thesis is a literature study which integrates 
social mobilization theory, counterinsurgency history, and observations of 
ongoing counterinsurgency operations in Iraq.   
Social mobilization theory (SMT) provides a framework to describe and 
interpret the growth, development, and maturation of social movements engaged 
in contentious politics.14  In this thesis, SMT provides a systematic approach to 
describe the insurgent group AQI in contention with the coalition and Iraqi central 
                                            
 13 Bard O’Neil, Insurgency & Terrorism (New York, Brassey’s Inc Maxwell MacMillan 
Permagon Publishing Corp, 1990), 150-152. 
14 Wiktorowicz, Islamic Activism, 4. 
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government.  It provides insight and expected outcomes for group dynamics in 
an active environment containing multidimensional stimulus and feedback.   
Understanding the origins and nature of an insurgent group provides a valuable 
first step in defeating or demobilizing it.   
The second area of study involves a survey of counterinsurgency literature 
to highlight and evaluate strategies that have the potential to defeat or demobilize 
the threat.  A majority of insurgency-counterinsurgency literature deals with 
describing insurgent groups in their successful operations against repressive or 
post-colonial governments vice a balanced analysis of the insurgent-
counterinsurgent conflict.  Indeed, most political scientists know the names and 
deeds of Francis “Swamp Fox” Marion, T.E. Lawrence, Mao Tse-Tung, Vo 
Nguyen Giap and Ernesto “Che” Guevara.  Their writings aid the understanding 
of insurgent operations and objectives.  Insurgency analyst and writer O’Neil 
treats the counterinsurgency effort not as “the other side of the coin” and co-
equal to the insurgency, but as one of seven elements in his insurgency analysis 
framework.15  Few political analysts beyond specialized circles of 
counterinsurgency, are familiar with the contributions of Gen Sir Frank Kitson, 
Ramon Magsaysay, C.E Callwell, or Gen Sir Gerald Templar.   
Another limitation within counterinsurgency literature is the focus on the 
tactical-military role in combating insurgents at the individual-to-group level of 
analysis.  These studies use detailed case studies to delve into the causes of a 
specific insurgency, the government’s reactions, and the lessons derived from 
this particular experience.  These case studies reveal useful examples of 
successful or failed tactics, but generally do not place their studies into a broader 
context or within an overarching framework of counterinsurgency at the strategic 
level.  The government has a significant advantage in the conventional tactical 
environment or as C.E. Calwell is quoted, “Tactics favor the regular army while 
strategy favors the enemy [guerrillas].”16   
                                            
 15 O’Neil, Insurgency & Terrorism, 45-66. 
 16 Anthony James Joes, Resisting Rebellion: History and Politics of Counterinsurgency 
(Louisville KY, U Of KY Press, 2004) 10, quoted from Callwell, Small Wars (Lincoln NB, U of 
Nebraska Press, 3rd ed, May 1996), 85. 
8 
In this vein, the American military historically takes a very narrow view of 
counterinsurgency strategy.  Often, rather than considering associated social, 
political, and economic factors, tactical military matters normally form the basis of 
American strategy.17  While a military-focused strategy leverages dominant US 
military strength, the multidimensional nature of insurgency makes it possible for 
the insurgents to loose every battle and still win the war.   
To demobilize and defeat the insurgency in Iraq, a coordinated and 
comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy is essential.  John Baylis provides a 
useful six-dimensional framework for categorizing the insurgent’s and the 
counterinsurgent’s objectives, motivations and tactics.18  While comprehensive, 
this approach is not entirely new.  During the early 1960s, with the US facing 
Communist insurgencies, President Kennedy’s advisors also emphasized the 
need for a “combination of political, military, social, psychological and economic 
measures.”19  Academically speaking, the process of counterinsurgency may 
appear orderly and the implementation conceptually easy.  In reality, it is neither.  
Indeed, to quote T. E. Lawrence, “Making war upon insurgents is messy and 
slow, like eating soup with a knife”20.  Unfortunately, counterinsurgency has been 
the most common form of warfare since World War II.  This is not a mission that 
will go away and, according to former United States Marine Corps (USMC) 
General Anthony Zinni, “statebuilding, peacekeeping and counterinsurgency are 
not military-operations-other-than-war, they are war.”21 
                                            
 17 David Morgan, An Evolving View of Warfare: War and Peace in the American Military 
Profession, Small Wars and Insurgencies’, Vol 16, No 2, (June 2005), 149-150. 
 18 John Baylis, “Revolutionary Warfare,” in John Baylis; Ken Garnett; and Phil Williams, eds. 
Contemporary Strategy, Vol. I:  Theories and Concepts, New York:  Holmes & Meier, 1987. 
 19 Bard O’Neil, Insurgency & Terrorism (New York, Brassey’s Inc Maxwell MacMillan 
Permagon Publishing Corp, 1990), 5. 
 20 John A. Nagl,. Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from 
Malaya and Vietnam (Univ of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2002), xii. 
 21 John A. Lynn, Pattern of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency, Military Review (Jul-Aug 
2005), 22. 
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II. AL QAEDA IN THE LAND OF THE TWO RIVERS 
A. AL QAEDA IN IRAQ AS A SOCIAL MOVEMENT 
This section examines social mobilization as the functional interaction 
between Zarqawi, his followers and their environment.  Although it is debatable 
whether this Salafi-Jihadist insurgent group constitutes a true social movement, 
the methodology and terminology of social mobilization theory is a useful 
framework to describe the group’s birth, mobilization and maturation into the 
organization currently operating in Iraq.  It also may provide insights into means 
available to the US and Iraqi governments by which the insurgency can be de-
mobilized.   
Social movement theory provides a framework for analyzing how 
insurgent groups coalesce, mobilize, gain resources and conduct operations 
against a central power.  This theory is informed by the interaction of four 
functional areas.  These include political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and 
framing processes.22  This chapter describes Al Qaeda in Iraq in these terms. 
B. POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES 
Political opportunity structures “shape the prospects for collective 
action”.23  These are unique to the national context in which they occur, and 
provide conditions that favor or limit social mobilization and channel resulting 
forms of action.24  Several conditions and actions contributed to the mobilization 
of a violent insurgency against the US-led coalition.  While these conditions may 
not have made an insurgency inevitable, they conspire to make it difficult to 
establish a stable post-conflict environment. 
1. Middle East Regional Trends 
Numerous regional trends contribute to a sense of instability and conflict.  
These include rapidly expanding populations, uncontrolled urbanization, stagnant 
                                            
 22 McAdam et al, Introduction: Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures and Framing Processes. 
 23 McAdam et al, 3. 
 24 Quinton Wiktorowicz,, Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach 
(Bloomington Ind, Indiana University Press, 2004), 13-14. 
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economic growth, lack of effective popular political influence, government 
repression, and the rise of religious conservatism.  Together, these factors create 
an overall environment of dissatisfaction and discontent.25  In addition, the 
destabilizing tension of the Arab-Israeli conflict, Palestinian refugee issues - 
either concentrated in UN refugee camps or scattered in more prosperous 
countries and the uncertainty created by the US Global War on Terrorism 
(GWOT) create an atmosphere of instability and conflict.   
The US can moderate the effects at the periphery of these problems, but it 
will take concerted effort on the part of all regional governments to solve them.  
Thus far, the regimes involved have not demonstrated a significant commitment 
to doing this. 
2. Rise of the Mukhabarat State 
After the successive defeats in 1948, 1956 and 1967, many Middle 
Eastern Arab governments were overthrown by their own military or faced active 
internal opposition political groups.  In response, these governments became 
increasingly more repressive in order to “coup-proof” themselves.  Methods 
included creating competing regular army and national guard/republican 
guard/revolutionary guard units, stationing ultra-loyal Praetorian Guard units in 
the capitol, creating several competing internal security services, institutionalizing 
rapid turnover or placement of family-members in key government leadership 
positions, arresting anyone demonstrating dissatisfaction with the government, 
and repressing all competing political/social groups within the society.  This all-
inclusive repression effectively strangled any legal political opposition as a form 
of activism.  With the playing field cleared of all challengers, the only acceptable 
form of social activity was Islam.  The predictable result was increasingly 
radicalization of the opposition with an Islamic character.26   
3. Pressure from Puritanical Challengers 
The 1979 Shi’a revolution in Iran and the Wahabi takeover of the Grand 
Mosque in Mecca created a significant challenge to the legitimacy of the Saudi 
                                            
 25 Robert Kaplan, “The Coming Anarchy”, Atlantic Monthly, 273 2 (Feb 1994), 46. 
 26 Wiktorowicz,, Islamic Activism, 10. 
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royal family.  Without the cushion of a healthy civil society, the al-Saud regime 
sought to reinforce their religious credentials in order to survive.  Their goal was 
to appear as pious as their Sunni Wahabi or Iranian Shi’a Revolutionary 
challengers.  This prompted the Saudi government to support puritanical Wahabi 
education within their own country and finance the educational export of their 
form of Islam throughout the region as visible evidence of their religious nature.   
4. Al Qaeda Operations against the Soviets in Afghanistan 
The 1980 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan created a critical political 
opportunity for regional activism.  The communist occupation of Muslim lands 
deeply offended Muslim Salafis throughout the region.  Saudi Arabian Wahhabis, 
those who follow the teachings of 18th century Salafi theologian Muhammad ibn 
abd al-Wahab, believed that dying in Jihad against invaders would gain them 
entry into heaven as martyrs.27  This contentious mindset effectively mobilized 
support for the resistance, providing motivated young activists, finances, and 
military equipment.  In a parallel effort, other Muslim states also exported their 
militant activists to Afghanistan to do their duty in what was seen as a sacred 
struggle.28  The conflict in Afghanistan and flow of support into Pakistan created 
the conditions which required an organization to organize the recruits, train and 
equip them and feed them into the fight against the Soviets.  This effort provided 
the organizational birth of al Qaeda, the Base.  One of these young activists was 
Osama bin Laden, the son of a wealth Saudi businessman, arrived in Peshawar, 
Pakistan in 1980.  Once there, he began organizing safe houses, training camps 
and logistic support for the Arab mujahideen traveling to Afghanistan.29  Tales of 
Arab mujahideen combat exploits were used as recruiting tools by the Imams of 
Salafi mosques who leveraged these stories to organize and provide additional 
recruits for the Afghanistan Jihad.  When the Soviet forces withdrew, the tales of 
these Arab mujahideen grew to myth-like status.   
                                            
27 Jason Burke, Al-Qaeda: The True Story of Radical Islam (New York, IB Tauris, 2003), 42-
43. 
28 Fawaz Gerges, The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global (New York, Cambridge Univ 
Press, 2005), 81-82. 
29 Burke, Al-Qaeda, 72-80. 
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Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda organization exploited the mujahideen myth.  
The legacy of this resistance movement provides two essential political 
opportunities to the Iraqi insurgency: 1) a trained cadre of militant leaders and, 2) 
a perceived model of effective action that would allow a weak but pious Muslim 
state to resist and defeat a superpower.  This perceived victory against the 
Soviets in Afghanistan provided an essential frame of legitimacy essential for 
recruiting efforts.  
5. Iraq’s Invasion of Kuwait and the US Defense of Saudi Arabia 
In August 1990 when Saddam Hussein invaded neighboring Kuwait, he 
set in motion a direct competition between the US and Al Qaeda as the rightful 
defender of Saudi Arabia.  The al-Saud chose the US as the more effective 
military power to defend the kingdom.  In response, the US and coalition 
deployed some 500,000 foreign troops to the region.  Bin-Laden was humiliated 
and enraged.  This decision set al-Qaeda firmly against both the al-Saud 
monarchy as well as the US  From this point on, Al Qaeda framing would portray 
the al-Saud as corrupt rulers incapable of protecting the two holy sites (Mecca 
and Medina) and portrayed the US as a distant neo-colonial power propping up 
this unworthy regime.   
After his defeat in 1991, Saddam’s persistently aggressive behavior 
ensured the US would maintain a sizable contingent of forces in the kingdom.  
The continuing US presence reinforced bin Laden’s frame of foreign occupation. 
6. Iraq’s Defeat in Operation DESERT STORM and the Expulsion 
of the Palestinians 
Prior to the war to expel Saddam’s forces from Kuwait, the Palestinians 
and Jordanians largely sided with Saddam against the west and against other 
Muslim states.  This was partly due to Saddam’s contributions to Palestinian 
projects and partly due to disgust with the excesses of the Kuwaiti royal family.  
After Saddam’s staggering military defeat in 1991, both the Palestinians and 
Jordanians felt the ire of the US and their Muslim neighbors.  Approximately 
250,000 Jordanian-Palestinians were expelled from Kuwait – approximately 
13 
160,000 of these settled in the Zarqaa area30 of Jordan.  This sudden influx of 
newly-unemployed Palestinians had a dramatically detrimental effect on society 
and the local economy.  In particular, it strengthened the militant Salafi 
organizations.  It heaped a large number of disaffected youth onto an already 
strained situation and provided a ready pool of potential recruits to the militant 
cause.  This expulsion of Jordanians and Palestinians from Kuwait significantly 
radicalized the Islamist movement in Jordan. 
7. Jordan - Repression, Imprisonment & Amnesty 
Facing this challenge to its legitimacy and rule, the Jordanian government 
predictably reacted by strengthening its police functions and jailing many Islamist 
agitators.  Like many other Arabs who had gone to Afghanistan, Abu Musab al-
Zarqawi returned to his home country in the early 1990s to carry the Jihadist fire 
into his home state.  Arrested on weapons charges, Zarqawi was convicted in 
1994 and imprisoned in the Al-Sawwaqa prison where he was joined by his 
ideological mentor, Muhammed al-Maqdidi.   
While in prison, Zarqawi distinguished himself through his physical 
toughness and uncompromising confrontational actions toward the guards.  
Within the prison, Zarqawi soon eclipsed his spiritual mentor as leader of the 
Jordanian Salafi-Jihadists.   
Upon the death of King Hussein of Jordan in 1999, his son and the new 
King Abdullah, proclaimed an amnesty for many of his father’s political prisoners.  
Although Abdullah apparently intended the move to clean the slate and obviate 
grounds for violent resistance, its effect was to set loose in Jordan thousands of 
battle-hardened Jihadis and Salafi ideologues.  Rather than wait to be rearrested, 
Zarqawi returned to Pakistan and then moved on to Afghanistan.  There he 
established a training camp near Herat that operated autonomously of bin-
Laden’s al-Qaeda network.  Zarqawi’s focus was on training Jordanians and 
Palestinians for operations in Jordan to overthrow the monarchy 
                                            
 30 Nimrod Raphaeli, “The Sheikh of the Slaughterers’: Abu Mus’ab Al-Zarqawi and the Al 
Qaeda Connection”, Middle East Media Research Institute, Inquiry and Analysis Series No 231 
(01 Jul 2005) 2. 
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8. Defeat of the Taliban and the Transformation of Al-Qaeda 
After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks which were determined to 
be the work of bin-Laden’s Al Qaeda, the US demanded Afghanistan’s Taliban 
regime hand bin-Laden over for justice.  When the Taliban refused, they were 
attacked by a multi-national coalition led by the US, which leveraged the 
indigenous Northern Alliance as the primary ground force.  Not only did this 
defeat scatter the remaining mujahideen, it also shattered the original loose 
hierarchical structure of bin-Laden’s Al Qaeda.  This military defeat forced Al 
Qaeda to transform into a more nebulous-structured, transnational, militant 
ideological organization creating a “franchised terrorist organization” and a 
prototype of a stateless insurgent enemy.31   
This transformation of al-Qaeda has become a transnational insurgency 
fed by regional instability and dissatisfaction.  It is uneven in its appeal – its 
frames are compelling in some parts of the world, less elsewhere.  Where Al 
Qaeda’s ideology resonates, and the local conditions provide sufficient political 
opportunities, the movement can spawn localized terrorist actions or anti-
government insurgencies.  Indeed, this “flattened” or franchised organizational 
structure uses recruitment rhetoric that emphasizes the US support for local 
governments and the formation of a transnational network to enable bin Laden to 
“reorient local resistance movements away from their local grievances in the 
short term so as to bring an accumulation of violence against their common 
enemy, the United States.”32 
This transformed al-Qaeda not only catalyzes these terrorists and 
insurgencies, it provides a support network that continues to feed them and 
provide them the means to create effects well out of proportion to their numbers.  
The global Salafi network provides funding, manpower, equipment, and political 
and religious legitimacy.  If the insurgency fails, the network will also provide fall-
back locations where operatives can rest and regroup.   
                                            
 31 Thomas Hammes, The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century (St Paul MN, MBI 
Publishing, 2004), 256. 
 32 Robert Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism (NY, Random House, 
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For example, as the Taliban regime was crushed, Zarqawi and about 30 
followers left Afghanistan and with tacit government approval,  traveled through 
Iran to link up with an Al Qaeda affiliate, Ansar-al-Islam, in Kurdish-controlled 
northern Iraq.33  Here, he was able to establish a new organization “Al-Tawheed 
wal Jihad” (Monotheism & Jihad). 
After US-led forces defeated Saddam Hussein’s Ba’athist government, 
Zarqawi’s operations scored headlines while the core of al-Qaeda seemed to 
fade from prominence.  In October 2004, Zarqawi pledged allegiance to bin-
Laden and in return bin Laden named Zarqawi emir of Al-Qaeda in Iraq.  To 
symbolize this union, he renamed his organization Qa’dat Al-Jihad Fi Bilad Al 
Rifidain (al-Qaeda for Jihad in the Land of the Two Rivers).  “Two rivers” refers to 
the Tigris and Euphrates and the land is alternately referred to as Mesopotamia 
or Iraq.  This alliance provides bin-Laden with fresh victories his organization can 
claim and ensures Zarqawi remains the junior partner.  Zarqawi benefits by 
gaining access to al-Qaeda’s prestige and legitimacy and Zarqawi himself is 
elevated from a “field commander to a global Jihadi on par with Abdullah Azzam, 
bin Laden, and Zawahiri.”34  Materially, AQI gains access to Al Qaeda’s global 
operational networks, gains access to bin Laden’s sources of funding (especially 
form wealthy donors in Saudi Arabia), and gains access to an already mobilized 
pool of manpower35. 
Although a transformed al-Qaeda provides a ready source of funding and 
well-motivated recruits, it is in and of itself, insufficient to produce the insurgency 
we see today.  Saddam Hussein’s entrenched Ba’athist regime stood in the way 
of any effective revolt.  More immediate and localized opportunities are needed 
to explain the ongoing conflict in Iraq.   
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9. Fractious Pre-War Conditions in Iraq  
Among the other factors that provide a favorable climate for al-Qaeda, Iraq 
is a highly divided state separated along economic, sectarian, and ethnic lines.  
In broadest terms, it consists of an economically poor and politically repressed 
Shi’a majority (~60%), a semi-autonomous Kurd and Turkomen minority in the 
north (~20%), and the ruling elites of the minority Sunnis (~20%).  The Iraqi 
Ba’ath party ruled the “Republic”. However, the reality was President Saddam 
Hussein held all the levers of national power.  “Saddam’s manipulation of Iraq’s 
ethnic, tribal, and religious divisions left Iraq with few cross-cutting identities” 
which could moderate opinion.36  Saddam’s systematic and brutal repression of 
any organized dissent meant there was no effective opposition movement in 
operation (such as Afghanistan’s Northern Alliance) to which we could turn for an 
immediate replacement of the existing Sunni/Ba’athist power structure.  His 
selective support for loyal tribes and clans further fragmented society.  In the 
post-war environment, Zarqawi was able exploit this fractured social structure 
and gain support from  the Sunni minority to transplant his fledgling Jihadi group 
to resist US forces in Iraq.  This divided society provides a local constituency, but 
also imposes limits on Zarqawi’s ability to form a movement which includes the 
majority of Iraqis. 
10. Operation Iraqi Freedom and the Collapse of Iraqi Stability 
The American-led war against Saddam Hussein’s regime in many ways 
provided an enormous political opportunity to al-Qaeda.  With Afghanistan 
effectively closed, the Iraq war opened a new theater of operations for Salafi-
Jihadists to train and conduct operations against their “far enemy”, the United 
States.  The collapse of stability in the transition to post-conflict (Phase-IV) 
operations allowed insurgent groups to take hold, grow, and mature.   
The removal of Saddam Hussein from power did not create the 
insurgencies; the vast majority of Iraqis had no great love for their former leader.  
Instead, the chaotic conditions and power vacuum that replaced Saddam’s 
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repressive police-state rule provided a permissive environment which enabled 
various factions to seek to expand their influence.  In one stroke, the entire 
framework of political governance, security, and social services was swept away 
and the resulting vacuum allowed the forces of tribal or family grievance, 
nationalism, and religious intolerance to grow and mature into violent insurgency.  
Operation Iraqi Freedom ended without surrender; no Appomattox; no 
Battleship Missouri.  Armed Iraqi soldiers melted back to their homes and their 
leaders escaped.  The resulting hunt for Saddam and for Iraqi Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (WMD) occupied the majority of the coalition resources, time, and 
energy.  The situation deteriorated into chaos and, within this chaos, insurgent 
groups began to mobilize.37   
The highly combat-effective, but minimalist US force structure had multiple 
down-stream effects.  Without large numbers of “boots on the ground” to ensure 
order, the most immediate effect was widespread looting, the removal of 
weapons and explosives from unsecured depots, the pilfering of critical economic 
infrastructure, and the loss of US psychological dominance.  The Coalition 
Provisional Authority’s (CPA) subsequent decision to disband the Iraqi military, 
de-Ba’athify the government, and the implosion of the police force left the 
coalition with few Iraqi allies to counter the growing lawlessness.  These 
decisions helped to create a large number of trained, armed and unemployed 
young men disenfranchised and without options.  It was not until nearly a full year 
after the war that the US began to train Iraqi security forces for counter-
insurgency operations38.  Predictably, when facing well-trained, well-armed 
insurgents, these newly-trained police and soldiers performances were “generally 
poor.”39 
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11. Growth in Information Technology 
Although the Salafi-Jihadist insurgents’ religious creed may be rooted in 
the 7th and 8th century, they show no reluctance to use 21st century technology.  
Facilitating the decentralized transformation of Al Qaeda, the advancements of 
digital imaging/audio/video, data-compression technology, broadband internet 
connectivity and satellite communications have fueled a significant advance in 
psychological warfare, recruiting, training and command and control warfare.  In 
the 1990’s, bin Laden used video-tapes, audio-cassettes, and faxes to 
disseminate his message to sympathetic media outlets40.  This information-age 
war goes well beyond the “al-Jazeera effect”.  Al-Qaeda’s “Global Islamic Media 
Front” is orchestrated by Salahddin II (a non-de-Guerre) declaring the “front does 
not belong to anyone and knows no boundaries” in creating a “media Jihad”41.  
The Zarqawi equivalent has been organized and orchestrated by AQI Chief of 
Media, Abu-Maysara Al-Iraqi. 
a. Propaganda Effect 
This evolving technology allows rapid dissemination of messages 
and narratives to a world-wide forum.  Because it goes directly from source to 
recipient, it is changing the nature of psychological warfare.  This new method of 
information dissemination both exploits and sidesteps the traditional media 
outlets.  While traditional media outlets are still leveraged by insurgent groups, 
these technologies allow the insurgents to broadcast propaganda without 
government control, oversight, or alteration of the message.   This rapidly 
expanding technology has created a “hole42” in the informational space which 
allows Jihadis to produce and disseminated high-quality propaganda to a world-
wide audience in near-real-time giving them immediacy and credibility. 
This growth of digital technology has had two opportunity effects.  
The first is psychological and social effect where all insurgent attacks can be 
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immediately publicized worldwide.  These videos are packaged with 
sensationalized political messages which become fact to many remote readers.  
Indeed, it appears filming attacks has become an integral part of the attacks43.  
Secondly, by monitoring US and third-world country news, insurgents gain 
information “on US and Iraqi intelligence, targeting, and operational data.”44 
b. Web-Enabled Decentralized Command & Control 
Web posting and the use of seemingly ambiguous code-worded 
messages provide insurgent leaders the ability to transmit messages, receive 
status reports, and provide direction without exposing themselves to conventional 
targeting.  This “all-channel network”45 broadcasts blind so it can be received by 
friend and foe alike, but the rapid dissemination and ability for both the sender 
and receiver to remain anonymous in the mass of internet “hits” strongly favors 
the insurgents.  Terrorists also communicate directly with their fellows using the 
proliferation of free web-mail accounts.  These services require minimal personal 
information, the data is rarely verified, and allows terrorists to randomly set-up 
and discard accounts making government tracking nearly impossible46.  Finally, 
password-protected chat rooms provide a digital conference area terrorists can 
interact in relative secrecy.   
c. Online Training 
Digital technology is also used to disseminate information and 
answer questions from geographically distant allies.  Online Mujahideen 
handbooks detail how to build and use explosives and poisons.  These manuals 
are written in English and are provided to a world-wide audience to enable 
otherwise autonomous terrorists to conduct attacks with little formal training47. 
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Alleviating the need to congregate or travel with tell-tale 
documents, a laptop provides access to a rapidly-growing online library which 
provides support on a wide variety of subjects.  Topics, in multiple languages, 
include how to conduct a successful raid, how to shoot a US soldier, and how to 
navigate by the stars48.  It contains advice on how to travel to Iraq, the names of 
Syrian mosques to stay in, how to bribe border guards and plausible cover 
stories in response to questioning.49  For immediate technical assistance, there 
are real-time chat rooms where specific technical advice can be obtained.   
d. Web-Based Recruiting 
Some analysts have proposed that strictly web-based recruiting 
could produce a completely anonymous terrorist operation where the operatives 
themselves do not know the true identity of their partners50.  Most analysts agree 
that web contacts may be able to sustain a previously established close 
relationship, but that strictly web-based recruiting does not establish the essential 
links of trust required to conduct high-risk terrorist operations51.   
C. MOBILIZING STRUCTURES 
Mobilizing structures are the formal and informal vehicles through which 
people mobilize and engage in collective action.52  These are the material & 
organizational resources (cadres, finances, property, facilities, weapons, 
communication and war materiel) and institutional resources (public offices and 
political platforms) needed to propel the movement.53  In contrast to the 
formalized structures found in the west, the Iraq insurgents use formal and 
informal associational networks of personal relationships, “that characterize 
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much of politics, economic activity, and culture”54.  Also, unlike most other 
nationalistic rebel groups, AQI has not adhered to the normal triad of 
interconnected functional areas - security/terrorism, political activism, and social 
welfare.  Nevertheless, AQI has been able to mobilize international resources 
and manpower, task organize, and conduct effective operations.  This lopsided 
approach to insurgency leaves AQI with a deficit of legitimate political and social 
influence which will hamstring their ability to translate anti-coalition and anti-Iraqi 
government attacks into longstanding political or social power.  The following are 
significant contributing factors in mobilizing and empowering the Salafi-Jihadi 
insurgency in Iraq. 
1. A Militant Reading of the Muslim Faith 
Historically, religion has provided many groups with a powerful mobilizing 
structure.  For Salafi-Jihadists, the world is “decadent, violent, oppressive, and 
riddled with contradictions.”55  Salafi Muslims believe the present problems in the 
region are a result of a gradual compromise and decadence of the faith which 
has taken place over the over the past 500 years.  In this light, religion provides a 
powerful prescription.  To regain lost preeminence, Muslims must return to a 
puritanical application of Islam.56  Salafis believe that by returning to the 
standards of behavior of the original followers of Mohammed, the Salif, Islam can 
regain its lost greatness.  All Salafis share a common religious-political outlook 
but sub-groups disagree on the means to achieve their ends.  Among these three 
differing approaches are the purists, who see religion as a deeply personal issue 
that requires the individual to redouble their efforts to live a pious life. Purists 
believe a grass-roots approach can gain Islamic ascendance where Islam 
transforms society and society transforms government.  A second group, the 
Politico-Salifis work toward a top-down approach where the state is captured by 
politically-active Islamists who then impose Islamic reforms from above.  The 
third type, the Salafist-Jihadists, “support the use of violence to establish Islamic 
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states”.57  All three have the same puritanical reading of the faith; the difference 
only lies in its expression.58  At its heart, both Al Qaeda and AQI are Salafi-
Jihadist organizations.   
A leading Salafi ideologue, Sayyid Qutb, focused on two concepts of faith, 
jahiliyya and takfir, as the justification for militant Jihadi action.  Jahiliyya refers to 
the “condition of the pre-Islamic society, combining ignorance and savagery.  
Jihadists view current Muslim governments as having reverted to this pre-Islamic 
state of jahiliyya.  The extension of this idea is that governments which are 
Muslim in name only are unlawful; therefore, Jihad against them is lawful.  The 
second concept, takfir, is excommunication or the declaration of a state of 
infidelity.  Takfir is declared against someone who professes Islam, but is in fact 
kafir, an infidel.59  The Salafi-Jihadists apply these concepts in a lose and militant 
way.  Instead of seminary training, their ideology is the product of battlefield 
experiences in Afghanistan and rejects the academic interpretation of the purists 
and political action of the politicos60.  In viewing less ardent Muslims, Salafi-
Jihadists cite perceived anti-Islamic actions as proof of rejection of the faith.  This 
action allows the Salafi-Jihadists to declare these less-ardent Muslims as takfir 
and therefore punishable by death61.   
Although not a religious scholar, in 1998, bin Laden issued a fatwa or 
religious decree, stating it is a religious duty to wage Jihad to remove Western 
influence from all Muslim nations - especially Saudi Arabia; obliterate Israel; and 
overthrow Western-supported dictatorships in the region. Bin Laden has also 
stated all Muslims should unite to establish an Islamic state or Caliphate based 
on the rule of the Rashidun (the four initial “rightly guided” Caliphs).62 
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This Salafi-Jihadist outlook provides the insurgents legitimization and a 
sense of a higher calling.  Zarqawi effectively employs these Jihadist message as 
a call to action, a political plan, and a source of social standing.  He translates 
faith into operations to reestablish an Islamic Caliphate in the Middle East.  
According to an intercepted letter from bin Laden’s ideological advisor, Ayman al 
Zawahiri, to Zarqawi, the struggle in Iraq is central to Al Qaeda’s ultimate goal.  
Echoing Bin Laden’s 1998 fatwa, Zawahiri’s letter describes a four-step 
process63.   
1.  Expel the Americans from Iraq. 
2.  Establish an Islamic authority or emirate in Iraq. 
3.  Extend the Jihad to the secular countries neighboring Iraq. 
 4.  Clash with Israel. 
According to this plan, the Salafi-Jihadi insurgency would not disband and 
return to peaceful pursuits after US forces depart Iraq.  Instead, they would 
remain to consolidate their gains and then expand Jihad to neighboring states.  
Under this operational concept, AQI would likely threaten Hashemite Jordan, 
secular Ba’athist Syria and the Al Saud government in Saudi Arabia.   
AQI’s ideology differs markedly from Al Qaeda’s as expressed by bin-
Laden and al-Zawahiri.  In comparison, Al Qaeda’s ideology is a relatively broad-
based reading of the Muslim faith.64  AQI is far more militant and exclusionary.  
Unlike bin-Laden, Zarqawi’s AQI liberally applies the label takfir to all westerners, 
Muslims assisting the coalition forces, political opponents, and Iraqi government 
functionaries.  They view the Iraqi Shi’a majority as heretics and justifies their 
being targeted.  Salifists condemn democracy as anti-Islamic because it elects 
men into decision-making positions and places man-made law above Sharia or 
“God’s Law”.  Those seeking a democratic government are denounced as 
blasphemers and can be targeted.  The US is seen as a decadent, neo-colonial 
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power infecting the lands of Islam.  This militant puritanical ideology is well 
entrenched, and, among Salafis, not open to discussion, moderation, or western 
influence. 
In operationalizing faith into insurgency, both Sunni and Shi’a militant 
groups use mosques as an uncontested “religeospatial mobilizing structures”65 
where they can organize and equip themselves66.  These structures provide safe 
havens from which the insurgents can emerge and conduct operations in the 
surrounding area.67  Insurgents play on the coalition’s reluctance to attack forces 
housed in mosques, respecting their Law of Armed Conflict “protected status” 
even when the insurgents have clearly violated the sanctity of these structures.  
While this practice is likely to continue, its propaganda impact can be moderated 
by using Muslim Iraqi forces to search and clear these structures.   
2. Resource Mobilization 
Any insurgency must maintain sources of income and material resources.  
While insurgency is less expensive than state governance, the insurgents must 
still provide for recruiting, training, housing, food, equipment, weapons, forged 
identity papers and travel documents, computers and communications gear, 
incidental expenses of operatives, and compensation for families of killed 
terrorists.68   
Insurgents are difficult to strangle logistically.  Unless they have entered 
into Mao’s third (civil war) phase of revolutionary war, insurgents do not normally 
engage in continuous high intensity combat operations.  This relieves them of 
most of a conventional army’s logistical requirements.  For example, in Vietnam 
during the mid 1960s, it required between 10 days and three months to transport 
supplies from ports in North Vietnam to the insurgents in the south along the Ho 
Chi Minh Trail road complex.  Approximately 20-35% of these supplies were lost 
to interdiction efforts, but the Viet Cong (VC) were able to maintain a steady 
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tempo of attacks on US and South Vietnamese until the VC was largely 
destroyed in the Tet offensive.  Prior to this disastrous military defeat, the VC 
were not only able to survive, but maintain operational freedom of action, 
“initiating 88% of all combat engagements.”69   
In Iraq, AQI terrorists employing small arms, IEDs, VBIEDs and suicide 
bombers, also require minimal logistical support to maintain operations.  Prior to 
the OIF, Hussein’s militarized state supported a huge armed infrastructure.  With 
the collapse of that state, “few experts, if any believe that the insurgents face any 
near term supply problems given the numbers of weapons looted from Iraq’s vast 
arms depots during and after the fighting that brought down Saddam.”70 
a. Financial Resources 
Just as the government cannot function without revenues and 
resources, neither can an insurgency.  But, unlike their historical insurgencies, 
AQI has not cultivated a widespread support infrastructure within the Iraqi 
population.  It has gained support from the Sunni minority of western Iraq, but 
this constitutes only 20% of the overall population and is concentrated in only 
four of the eighteen provinces.   
The exact methods and sources of Zarqawi’s funding are not clear.  
There is only antidotal evidence that AQI insurgents continue to be well-funded71.  
In analyzing the resource mobilization of Palestinian terrorist groups, Hizballah 
and Al Qaeda, economics and narco-terrorism author, Rachel Ehrenfeld, 
identifies an interconnected and mutually supporting “global Islamist terror 
network is estimated to be in the billions of dollars.”72   
The 9/11 commission found Islamic charities, “particularly from 
Saudi Arabia had knowingly or unwittingly played a significant role in financing al 
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Qaeda.”73  In particular, the Muslim World League (MWL) and the International 
Islamic Relied Organization (IIRO) are recognized as funding sources for 
terrorism.  These charities operate with negligible state oversight; they present 
an immediate method for co-religionists to provide direct support to militants.  It 
has only been after the 2003-2004 terrorist attacks within Saudi Arabia that 
prompted Saudi officials to crack down on other sources of terrorist funding74.   
Other shadowy sources of funding for terrorists include front 
businesses, exploitation of unregulated commodity markets, and international 
trade in precious commodities (diamonds and gold).  Criminal activities such as 
kidnapping, extortion, smuggling, credit card fraud, counterfeiting, and sale of 
illegal drugs also provide a substantial source of terrorist funds.  Although 
purportedly a religious-based organization, Al Qaeda is not above these illicit 
activities.  US law enforcement derailed a plot to exchange  a significant cache of 
weapons and explosives “for $25 million dollars in cash and cocaine.” 75    
Once the money is gathered, it becomes essential to move it to 
where it is needed.  One method is to convert cash to money orders in sums 
smaller than $10,000 (transactions over $10,000 are reported to the government) 
and “sent home”.76  A less formal method is the use of hawala, a traditional 
system of money transfers without the physical movement of cash.  This process 
is fast, discrete, and inexpensive and has been used to allow money to flow 
within communities poorly served by banking institutions.  It allows Middle 
Easterners working in foreign countries to send money home to support their 
families without a social security number or having these funds taxed.  The 
process is based on a level of trust and involves an international business with 
links in many locations where a person gives the hawaladar a sum of money in 
one location.  The hawaladar then arranges for the same amount of money to be 
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given by one of his associates to an associate of the person’s at a remote 
location.  No money actually moves and the process is untraceable.77   
While hawala has been used as a legitimate means of transferring 
funds, it has also been employed to support ongoing Jihadi operations78.  An 
electronic version of hawala has grown  with the expansion of e-commerce.  
Peer-to-peer transactions involving e-cash, electronic purses, and smart cards 
make it easier for money launders to move, store, and use their funds.79   
b. Recruiting and Manpower Mobilization 
Like Al Qaeda’s funding sources, the process by which AQI recruits 
are identified, trained, and brought to Iraq is not fully understood.  Al Qaeda, a 
more mature and well-studied organization, has employed a process-dependent 
path for recruiting80.  In this process, tightly-knit groups of close family or long-
time friends are recruited into the group by current group members.  In this way, 
Al Qaeda members would invite friends or family to go to a training camp for 
initial training, vetting, and evaluation.  Depending on the evaluation, they could 
progress to further training, be sent into Afghanistan, or return home.  Because of 
the fear of counterintelligence penetration, there was little freelancing for recruits.  
Instead, recruits were drawn from networks of close family or life-long friends 
rather than drawn from the general Middle Eastern population.  The fact that bin-
Laden and multiple ruling clerics from across the Middle East have put their 
prestige behind the insurgency has created no lack of recruits81.  There is 
evidence this process has continued with Zarqawi drawing recruits from his home 
town of Zarqaa and the nearby Al-Ruseifah Palestinian refugee camp in 
Jordan82.   According to CIA director Porter Goss, the ongoing American 
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occupation in Iraq helps provide motivation and recruits while DIA director Adm 
Jacoby cited Saudi Arabia, Morocco, and Jordan as locations of greatest anti-US 
resentment.83  After Zarqawi’s oath of loyalty to bin Laden in late 2004, AQI 
received a boost of legitimacy and with it came “a windfall of human, financial 
and logistical resources.”84    
Zarqawi is also very active recruiting from his European-Muslim 
networks.  Originally, duty in Iraq was thought of as a “one-way-trip”, but now 
European intelligence agencies are beginning to see a rotational pattern wherein 
Islamic activists who have traveled to Syria and Iraq are returning home to 
“bolster support and encourage new recruits”85.  The return of Salafi-Jihadists to 
Europe not only raises the concern of Salafi-Jihad recruiting for service in Iraq, 
but also increases the fear of “franchised terrorism” within Europe itself.   
There is anecdotal evidence that suicide bombers do not go 
through  the same rigorous recruiting, training, and vetting procedures as other Al 
Qaeda members.  These volunteers for “martyrdom operations” are often “walk-
in volunteers, with little connection to terrorism or any other form of violence until 
just before they sign up for their missions.”86   
c. Training 
With the loss of Afghanistan as a training locale, terror groups need 
new training camps to test and evaluate their recruits.  Within Iraq, Zarqawi has 
gained a foothold in western and central Iraq and is attempting to replace 
Afghanistan as the effective training ground for a second generation of Jihadis.  
These Jihadis are thought to be more dangerous than their predecessor in they 
are training in a “real-world laboratory for urban combat.”87  On 12 Sep 2005, US 
ambassador, Zalmay Khalilzad declared foreign fighters from Saudi Arabia, 
Yemen and North Africa have been able to fly into Damascus, receive training in 
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Syria, and then cross the border into Iraq to kill Iraqis88.  In a poor substitution for 
hands-on instruction, web-based training is also available to aid franchised 
terrorist groups89.   
3. Insurgent Group Organization 
There is little unclassified information concerning AQI’s organizational 
hierarchy, functional structure, number of fighters or methods of support.  What is 
available indicates AQI is probably mainly composed of a coalition between three 
militant Sunni groups: Ansar al-Islam, Jaish Ansar al-Sunnah and al Tawhid wa 
al-Jihad.  These groups are thought to maintain their separate sub-group 
identities, but “coordinate joint armed operations.”90  The Bookings Institution’s 
estimates place insurgent numbers between 700 and 2000 out of a total 15,000 
to 20,000 in the overall insurgency.   
While bin Laden’s Al Qaeda was composed primarily of Arabs from the 
Arabian Peninsula, Egypt, and North Africa, the group Zarqawi brought with him 
from Afghanistan was composed mainly of Jordanians, Syrians and 
Palestinians91.  To replace casualties, he expanded his recruiting circles to 
include Iraqis, Saudis, Yemenis, and militants from the Gulf States and North 
Africa.  Two of his chief lieutenants, Abu Maysara al-Iraqi, AQI’s Chief of the 
Media Wing, and Abu al-Dardaa al-Iraqi, a Baghdad military commander, are 
both believed to be former Iraqi army officers. 92   
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Figure 1.   Nationalities of the Foreign Militants in Iraq – Sept 200593 
 
Although some analysts believe the various Iraq insurgency groups have 
remained cellular in structure because the insurgency is a fledgling movement 
and not yet consolidated with a unified national-level oppositional leadership,94 
others see the loose organizational structures of the insurgents as evidence of a 
“net-war organization” wherein the organization is better described as linear, 
cellular, and internet operations.95   This looser form facilitates the instrumental 
cooperation between Shi’a militias, Sunni tribalists, former Ba’athists, and the 
Jihadists.  This construct has some liner chains, but will have the distinctive 
feature of an internet-enabled “all-channel network”, where the “principle node 
can communicate and interact directly with all other nodes”96.   In net war, the 
structure is ad-hoc - cells can communicate, exchange information, train or 
equip, conduct operations, and then disperse and never work together again.  
This loose and flexible organization is far more difficult to analyze, making it far 
more survivable and able to overcome loss of individual nodes.  Its operations 
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are more autonomous, mobile, and adaptive.  It will require new methods of 
counter-insurgency to combat these threats.   
D. MESSAGES, IDENTITY & FRAMES OF CONFLICT 
Framing is “shared meanings and definitions”97 as well as the process by 
which these shared meanings motivate people to act against an injustice and 
become convinced they can make a difference.  They “represent schemata that 
offer a language and cognitive tools for making sense of the experiences and 
events in the world out there.”98  To this end, the jihadists employ a rich 
collection of stories, symbols, and histories which resonate not only with the Iraqi 
religious community, but especially within the larger Middle East population.  
These frames provide the legitimacy and identity resources (moral authority and 
an ability to demand sacrifices from followers based on perceived primordial ties) 
which tend to keep a movement coherent.99  This framing provides group 
identification from which members draw strength and meaning, offers solutions to 
challenges, and provides a rationale to motivate support for collective action100.  
This activism leverages the symbols, language, and cultural history of their 
society and “successfully resonated with increasingly disillusioned populations 
suffering from political exclusion, economic deprivation, and a sense of growing 
impotence”101. 
Zarqawi’s successful terror attacks will influence his Iraqi Shi’a population 
directly but are insufficient to publicize his narrative to an internationalist 
audience.  AQI also frames its victories for its international constituency.  To 
accomplish this end, Zarqawi’s propagandists turn to the internet and 
sympathetic media outlets to by-pass more conservative news services.  In 
framing his message, his organization is direct, clear, and its messages contain 
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three essential psychological warfare themes.  As noted by psychological 
operations theoretician Dr Maurice Tugwell, these are the “Mobilizing Trinity”:  1) 
my cause is “good and should be promoted”; 2) the enemy “is evil to be 
destroyed or resisted” and 3) ultimate victory will come to the good cause.  In a 
religious conflict, the same trinity still applies 1) “we have faith in the right cause”; 
2) “The enemy “are heretics, they are evil in the eyes of God; and 3) “The will of 
God makes Victory Inevitable.”102 
For Zarqawi, successful terror attacks influence the Iraqi Shi’a population 
directly but are insufficient to support his internationalist cause.  AQI also needs 
to trumpet its victories to an international constituency.  AQI effectively employs 
its media connections to release an unbroken litany of web announcements often 
in a standard message format.  These messages are written in flowery Arabic 
prose, and mix Koranic verses with operational details103.  In addition to the 
three-parts described by Tugwell, AQI messages add lead-in and closing 
statements that give praise to God, They frame their communiqués in Salafi-
Jihadist terms throughout.  For example, in a short news release, Zarqawi hails a 
September 2005 attack that killed Iraqi National Guardsmen in Ba’qubah: 
In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate. 
Oh God, guide our aim and keep our feet firm. 
Praise be to God, Lord of all creation.  Prayers and peace be upon 
our Prophet Muhammad and upon his family and companions. 
Yesterday, Saturday 20 Sha'ban 1426, corresponding to 24 
September 2005, your brothers in the military wing of al-Qa'ida 
Organization in the Land of the Two Rivers assassinated a member 
of the pagan [National] Guard in Ba'qubah.  Praise and thanks be to 
God. 
Your brothers in al-Qa'ida Organization in the Land of the Two 
Rivers are ongoing in their jihad and battling God Almighty's 
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enemies until worship is solely for the sake of God.  It is either 
victory or martyrdom. 
God is great.  God is great.  Glory be to God, His messenger, and 
the mujahidin.104 
The message denounces the enemy as “pagans” and “God Almighty’s 
enemies”; it praises Jihadis as “your brothers” who are fighting “until worship is 
solely for the sake of God”; it demonstrates certain belief in victory - either in the 
form of a victorious attack or transcendental martyrdom.  Among Salafi-Jihadists, 
this is a very persuasive method of communication.   
The will to continue must be maintained by insurgent movements.  The 
best way to build morale is to gain military and political victories.  However, 
propaganda, or the power of the story, can make one appear stronger than in 
reality, can undermine the enemy’s popular support, and can be used to 
legitimize violence.  In so doing, the psychological war enhances the impact of 
military and political efforts.105 
The psychological dimension of war reinforces identities of adherents, and 
battles for the minds of the unconverted.  Insurgents conduct conventional and 
terrorist operations to create a climate of fear, chaos, and collapse.  These 
operations are designed to degrade the morale of government, military, and 
civilians and incite operational paralysis.  In this dimension of warfare, insurgent 
attacks are a vehicle to produce psychological outcomes which discredit the 
government. They demonstrate the impotence of the military and undermine 
popular confidence106.   
Beyond these framing structures and message formats, what is Zarqawi’s 
self-identification; what are his narratives and how do his messages influence his 
followers? 
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1. Al Qaeda’s Salafi-Jihadist “Clash of Civilizations” Frames 
AQI frames have largely grown out of preceding Al Qaeda frames.  In 
keeping with their militant reading of the Muslim faith, the core Al Qaeda world-
view posits that the decline in global Muslim stature is due to US expansion of its 
“veiled colonialism.”  They contend that by leveraging corrupt Middle Eastern 
regimes as tools, the US has subjugated the region to the interests of the 
“Crusader-Zionist alliance”.107  Bin-Laden couches his declarations as defensive 
jihad, justifying counterattacks because the global Islamic umma was under 
attack by a foreign and decadent culture108.   
2. AQI’s Salafi-Jihadist Self Identification Frames 
According to a web-posting by AQI Chief of Media, Abu-Maysara Al-Iraqi, 
AQI is comprised of a group of Muslims who have committed themselves to 
keeping Allah’s orders and proscriptions and to see to it that others do so as 
well109.  Literate but not eloquent, Zarqawi has never been characterized as a 
leading Islamic thinker.  Instead his organization’s suicide bombings and mass-
casualty attacks and not his ideas are pushing the limits of Islamic 
Fundamentalism.  More a hardliner than even many Al Qaeda hardliners, 
Zarqawi is reportedly “more interested in action than in preaching and 
indoctrination and had an impulsiveness and recklessness that disturbed his 
cohorts”.110  His ideological mentor, Muhammad al-Maqdisi is a fellow Jordanian 
and Salafi author whose thinking and writings have been strongly influenced by 
ibn Taymiyyah, Muhammad ibn Abdul-Wahhab, and Sayyid Qutb.  Their 
relationship dates back to the 1990s when he and Zarqawi were imprisoned 
together in Jordan.  Another former prisoner and Zarqawi’s Jordanian biographer, 
Fu’a Hussein, believes that “Zarqawi’s prison experience was the most significant 
phase in the development of his personality”, imparting a bitterness and rage 
against the world.111  Released in the same amnesty program in 1999, Maqdisi’s 
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and Zarqawi’s share a powerful “blanket takfeeri ideology which makes few 
compromises.  These brutally uncompromising Salafi-Jihadist frames inform 
analysis of AQI actions.   
This blanket takfeeri ideology expands the definition of takfir, to label not 
only Muslims working in Iraq government or working in some capacity with the 
coalition as heretics, apostates, or collaborators, he also applies it to Shiites, 
Kurds and the “silent” and “defeatist” ulama.   By applying this anti-God label, the 
jihadists justify their targeting strategy.  These frames are used to justify attacks 
on unprotected, non-governmental organization (NGO) workers, embassies, aid-
workers, and foreigners, undermines stability and reconstruction efforts and 
undermines government legitimacy.  It also gains media attention and puts 
pressure on their home governments to pull personnel out of Iraq.  The 
insurgents also make a point of kidnapping, killing, or intimidating foreign women 
as this practice gains an even wider media attention.  These attacks are effective 
psychological weapons because they gain greater media coverage, intimidates 
civilians, demoralized the government, and alienates the West from the Islamic 
world to reinforce the perceived “Clash of Civilizations”112.  In most 
counterinsurgency efforts, government will over-react or shrink from such 
attacks.  Either response works to the advantage of the insurgents.  These 
frames resonate well with some fellow Salafis, but less well with Iraqi tribal 
Sunnis and not at all with Iraqi Shi’a & Kurds.   
3. Framing AQI’s Objectives  
In an Islamic web-posting, AQI has highlighted their central goals which 
include:  
1) Renew pure monotheism which was sullied by the filth of 
polytheism elements 
2) Wage Jihad for the sake of Allah, so that his message be 
supreme and in order to recapture all the lands of the Muslims from 
the hands of the infidels;  
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3) Come to the aid of Muslims everywhere and reclaim the Islamic 
dignity which has been soiled by the foreign invaders; and  
4) Re-establish the Rightly-Guided Caliphate in accordance with 
the Prophet’s example113  
These goals are similar to the seven-phase agenda set described by 
Jordanian journalist Fouad Hussein in al-Zarqawi – al Qaeda’s Second 
Generation, which involves goading the US into overreacting, consolidating the 
Islamic community and using Syria as a base, defeating regional Arab 
governments, inducing the decline of western influence in the region, and ending 
in “total confrontation and “definitive victory”. 114   
AQI’s tactical-level goals in Iraq are to destabilize the country to the point 
where it becomes a long-term civil war and continuing anti-US insurgency.  This 
would provide global Jihadists with an ongoing venue for training recruits.  It 
would foster a psychological sense of chaos and cause popular defection from 
Iraq’s nascent political structure and probable collapse of a democratically-
elected government.  It would bleed US’s military forces, demoralize US 
domestic will to continue the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT).  A continuing 
war will be portrayed as an invasion and occupation by the US and will continue 
to polarize world opinion, tarnish US’s social standing, and undermine the US’s 
international legitimacy.   
If successful in forcing the US to leave Iraq before meeting our objectives, 
it would be trumpeted as a repeat of their self-promoted “mujahideen defeat of 
the Soviets in Afghanistan” with the US playing the part of the USSR.  It will 
support the Jihadists long-term goal of resurrecting a global Caliphate by 
mobilizing the Muslim world against the west and specifically the “far enemy”, the 
United States.  These frames are designed to resonate with regional Salafis who 
are already committed to the ideal.  Although US presence is increasingly seen 
as having a radicalizing effect in the region, these goals are not necessarily 
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shared by Salafi purists or politicos and have a distinctly negative effect 
moderate Muslims, pro-Iraqi Sunnis, Kurds and the Shi’a. 
4. AQI’s Frames on Democracy & Democrats 
The US mission in Iraq involves implanting a democratic political process 
to draw Iraqis toward moderation and compromise.  However, AQI is vehemently 
anti-democratic.  AQI’s anti-democratic frames have roots in the writings of 
Sayyid Qutb who argued “the basic problem was the subordination of human 
beings to one another and only God could exercise sovereignty and only God 
knows true laws.”  Democracy elevates man as a false idol and displays 
ignorance of God.115  Bin-Laden echoed these comments warning democracy is 
a rival religion and “anyone who participates in these elections has committed 
apostasy against Allah”.  Politically, Al-Qaeda frames also equate democracy 
with neo-colonialism, a foreign concept which has no place in the Middle East 
and is simply a method of re-asserting control on their society “ordered by 
America, under their airplanes, bombs and tanks”116.  In the introduction of an Al 
Qaeda training manual seized by Manchester police stated it this way: 
The confrontation that Islam calls for with these godless and 
apostate regimes, does not know Socratic debates, Platonic ideals 
nor Aristotelian diplomacy.  But it knows the dialogue of bullets, the 
ideals of assassination, bombing and destruction, and the 
diplomacy of the cannon and machine gun.117 
Among all the groups vying for power, AQI is an unusual case.  Its 
puritanically-based rejectionist stance does not allow for peaceful power-sharing 
with the Kurds, Shi’a or more moderate Sunni.  Its political goals include 
establishing an Islamic state based on strict interpretation of sharia followed by 
confrontation with neighboring states and the reestablishment of the Caliphate.  
AQI rejects the entire political process and threatens not only opposition parties, 
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but also those who participate in any way.118  In a 23 January speech 
denouncing democracy, Zarqawi described the democratic process as the “very 
essence of heresy, polytheism and error” and concluding, “If a Muslim 
apostatizes from Islam to heresy, he should be killed”.119  This stance does not 
present openings for compromise or reconciliation with Iraqi society, but 
resonates well with Salafi-Jihadists.   
5. AQI’s Anti-Shi’a Frames 
In drawing from the most puritanical and exclusive reading of Salafi Sunni 
theology, Zarqawi has made a significant departure from the more religiously 
inclusive al-Qaeda script by declaring war on Shi’a Muslims120.  In referring to 
them as “the lurking snake, the crafty and malicious scorpion, the spying enemy 
and the penetrating venom”, he declares them takfir121.  In a tape, Zarqawi re-
declared the war and stated it was in response to a US/Iraqi Army offensive 
along the northwestern Syrian border saying AQI "has decided to launch a 
comprehensive war on the Shiites all over Iraq, wherever and whenever they are 
found. This is revenge … Take care, because we are not going to have mercy on 
you"122.  In the most deadly attack of the occupation, Zarqawi employed a new 
tactic: luring scores of Shi’a unemployed laborers to an explosive-packed van 
with promises of work and then blowing it up.  In response, Shi’a clerics 
condemned the attacks, but urged restraint, not wishing to be drawn into a larger 
sectarian civil war123.   
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6. The Tawheed wal Jihad Flag 
A flag is prominent symbol of any self-identified group.  Zarqawi’s original 
Tawheed wal Jihad (Monotheism and Jihad) flag consists of an overall black 
background with a grey globe in the lower center.  The black background color 
represents the goal of restoring the Islamic Caliphate by way of militancy. The 
globe represents the global community of Muslims or Umma as well as the 
jihadists global ambitions.  Superimposed over the globe is an open Koran, 
facing up, representing the jihadists’ foundation in Islam.  Rising out of the Koran 
are an AK-47, a hand pointing skyward, and a black flag which are all symbols of 
militancy.  The Arabic Script at the bottom reads "Monotheism and Jihad," the 
original name of Zarqawi’s group 124.  In a newer variation, AQI’s flag is a gold or 
silver disk with the Shahada (profession of faith) across the top and “Monotheism 
and Jihad” across the bottom.125  In keeping with the group’s Salafi-Jihadist 
ideology, this symbol does not indicate any nationalist goals, political affiliation, 
or areas for compromise. 
    
Figure 2.   Zarqawi’s Original “Monotheism & Jihad” Flag126 
 
   
Figure 3.   More Recent Variations of AQI’s Flag127 
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E. ACTION REPERTOIRES 
Action repertoires can be a form of “propaganda by deed aimed at 
demonstrating the military strength and seriousness of purpose of the 
insurgents.”  They can also “involve a combination of propaganda and practical 
considerations, such as killing a particularly effective police chief or government 
spokesman.128  According to global sociology author, Enrique Pumar, 
“repertoires encompass action-orientated tactics actions against the regime such 
as strikes, insurgencies and sabotage”.129   
Militarily, the insurgents win by not losing.  To survive against a better 
armed and more numerous government forces, insurgents engage in asymmetric 
operations which pit their limited strength against weak points in the 
government’s defenses.  Operationally, the predominate insurgent method is to 
attack at a time and place of the insurgent’s choosing, using mobility, knowledge 
of the terrain, light weapons, and careful planning to conduct lightning-speed 
raids or ambushes and then quickly dispersing.  Their goal is to conduct a long 
war of attrition to wear down the government and avoid extermination.   
Insurgents are normally not based out of elaborate permanent bases, but 
instead vie for the control of the rural countryside or poor urban areas using the 
population for cover.130  They seldom seek pitched battles but, instead, they 
employ a strategy of slow attrition against the government forces while incurring 
minimal losses.  Tactically, the favored methods are roadside bombs, sniping, 
squad-scale raids, and assassinations.  Several researchers have noted guerrilla 
warfare has a Darwinian effect on insurgent groups.131  Through time, the  
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government forces capture or kill less-competent guerrillas, while ones that are 
more proficient adapt and become more dangerous.  They, in-turn, provide better 
training to recruits.    
Not all rebel groups revolting from a central government employ the same 
strategy and no single strategy has universal applicability.  The type employed is 
a result of the insurgent’s strengths, weaknesses and goals, the government’s 
responses and the particular circumstances of the conflict.   
Bard O’Neil describes four distinct insurgent strategies.  The conspiratorial 
strategy involves a small group of political/military elites who seek to remove the 
governing regime using a “swift use of force” or a coup.  The Mao’s protracted 
popular war strategy is based on harnessing a groundswell of rural peasant 
discontent to oppose the government.  This “people’s war” strategy involves 
three phases ranging from the initial organization to guerrilla warfare to civil war.  
The military-focus strategy “gives primacy to military action” assuming political 
support is sufficient or a product of military action.  The Confederate States in the 
American Civil War and Castro in the Cuban revolution both used a military-focus 
strategy.  O’Neil’s fourth type is exampled by Carlos Marighella’s urban warfare 
strategy which centers on terrorist operations in major cities to cause collapse 
from within.  Although Al Qaeda has no formal army, O’Neil suggests Al Qaeda is 
using a transnational variation of the military-focus strategy with the entire world 
as a battlefield.132  Zarqawi’s strategy varies somewhat from Al Qaeda’s as well.  
While doctrinally, Zarqawi and bin Laden agree, Zarqawi is focused on Iraq, 
Jordan, and Syria, and has reportedly criticized bin Laden for “not being forceful 
enough to deal more violent and more painful strikes to the enemy.”133   
Strategically, the Salafi-Jihadists cannot defeat the US and Iraqi forces in 
a direct military confrontation.  They have neither sufficient dedicated fighters nor 
a sufficiently large constituency to advance through the phases of war and bring 
a revolution to a successful conclusion in a conventional civil war.  They could 
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succeed by continuing to attrit US forces while “creating an atmosphere of 
intimidation, insecurity and despair” until the US loses patience and withdraws 
before the Iraqi military and Iraqi government have the capability to stand on their 
own.  In that environment, exploiting their international resources, they could 
“seize power from a weak and demoralized regime.”134   
As insurgencies become increasingly successful and an increasing threat 
to the government, it progresses through several general stages of development.  
These include an incipient formation stage, an organizational stage, an irregular 
(terrorist or guerrilla) warfare stage, and a conventional civil war stage.  In each 
of these stages, the insurgents conduct relatively predictable operations and 
targeting patterns designed to force the government to over-react and, through 
heavy-handed military operations, cause inevitable civilian casualties.  While  
both the Ba’athist and Jihadist insurgents are acting to this established pattern of 
guerrilla warfare, the Salafi-Jihadists are also conducting an unusual pattern of 
exceptionally brutal terrorist attacks on the Iraqi population.  In so doing, they risk 
not only alienating the majority of the Iraqi population, but also cause dissent 
within their own foreign support base. 
At the tactical level, the insurgency in Iraq has adopted the general tactics 
expected of insurgent action.  However, they have added ritualized executions 
and suicide bombings as unique tactics to the established insurgent action 
repertoire.   
The insurgency in Iraq has not remained static.  It has been quick to react 
to coalition operations and force-protection measures with a concurrent increase 
in sophistication and lethality of insurgent operations.  The insurgents have been 
able to produce a steady stream of coalition casualties and maintain a constant 
climate of violence.135  While it is difficult to determine which groups are 
responsible for individual attacks, in general, the insurgents have learned to 
mount larger, explosive charges in cars to create vehicle-borne, improvised 
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explosive devises (VBIEDs) and have combined multiple, timed attacks to target 
fire and police first-responders.  They now counter US electronic counter-
measures by mixing IEDs with small-arms and RPG attacks.  Most recently, they 
are employing “swarming” tactics where insurgents attack with small-arms and 
RPGs from multiple directions at once.136  
In summer 2005, there has been a shift in targeting from many small 
attacks intent on killing Iraqi officials to a small number of very effective mass-
casualty attacks on the population to terrorize and grab headlines137.  AQI has 
specifically targeted civilians to create sectarian divides.  They have mounted 
larger attacks to coincide with the commemoration of important dates and 
festivals such as Ashura.  
1. Insurgent and Terrorist Operations 
Students of insurgency have compiled a relatively complete study of the 
ways in which guerrillas fight.  Common themes emerge form their operations 
used to engage a superior military force, unseat the government in power or 
resist foreign invaders.  These themes generally include swift attacks on isolated 
units, remote outposts, and vulnerable lines of communications.  These have 
been well documented in studies of the Afghan insurgents138. These strategies 
commonly target the Army, security services, mid-level government functionaries, 
income-generating activities, and international links.   
Radu believes terror is “a necessary part of any guerrilla campaign”, and 
that its role of “killing countless civilians as part of a massive and quite effective 
campaign of intimidation, population control, and recruitment.”139  Safafi-Jihadist 
groups reinforce their anti-coalition, anti-Iraqi government, anti-collaborator 
framing with brutal terrorist attacks.  These attacks are designed to bolster the 
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group’s hold over its population base, terrorize opponent populations, and create 
a general climate of chaos that discredits the government.  Since Aug 2004, 
there have been more than 1500 attacks per month; 90% credited to Sunni 
groups.  These have included both indiscriminant bombings which killed innocent 
civilians as well as targeted attacks on vulnerable coalition-member forces and 
intelligence assists140.  To gain their desired effect, the killings are violent and 
public – often with videos posted on Islamic web sites.   
There is a tension in the literature as to the value of terrorist operations in 
an insurgency.  While Radu sees terrorism as another tactic available to the 
insurgents to coerce the government and influence a target population, Joes 
states, “Terrorism is not intrinsic to a properly waged guerrilla war, but that it is 
indeed antithetical to it”.141  Conducting terrorism undercuts popular support 
needed to empower a viable political organization once the central government is 
deposed.  Al-Zawahiri echoes this belief when he cautions al-Zarqawi about the 
“scenes of slaughtering hostages” which the Muslim populace “will never find 
palatable”.142  This dependency on terrorism is a significant weakness in 
Zarqawi’s strategy.   
a. Attacks on Coalition Forces and Western Civilians 
While the act of insurgent attacks on US forces is not surprising, 
the numbers are staggering – averaging nearly 100 per day in Oct 2005.143  
According to the Brookings Institute, there have been 2,092 US military deaths 
between March 2003 and September 2005144.  Insurgent attacks are not meant 
to defeat the coalition forces in the field.  Instead, they are designed to slowly 
attrite coalition forces and defeat US and allied public opinion.  The most 
effective tactic used is the improvised explosive device (IED) or the vehicle-borne 
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improvised explosive device (VBIED).145  Mechanically or remotely detonated, 
these weapons are inexpensive, easily constructed, and a low-risk tactic which 
keeps US soldiers venturing outside heavily protected zones on constant guard. 
b. Attacks on Representatives of the Iraqi Government, the 
New Iraqi Army and Iraqi Police 
The murder of opposition politicians is “part and parcel of guerrilla 
politico-psychological warfare.”146  The insurgents conduct these attacks to 
undercut the US and Iraqi government legitimacy and hope to instill enough fear 
that Iraqis will not volunteer to serve in the police or army.  Between June 2004 
and January 2005, 1,300 Iraqi military and police have been killed in insurgent 
attacks147.  An Al Qaeda in Iraq video labeled, “The Whole Region is For Allah” 
posted on a militant website justifies the killing of these civilians labeling them 
“slaves and servants of the Crusaders”148.   
 
Figure 4.   Iraqi Military and Police Killed Monthly149                                             
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c. Attacks on Critical Infrastructure and the 
Reconstruction Effort 
Sunni groups target critical infrastructure to deny the government 
the legitimacy of an effectively-run economy150.  Bin-Laden’s own calls for 
attacks on infrastructure may be a refocus away from the spectacular September 
11-style attack to a more protracted attrition-style of warfare151.  Given Iraq’s oil-
dependent economy, pipelines, refineries, and pumping stations are common 
targets.  Their destruction denies the new government critical revenues.  The 
insurgents target power, water, and sewer systems to create popular 
dissatisfaction with the government’s capacity to provide basic services for the 
population.  This sows creeping dissatisfaction with the Iraqi government and the 
US.  This disappointment is made even more bitter, given the pre-war projections 
of great improvements in civil services.  This shift may be driven by either the 
desire to make the war with the US a more protracted struggle or be driven by 
the realization that smaller, less spectacular attacks are all that a decentralized, 
net-based organization is realistically capable of organizing and executing. 
d. Attacks on Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), 
Inter-Governmental Organizations (IGOs) and 
Humanitarian Relief Organizations 
An international-coordinated and effective reconstruction and 
stability effort in Iraq is a significant threat to the Salafi-Jihadist insurgency.  To 
defeat or forestall stabilization and reconstruction, all efforts that support the 
rebuilding of Iraq are de-facto AQI targets.  In addition to attacks on contractors, 
oil pipelines, water & sewage plants, AQI has conducted high-profile attacks, 
such as the suicide car bombing of the UN headquarters in Baghdad, bombings 
of the International Red Cross, and the murder of the Care International country 
director, Margaret Hassan.  These organizations normally insist on their 
independence from the US military and believe their impartiality in providing aid 
is a source of protection.  However, because of the stabilizing nature of these 
organizations and the complete rejection of their mission by the Salafi-Jihadist 
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insurgents, these humanitarian organizations are conflated with the military 
forces by default.  To mitigate the threat of insurgent attack, aid organizations 
have reduced their foreign staff to minimum levels within Iraq, set up operations 
in neighboring countries, and hired Iraqis to staff the operations within Iraq.  
Unfortunately, this has also mitigated their effectiveness. 
e. Suicide (Homicide) Bombings 
One of the most terrifying and effective weapons in AQI’s inventory 
is the suicide bomb, it has become their prime weapon.152  Whether undertaken 
by a single person wearing an explosive vest, a driver of an automobile carrying 
several 155mm artillery rounds wired together, or a dump-truck packed with 
explosives, the tactic is essentially the same: individual bombers wearing 
explosive underneath their clothes mingle among their targets and detonate 
themselves without warning.  Alternately, they drive or crash into the target 
building and explode with the force of a focused artillery barrage.  Although 
suicide bombing is often identified with Islamic Fundamentalism, it is actually a 
non-denominational military strategy used by weak, opposition groups against 
stronger (normally democratic) enemies as part of a larger organized 
campaign.153  Numerically, the world’s largest practitioners of suicide bombing 
are the Marxist/Hindu Tamil Tigers.154  This is a tactic where the weak can 
coerce the strong and the strong cannot easily adjust to protect themselves155.   
Suicide bombing is relatively inexpensive and requires little training.  
As opposed to the high-cost of complex weapons, a bomb vest is simple to 
construct and can be built for as little as $150.156  To fight a conventional war 
requires large formations of well-trained and well-equipped troops.  In contrast, 
the labor requirements for a suicide bombing campaign are small.  Although 
there are a number of people involved in constructing the bombs, choosing the 
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targets, and motivating the individual bombers, suicide bombings only require the 
sacrifice of a single person to inflict catastrophic damage to a soft target.  In 
Lebanon, Hizballah was able to motivate bombers using an intense sense of 
crisis convincing them this tactic would work and provide the bombers the 
blessings of their religious community.157 
According to Dr Mohammed Hafez, three conditions must be met in 
order for adherents to embrace suicidal violence:  “(1) prevailing cultural norms 
and mores encompass belief systems, symbolic narratives, and historical 
traditions that justify and celebrate martyrdom; (2) legitimate authorities promote 
or acquiesce to extreme violence; and (3) groups or communities feel 
overwhelming threats and victimized by external enemies in the course of 
political conflict.”158  Although less militant Muslims, including portions of Al 
Qaeda itself, are appalled by “Zarqawi’s excessive sectarianism and 
bloodletting”,159 within the Salafi-Jihadi community, AQI’s use of suicide bombing 
meets Hafez’s criteria.  For example, in the words of former HAMAS leader, Abd 
al-Azizal-Rantisi: 
The enemies of Allah and the enemies of this people are cowards.  
They crave life, while the Muslims crave martyrdom.  The 
martyrdom operations that shock can ensure that horror is sowed in 
the {enemies] hearts and horror is one of the causes for defeat… In 
order to defend the homeland from the terrorist Crusader attack; 
there is a need for people who yearn for Paradise, and the shortest 
way to Paradise is death [for the sake of] Allah.  Some of us should 
see the joyful and satisfied faces of the mothers in Iraq when they 
part from fruit of their loins, who go off to the realms of honor, the 
realms of martyrdom.160  
These attacks produce both physically and psychologically 
devastating effects and constitute the insurgent’s precision-guided munitions.  
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AQI uses suicide bombing because it is reportedly “twelve times deadlier” than 
any other form of terrorism.  Worldwide “3% of all terrorist incidents” were suicide 
bombings, but they inflicted “48% of all terrorist fatalities.”161  In addition to their 
disproportionate physical damage, death and injuries, suicide bombings 
demonstrate the ultimate level of commitment by the insurgents to their cause. 
Car bombs are another highly effective tactic which explode with 
the force and effectiveness of several artillery rounds.  Attacks on police and 
army recruiting stations, police stations, and Iraqi workers waiting outside US 
base entry checkpoints are favorite targets for these attacks.  In some cases, 
bombings have been preceded with leaflets warning Iraqis to stay home.  As in 
the case of Hezbollah, Zarqawi honors his suicide bombers by posting their 
names and last testimonials on to Islamic web sites.162   
f. Hostage Taking and Beheadings  
Martha Crenshaw views hostage taking as a form of coercive 
bargaining in that “hostages represent the power to hurt in the purist form.”163  
Taking hostages was seen as a way for terrorists to bargain with the government 
while negating the government’s greater strength and resources.  Analysis of 
terrorist bargaining trends shows that for a terrorist to gain his demands, the 
government must find the threat of the hostage death to be less acceptable than 
the terrorist demands.  To gain additional bargaining strength, the terrorist has 
“two options, to make the threat more horrible and more credible or reward 
government compliance.”164  Videotaped serial hostage beheadings takes the 
concepts of horrible and credible to the extreme.   
Beginning with Zarqawi’s murder of American telecommunications 
contractor Nick Berg in May 2004, and lasting until the Battle for Fallujah in 
November 2004, this type of ritual execution was a popular AQI tactic.  In 
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creating a unique type of terrorist theater, the profile used by AQI uses different 
symbology than the Saudi Arabian public beheadings of criminals.  
The weapon used in Saudi Arabia is a long sword and the act 
completed in one rapid movement.  It is, by comparison, relatively humane.  The 
sword is often used in Islamic culture and usually symbolizes power, justice, and 
the might of Allah.  Zarqawi’s method uses a short knife similar to those used to 
slaughter animals and is intentionally painful.  The “execution” uses ceremony to 
feign legitimacy.165  The executioners are clad in black; the “prisoner” is dressed 
in an orange jumpsuit similar to the prisoners held at Guantanamo; the “charges” 
are read against the accused.  The objective of this ceremony is not to kill any 
one individual because of anything that person has done.  Instead, the goal is to 
appall the target audience and create terror in anticipation of the act.  When used 
against nations that bargain with terrorists, it is a very potent negotiating threat.  
When used against the US, it is a political statement designed to humiliate the 
US and demonstrate its powerlessness.166  To complete the macabre terrorist 
theater, the video of Mr. Berg’s death was posted to an al-Qaeda website on 12 
May 2004 with the title “Abu Musab al-Zarqawi Shown Slaughtering an 
American”167.  The US can do little to counter this tactic, but within the Muslim 
world, the practice has drawn sharp criticism - describing execution of hostages 
as un-Islamic. 
g. Mass-Casualty Attacks 
AQI conducts mass casualty attacks intentionally directed at 
civilians.  As of December 2005, including OIF, approximately 30,000 civilians 
have been killed.168  In the provinces  where they occur most often, these attacks 
have a deeply destabilizing effect.  Through the fall of 2005, the AQI offensive of 
suicide attacks has been accelerating.  Examples of the indiscriminant targeting 
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include a twin suicide bombing inside the Khanaqin mosque, killing 70169 and an 
attack on US troops who were handing out toys outside the general hospital in 
Mahmudiyah, killing 31, mainly women and children.170 
 
Figure 5.   Killed and Wounded in Multiple-Fatality Bombings171 
 
In a statement posted on 18 May 2005 in an Islamist message 
forum, Zarqawi quoted ibn Taymiyya, stating the need to “recognize the better of 
two good things and the worse of two evils” and defended the killing as legitimate 
citing “the evil of heresy is greater then the evil of killing Muslims”172.  This hard 
line stance has, to some degree, backfired as in the case of Tal Afar where Al 
Qaeda insurgents killed 31 members of the Albu Mahal tribe in punishment for 
joining the Iraqi security forces.  In response, Sunni tribalists have fought a 
simmering battle with Salafi-Jihadists for control of the region.   
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2. Puritanical Dress & Social Policies in Occupied Areas 
There are numerous historical examples where “insurgency in defense of 
religion will be both resolute and protracted.”173  When AQI takes control of an 
area, one of the ways Zarqawi visibly lays claim is to impose a strict 
interpretation of Islamic code of conduct and Islamic law.  This action is deeply 
rooted in Zarqawi’s exclusivist belief system and is a continuation of policies he 
employed while in the Jordanian Al-Sawwaqa prison.  The goal was to set 
himself and his followers apart from more secular Muslims in dress and action.  
In practice, it took on the appearance of an Afghani prison gang wearing 
traditional clothing.174   
In Tal Afar and al-Qaim, AQI governance brought public execution 
of city leaders, burning stores that sold CDs, lashing men accused of drinking 
alcohol, and the murder and public display of an accused prostitute.  A sign 
leading into Zarqawi-held territory read “Welcome to the Islamic Republic of 
Qaim” while terrified Sunni tribal residents fled the city175.   While this process 
remains true to Zarqawi’s hard-line ideology, in practice it is a counter-productive 
guerrilla tactic, alienating the tribal component of Iraq’s Sunni population.   
3. Enmity Towards Hashemite Jordan 
Occasionally misidentified as a Palestinian, Zarqawi is a native east-bank 
Jordanian who views the government of Jordan with the same enmity Bin-Laden 
views the al-Saud monarchy.  Arrested for political agitation and arms 
possession, Zarqawi was sentenced to 15 years in jail and confined from 1994-
1999.  After his release, he maintained a periodic interest in attacking the 
Jordanian government.  His Afghanistan operations were based in a training 
camp near Herat and set up for the benefit of Jordanian Jihadists.  He was foiled 
in a Millennium plot to attack hotels frequented by Jewish and Americans in 
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Amman176.  He was implicated in the successful plot to assassinate a US 
diplomat attached to USAID Lawrence Foley in Oct 2002.  In Apr 2004, the 
Jordanian government convicted Zarqawi in absentia for this crime and 
sentenced him to death by hanging177.   In Aug 2003, he successfully bombed 
the Jordanian embassy in Baghdad and in April 2004 unsuccessfully plotted to 
attack the Jordanian General Intelligence Dept HQ of the Prime Minister and the 
US Embassy in Amman178.   
 
Figure 6.   Failed 15 November AQI Suicide Bomber, Sajida Rishawi on 
Jordanian TV Showing her Explosive Vest179 
 
On 15 November 2005, he successful orchestrated a four-suicide-bomber 
attack on three downtown Amman hotels, killing 37 people (although three of the 
four bombs detonated).  To conduct the operation, Zarqawi chose four Iraqi 
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nationals.  For Zarqawi, hostility towards Jordan is a recurring theme, but is not 
the focus of his current operations.   
Zarqawi’s frames and actions in Iraq appear to be sectarian-motivated 
operations (the majority of the dead are Shi’as and Kurds), and indicate his intent 
to weaken the central government and incite a religious civil war.  The logic 
behind this strategy may be that the Sunnis are convinced they can retake the 
levers of power from the coalition and any elected government in place.  Should 
a civil war break out, it is possible neighboring Sunni states would mobilize 
support and come to the aid of the Iraqi Sunnis in retaking the state structure and 
re-imposing their will180.   This would, of course, invite counterbalancing support 
from Iran thereby risking a regional war, either directly, or by proxy.    
It is imperative this insurgency be defeated before the region descends 
into religious war.  The next section discusses a social mobilization-based 
counterinsurgency strategy which could contribute to the defeat or demobilization 
of the Salafi-Jihadists insurgents and help restore stability in Iraq. 
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III. COUNTERINSURGENCY STRATEGY 
The Insurgency in Iraqi is a complex affair with over 40 named insurgent 
groups.  Attacking any one group will not end the conflict.  A two-track 
counterinsurgency strategy must address the interplay between Iraqi-born 
insurgents, with national-oriented goals and foreign Salafi-Jihadists, with 
religious-based transnational goals.  The counterinsurgency strategy for 
defeating and demobilizing the Iraqi Sunni insurgency groups as described in the 
National Strategy for Victory in Iraq is a reasonable approach to addressing that 
portion of the insurgency.181  However, this strategy does not address the threat 
of foreign jihadists except as a target for military action.   
Given an understanding of the background and mobilizing structures of Al 
Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), the next step in countering the Salafi-Jihadist insurgency is 
to determine an effective strategy that protects against its strengths and exploits 
its weaknesses.  This counterinsurgency effort must be composed of more than a 
one-dimensional military effort.  Frank Kitson stated, “There can be no such thing 
as a purely military solution, because insurgency is not purely a military 
activity”182.  Mao described the importance of “military, political, economic, social, 
psychological” elements in a guerrilla war.183  John Baylis views the military 
dimension as only one of six dimensions in the insurgency-counterinsurgency 
conflict184.  He defines five other dimensions: the political, socio-economic, 
cultural-ideological, psychological, and international dimensions.  All of these 
dimensions are battlegrounds in which an anti-AQI strategy needs to be 
coordinated and synchronized into a coherent multi-dimensional effort.  Defeating 
AQI is neither impossible nor easy, but is a complex contest for physical, political, 
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economic social, psychological and international spaces.  The following sections 
build upon the social mobilization analysis of AQI developed in the preceding 
chapter.   
A. COUNTERING AQI’S POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES 
To counter AQI’s political opportunity structures, we can view these 
structures on a continuum based on their level of inertia and susceptibility to 
influence.  At one end of the spectrum are opportunity structures that have 
provided an avenue to mobilize and once “turned on”, cannot be easily “turned 
off”.  For example, historical events, such as a defeat in war or the advance of 
technology create opportunities, which cannot be removed.  Once the event 
occurs, it provides a set of opportunities.  To negate this event would require a 
new event with a new set of equal and opposite opportunity structures.  While 
theoretically possible, in application it is much more likely that a new event would 
simply produce a new set of opportunities that overlay the previous ones.  The 
rise of religious conservatism; the mujahideen victory over the Soviets; Saddam’s 
defeat in Desert Storm and again in OIF, the defeat of the Taliban; the 
transformation of Al Qaeda and the growth of information technologies all appear 
to be opportunity structures which do not lend themselves to direct alteration or 
management.  For example, the Afghanis’ myth of the Soviet defeat by pious 
Arab mujahideen will continue to resonate although the Arabs did a minor 
percentage of the fighting. An immediate US military withdrawal from Iraq will not 
restore the Hussein-era stability, but instead overlay an additional set of political 
opportunity structures.   
A second category of opportunity structures are those that are open to 
influence, but are part of a long-term process with significant inertia. Making a 
substantial change in these structures requires a committed effort over a 
protracted period.  The Middle East’s trends in population growth, rapid 
urbanization, economic polarization, the fall in overall standard of living, 
accelerating urbanization and degradation of infrastructure and religious 
conservatism are all long-term, limited access issues which will probably require 
effort over a time frame measured in generations, not years.  Although the 
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psychological effects of a US effort may indirectly help demobilize AQI, the time 
required to make substantial changes to these opportunity structures will 
probably not demobilize the current Iraq insurgency directly.   
The issues of repressive regimes and lack of political representation are 
less fixed while the US has diplomatic initiatives with friendly regional 
governments to encourage this type of reform.  Unfortunately, the normal 
reaction for a regional Mukhabarat police state faced with rising instability is not 
to enact sweeping political reforms.  Real democratic transformation is risky for 
the governments in power and uncertain in its outcome.   
To demobilize AQI, a parallel effort must also address the ongoing Sunni 
nationalist insurgency and moderate Iraq’s ethnic and sectarian political tensions.  
The instability created by nationalist-inspired violence creates a chaotic 
environment AQI can exploit for freedom of action within Iraq.  By conducting a 
parallel effort to demobilize the Iraqi Sunni insurgency and create an inclusive 
political system, AQI will progressively lose its ability to exploit this environment.  
This counter-Sunni-insurgency is the thrust of the Bush Administration’s National 
Strategy for Victory in Iraq.185   
1. Countering AQI Political Opportunity Structures Using a 
Military “Clear, Hold and Develop” Strategy 
AQI’s greatest political opportunity space is the post-OIF lack of security.  
To close this opportunity space, the Sunni insurgency is the primary actor.  The 
Sunnis are estimated to be 10-20 times larger than AQI, and presents a long-
term demographic challenge.  In contrast to the insurgent’s “not lose” strategy, 
the government must actively defeat or demobilize the insurgency to remain a 
viable legitimate representative of the people.  This requires the government to 
command a viable military, target a vulnerable insurgent center of gravity, and 
employ that military using an appropriate military strategy.   
The insurgent’s hit-&-run tactics of employing light forces, rapid 
movement, post attack dispersal, and the ability to melt into advantageous terrain 
makes counterinsurgency a difficult military problem.  “To win the hearts and 
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minds of the people, the rule of thumb is that government needs a ten-to-one 
ratio of military forces to subdue guerrillas.”186  Given estimates of total 
insurgents between 15,000 to 20,000, this would require a force of up to 
200,000.187  As of November 2005, there are 174,000 US and coalition troops 
serving in Iraq.188  However, dependence on foreign soldiers to fight the 
insurgency creates cultural-ideological issues that reinforce AQI’s frames of 
resisting a foreign occupation. 
While foreign support and military forces are necessary to engage the 
insurgents, the Iraqi government needs security forces of its own to engage the 
insurgents without being seen as a colony of the US  As of November 2005, the 
Iraqi Security Forces numbered approximately 211,000 soldiers and police.189  
However, the mere presence of Iraqi security forces does not necessarily equate 
to security.  For example, Cuba’s president Batista fielded an army that should 
have overwhelmed Castro’s small band of revolutionaries.  However, despite 
being a formidable force on paper, the Cuban army remained poorly trained and 
poorly motivated led by a politicized officer corps and estranged from the Cuban 
population due to the military’s poor human rights record.  Indeed, Castro felt 
such distain for the Cuban army that captured troops were simply released.  
When pressed by Castro’s offensive in August of 1958, the army folded and in 
January 1959, Batista fled to the Dominican Republic.190   
In contrast, in an example of a successful indigenous counterinsurgency 
campaign, the Thai army “blanketed target areas with troops, uprooted guerrilla 
infrastructure, built local militia groups, sent out special units to harass guerrillas, 
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and improved physical conditions in the villages.”191  Instead of enemy killed or 
captured or temporarily terrain seized, their measure for success was “the 
number of surrendered enemy personnel.”192 
To create an effective security force, the coalition is recruiting and training 
a new Iraqi army and police force.  Within the overall Multi-National Forces-Iraq 
(MNF-I), the training mission falls under Multinational Security Transition 
Command (MNSTC) under the command of Lt Gen Martin Dempsey.  The 
training is functionally divided between the Civilian Police Assistance Training 
Team (CPATT), which trains Iraqi police, border guards and non-military security, 
and the Coalition Military Assistance Training Team (CMATT), which trains the 
Iraqi military forces.193  As of 1 June 2005, twenty-six countries are participating 
in this training effort.   
In addition to the 28,000  troops provided by 28 countries,194 the NATO 
member states approved establishing a NATO training program in the fall of 
2004, and in December, the NATO Training Mission-Iraq (NTM-I) was 
established to training Iraqi staff officers and support staff. As of November 2005, 
NTM-I is staffed by 165 personnel, but is expected to grow to 300 personnel in 
the near-term.  NTM-I is providing training and technical assistance to the Iraqi 
security forces to include trainers, financial resources, and donations of 
significant quantities of equipment.  To aid in developing a professional officer 
corps, NTM-I is aiding in developing an Iraqi Staff College to “help mold the next 
generation of officers.”195   
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Although the insurgents have attacked recruiting centers and training 
locations, ambushed and killed trainees in route home for post-training leave, 
bombed gatherings of police in Iraqi cities and assaulted army and police 
facilities, the number of volunteers remains strong and the level of operational 
army battalions and police is constantly rising196.  These forces are operating in 
conjunction with US units closing no-go zones, progressively eliminating urban 
safe-havens197, and restricting the insurgent’s ability to organize, mobilize, and 
operate in the open.   
The most effective government military strategies concentrate on 
depriving the insurgent’s of their vital center of gravity but, unlike a conventional 
war, in a counterinsurgency, the insurgent’s military center of gravity is not their 
scattered field forces.  Instead, “the key to defeating a national insurgency is to 
separate it from its source of its strength: the population.”198  Specifically, the 
government must center its military efforts on separating the insurgents from their 
source of support and providing the Iraqi population security from AQI’s and 
Sunni insurgent attacks.  Operationally, the effect the government desires is to 
defeat the insurgency by isolating the insurgents not necessarily by killing all the 
terrorists.199   
Large, conventionally organized militaries often prefer dramatic, large-
scale sweeps designed to engage and defeat the insurgent’s field forces.  “This 
strategy assumes the insurgents operate like a conventional military force, 
employ conventional military strategies, and pursue conventional military goals.  
Sweeps are appropriate against large, conventional forces, but in an insurgency, 
are often counter-productive.  The insurgents melt away or hide within the 
population and do not allow themselves to be isolated and engaged.  After the 
government secures an area, its forces often redeploy to a new area.  This 
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leaves the original area open for the insurgents to return in an unending game of 
hide-&-seek.  While these operations will capture and kill insurgents, they will 
also often cause civilian casualties and destroy civilian property that creates anti-
government sentiment and indifference to insurgent operations, if not outright 
support.  The temporary presence of government forces does not provide lasting 
security and the net effect of these operations can strengthen the insurgents.  
During the Vietnam War, US strategy focused on killing insurgents at the 
expense of winning hearts and minds.  This “search and destroy” strategy 
failed.200  Through the summer of 2005, the US military in Iraq also has 
concentrated its effort on “hunting down and killing insurgents…to erode the 
enemy’s strength by killing fighters more quickly than replacements can be 
recruited.”201   
Historically, an effective counterinsurgency effort focuses on providing 
security for the population – not necessarily killing insurgents.  There are two 
traditional methods for securing the population - resettlement and local self-
defense.  Resettlement, also known as “reconcentration” in some historical 
instances, involves moving large blocks of the population from their homes and 
into defended locations where the insurgents are unable to gain access to food 
and support from the civilians.202  This method was used effectively in the South 
African Boer War, in the Philippines at the turn of the century, and by the British 
in Malaya203.  However, forced resettlement is also very controversial and may 
create large-scale popular disaffection with the government, as was the case in 
the problematic US “strategic hamlet” program in Vietnam.204   
The local self-defense method employs local militia and rural self-defense 
forces to provide security to home provinces and to protect local leaders.  These 
forces are intimately familiar with the local inhabitants, their culture, and the local 
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terrain.  In addition, they are very conservative in their use of firepower.205  This 
method has been effective in Malaya and the Philippines and in Vietnam where 
US Marine Combined Action Platoons (CAPs) and local Popular Forces (PF) 
worked in conjunction to provide local area defense, protect government 
infrastructure, train additional militia, and collect intelligence.  While not 
spectacular, these forces were highly effective.  During 1967, “the number of 
villages under Communist control increased everywhere except where CAP/FP 
forces were operating.”206  However, these local forces were not able to provide 
for all local-level security needs.  In the event of a concentrated insurgent attack, 
a reaction-force of regular army troops was needed to reinforce local forces.   
This local defense method is at the heart of French counterinsurgency 
strategist Joseph-Simon Gallieni’s, “tache d’huile’ or “oil-stain” clear-and-hold 
strategy for reclaiming insurgent-held territory.207  In its original form, the oil-stain 
“involves the establishment of strong points in a region, from which forces would 
spread out to control the country-side”, systematically comb each square on a 
map grid, working from the outside-in, “until the rebel forces within are brought to 
close quarters and exterminated.”208  In its more modern form, forces deploy 
from their operating base to patrol the local area until they are as familiar with the 
area as the insurgents.209  The oil-stain strategy focuses on “establishing security 
for the population specifically for the sake of winning the hearts and minds.”210  
This indirect approach cuts at the roots of the insurgent strength.211  The military 
provides security enabling local civic-improvement, free medical assistance, and 
education projects benefiting the local population.   
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The US Army used this method successfully in 1900 in the Philippines.  
The army established small, largely autonomous garrisons that “lived and worked 
in communities.”  Left to exercise their own initiative and adapt to local 
conditions, these squad to company-sized garrisons “tracked and eliminated 
insurgents, built rapport with the populace, gathered intelligence, and 
implemented civil works.”  Garrison commanders operated as the local political 
authority, “approving mayors and town councils.”212  Under their grass-roots 
security umbrella, the central government extended the reach of “rule of law”.  
The process was slow and methodical, but it gained the trust of the population 
and separated the insurgents from their center of gravity.  As the oil-stain gains 
ground, it steadily confines the insurgents into progressively shrinking areas.  It 
forces them to confront the government under gradually less advantageous 
conditions and on ground not of their own choosing.213  Copying the model used 
in Fallujah, US & Iraqi forces have begun a systematic process of clearing towns 
and leaving security forces behind.  In November 2005, operation Steel Curtain, 
a joint US Marine- Iraqi effort captured and cleared Husayba, Karabila and 
Obeidi and immediately set up temporary camps to begin stability operations.214   
Another aspect of a successful counterinsurgency strategy is strict 
limitation on force.  The practical legacy of Great Britain’s colonial past is the 
British Army’s “imperial policing” outlook that employs a minimum force 
necessary policy.215  This policy, which eschews high technology and heavy, 
indiscriminant weapons in favor of foot patrols employing small arms, is widely 
seen as both morally right and operationally effective.216  In practice, this core 
principle of restraint has proven effective in countering insurgencies and gaining 
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“trust and confidence”.217  Rather than operations focused in killing insurgents, 
“commanders seek ‘soft’ methods of arrest, physical isolation, or subversion”.218  
The 1940 USMC Small Wars Manual states, “the goal is to gain decisive results 
with the least application of force and the consequent minimum loss of life”.219  In 
the 2005 version, it stresses the need to impress upon both the insurgent and the 
local population the need to perceive that our forces are, in the words of the 1st 
Marine Division Commander’s guidance during Operation Iraqi Freedom, “no 
better friend and no worse enemy.”220 
Most counterinsurgency authors agree on the central importance 
intelligence plays in defeating an insurgency.  Armed with reliable intelligence, 
the more numerous and better-armed government forces can find, fix, and 
successfully engage the less numerous and less well-equipped insurgents.  The 
most valuable type of intelligence for counterinsurgency operations is local-level 
information describing what is happening in the immediate area.  This type of 
information is normally gained from interacting with local populace and is referred 
to as human intelligence (HUMINT).   
US counterinsurgency expert Bruce Hoffman stated, “it is a truism of 
counterinsurgency that the population will give its allegiance to the side that will 
best protect it.”221.  Where the government establishes enduring stability and 
security, it creates an environment that allows the population to conduct their 
lives peacefully.  In a secure environment, the population can provide the 
government HUMINT without fear of insurgent reprisals.  Direct, person-to-
person contact with the population is also important.  In Ireland, the British Army 
initially patrolled in vehicles, but was gaining little actionable intelligence.  Once 
foot patrols were substituted for motorized patrols, “the initially poor operational 
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intelligence began to improve.”222  Armed with this enhanced intelligence 
information, the government is able to provide enhanced security and creates 
opportunities for a creeping series of successive military successes.  A similar 
lesson is being learned in Iraq.  According to a Marine Captain in charge of 
operations in the Obeidi area, “just driving by, everybody waves, but that doesn’t 
do anything – they have to get out and interact with the people.  It’s the only way 
this thing is going to get won.”223 
Cordon & search operations are not productive in gaining useful 
intelligence because when government forces move through an area, they leave 
no lasting presence.  In fact, it is unlikely that, even if insurgents are in their 
village, local civilians will provide the government forces with information.  This is 
because there are higher costs for the population if they help government forces 
than if they remain neutral.  If they help the army, when the government forces 
eventually leave, the insurgents will reoccupy the town.  When the insurgents 
return, they are ruthless in their dealings with any opposition.  Conversely, if the 
civilians stay quiet, the insurgents will leave them alone and government forces 
will not hurt them.  For the government to win, “it needs the positive support of 
the population, whereas, “the insurgents need only neutrality.”224  The clear and 
hold, oil-stain strategy provides better HUMINT than cordon and search in that, 
once friendly forces secure an area, military forces remain visibly in physical 
control for a prolonged period.   
At the start of a clear and hold operation, the government should not 
expect an immediate outpouring of intelligence.  It takes time to build trust and 
assure civilian population that the government forces will not leave them to the 
insurgents – especially if there is a history of the government clearing a town, 
leaving, and the insurgents moving back in to take reprisals.  In addition, gaining 
HUMINT will often require linking economic and social benefits to civilian 
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cooperation.  If the government conducts a clearing operation, remains in the 
area, and provides economic and social goods without requiring reciprocal 
intelligence or displays of loyalty, they contribute to the civilians becoming “free-
riders” of government largesse.  Without requiring some reciprocal effect, 
providing benefits out of hand fails to establish a “link between behavior and 
reward.”225   
Instead, the government should drive out the insurgents and leave forces 
in the area to patrol, provide security, and become thoroughly familiar with the 
people and the terrain.  The government forces should impress upon the local 
leaders the importance of popular cooperation to receive new schools, clinics, 
veterinarians, public utilities, and reconstruction projects.  Where this cooperation 
is given, the government should freely provide social benefits in kind.  Where 
ambushes and IED attacks continue, these social benefits should be withheld.  
Not only will this process directly link social goods with the desired effects, it will 
have the effect of pushing down the cost of reconstruction projects in secured 
areas that, in turn, require less security.  Finally, when construction projects are 
awarded, the Iraqi government, not a local sheik or strongman, should provide 
the project to reinforce the legitimacy of the new government.226   
Because the resulting intelligence-enabled military operations are both 
more effective and more focused than large-unit sweeps, this process allows the 
military to reduce troop numbers and limit their use of firepower while gaining 
results.  By slowly enlarging the secured area, the insurgent’s freedom of 
movement and ability to conduct their operations will become increasingly 
limited.   
To facilitate a move to peaceful government, amnesty programs 
encourage insurgents to discontinue fighting without surrender or having to fight 
to the end.  During the US war in Vietnam, “approximately 194,000 Viet Cong 
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and NVA soldiers accepted amnesty”227which was a significant drain on 
insurgent manpower.   
2. Countering AQI Political Opportunities by Providing a Political 
Outlet for Grievance  
As with the military dimension, the greatest political opportunity open to 
AQI is the lack of effective security in Iraq.  By engaging the Sunni insurgency in 
the political dimension, these insurgents can be co-opted into the political 
process and demobilized which will, in turn, remove support for AQI.  This 
strategic vision is mirrored in the Bush Administration’s National Strategy for 
Victory in Iraq that describes political, military and economic measures to defeat 
and demobilize the associated Sunni insurgents.228   
War can not be separated from politics.  In politics, the goal for competing 
parties is to gain popular support.  In 1964, Bernard Fall wrote, “revolutionary 
warfare equals guerrilla warfare plus political action” making it the “application of 
guerrilla methods to the furtherance of an ideology or political system.”229  Gen 
Sir John Templar, Commander of the successful British counterinsurgency effort 
in Malaya stated, “the shooting part is only 25% of the trouble, the other 75% lies 
in getting the people of the country behind us”230.  From the insurgent’s point of 
view, revolutionary leader, Che Guevara wrote in Guerrilla Warfare, “the guerrilla 
fighter needs the full support of the people” and this support is ”an indispensable 
condition”.231  Guevara also wrote, “where a government has come to power 
through some form of popular vote, fraudulent or not, and maintains at least an 
appearance of constitutional legality, the guerrilla outbreak cannot be promoted, 
since the possibilities of peaceful struggle have not yet been exhausted.”232   
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In Iraq, Al Qaeda ideologue Ayman al-Zawahiri highlighted the importance 
of the political dimension in a recently disclosed letter to AQI leader al-Zarqawi 
where he wrote: “it’s imperative that, in addition to force, there be an 
appeasement of Muslims and a sharing with them in government and in the 
Shura council.”  Indeed, al-Zawahiri places politics equal to the military 
dimension, continuing, “I urge you to direct the political action equally with the 
military action”.233  US commanders in Iraq have also come to the same 
conclusion: that there is no purely military solution to the insurgency and the only 
way to end the insurgency is through political compromise.234   
The political plan for Iraq is to replace Saddam Hussein’s Ba’athist regime 
with a stable, moderate, democratic, political structure that will “catalyze the 
promotion of democracy throughout the Middle East.”235   While extraordinarily 
ambitious, a nascent Iraqi democracy does pose a serious threat to the 
insurgents.  The aphorism, “the ballot box is the coffin of an insurgency” may 
prove correct if elections provide a peaceful avenue to change and a non-violent 
method for the population to redress grievances.236 
Building a viable democracy in Iraq is not easy; nor is the outcome 
assured.  It is hardly the “ideal soil for growing democracy, but it is not as infertile 
as other places where democracy has taken root.”237  However, Iraq has several 
positive attributes which may assist it in the transition.  It has comparable “per 
capita income, literacy, and urbanization to several nations which are making the 
transition to democracy” and of all the Arab states, it is “the best educated, most 
secular, and most progressive.”238   
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AQI’s goal of implanting a puritanical Islamic state in the Middle East by 
force has been tried before and does not have strong antecedents, nor do 
modern states run by Islamic theocracy present a widely appealing vision of the 
future.  The Shi’a revolution in Iran in 1979 was the first Islamic major victory in 
modern times.  However, Khomeini’s political vision and utopian dreams have 
failed to generate a state capable of providing real gains for its constituents or 
the ability to export its ideology.  Most modern Iranians never lived under the 
Shah, but do live with “high unemployment, moral repression, and a cataleptic 
social order that was completely dominated by the religious hierarchy” who 
opposed any reform that would reduce their power.” 239   
Likewise, modern Sunni Islamic movements have a generally poor record 
of political performance.  The Al Qaeda of the 1980s and early 1990s was an 
internationally supported Salafi-Jihadist movement assisting a nationalist war to 
eject the Soviet Army from Afghanistan.  Among Sunnis, Afghanistan was seen 
as the movement’s greatest triumph “before it turned into its supreme 
catastrophe – where the Islamist victory broke down into internal struggles for 
political power, perdition of the population, and the ruination of the country.”240   
With the Soviets expelled from Afghanistan, the Jihadi movement 
dispersed and many of Al Qaeda’s “Afghani” mujahideen returned to their home 
states to ignite the fire of political Islam against their own regimes.  However, the 
challenges these Afghanis made to strong Mukhabarat states provides examples 
of the inability of Islamic insurgencies to overcome determined and repressive 
governments.  These states, fighting for control of their homeland, proved far 
more durable than the Soviet’s foreign occupation of Afghanistan.  Ultimately, the 
Jihadists have failed in every attempt to erect an Islamic state in the region.   
In 1992, Bosnia-Herzegovina declared independence from Yugoslavia, an 
act that sparked a bloody civil war.  Rallying to the call, the “Afghanis” flooded 
into Bosnia to assist their Bosnian Muslim brothers, but the relationship never 
                                            
 239 Gilles Kepel, Jihad: The Trail Of Political Islam, (Cambridge Mass, Belknap Press of the 
Harvard Univ Press, 2002), 364-365. 
 240 Kepel, Jihad, 361-362. 
70 
really took hold.  The Bosnians were secularized European Muslims driven more 
by nationalism than religious zeal.241  As would be the core in other Salafi 
movements, there was no Islamic intelligentsia, devout middle class, or 
impoverished urban poor to mobilize under Jihad’s banner.  Instead, what 
emerged was a “democratic attitude towards religion.”242     
The Algerian Civil War provides an interesting example that may illuminate 
the study of AQI.  This war pitted a military government who had deposed the 
secular anti-colonial Front de Liberation National (FLN) against a pair of Islamist 
opposition groups, the Front Islamique du Salut (FIS) and the militant Salafi 
Groupe Islamique Armee (GIA).  Political opposition originated because of 
popular disaffection with FLN’s large and corrupt socialist regime.  In 1988, rising 
social dissatisfaction ignited widespread rioting and was suppressed by the army.  
Among the resulting sweep of reforms, the president brought in a new 
constitution and the promise of free elections.243   
The FIS opposition had run successfully in an initial round of voting and 
had consolidated anti-government support from the devout middle class and 
urban poor..  Of the 225 seats determined, FIS won 189, 244  and was poised to 
continue this trend in the January 1992 run-off elections for the remaining 205 
seats.  With these victories, FIS would have full control of the government and 
the seats necessary to change the constitution.  Fearing the formation of a 
fundamentalist Islamic government, the military staged a coup d’etat, deposed 
the president, and cancelled elections.  During this time, the Soviets had 
withdrawn from Afghanistan and Algerian Afghani were returning home.  Their 
influence helped radicalize the opposition and the following five years saw a 
brutally savage civil war leaving over 100,000 dead.245  
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In May 1994, FIS and GIA combined to wage a ruthless campaign of 
targeted killings and calculated terror supporting a precise political agenda, but 
the alliance between the two organizations was never a comfortable one.  While 
FIS wanted international involvement and open dialogs with the government to 
facilitate elections and establish a moderate Islamic regime, GIA’s goal was “to 
purge the land of the ungodly.”246  The high-water mark came in September 
1994, with the death of GIA Amir Gousami.  His replacements unleashed 
terrorism within France that caused a violent French backlash and opened an 
exceptionally brutal phase of the war in Algeria.  In contrast, the FIS was working 
international connections and political solutions to return the army to the barracks 
and install a moderate government.  GIA reacted violently, accusing the FIS of 
being “betrayers of the jihad, selling the blood of its fighters to satisfy their own 
political ambitions”.247  GIA’s decent into indiscriminant violence continued into 
September 1997 when, during Ramadan, massacres of hundreds of civilians 
caused international and Algerian support to collapse.  FIS declared a unilateral 
truce and ceasefire.  The political failure of the Jihad in Algeria occurred because 
the Jihadis “lapsed into self-destructive terrorism” and forfeited all popular 
support.248   
In a repeat of a similar process, but on a smaller scale, Egypt faced similar 
challenges from the Muslim Brotherhood and the Gamma Islamiya (GI).  As with 
Algeria’s GIA, the Egyptian GI drifted into excessive terrorism systematically 
targeting Egyptian intellectuals and foreign tourists.  This strategy progressively 
undercut their popular and international support.  GI’s massacre of 60 tourists at 
Luxor in November 1997 marked the height of the violence, after which popular 
support collapsed.249  French political scientist, Gilles Kepel, views violence as a 
vehicle of political influence that has proven to be “a death trap for Islamist 
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movements, precluding any capacity to hold and mobilize the range of 
constituencies they need to seize political power.”250  
Ultimately, all Jihadist efforts to wrest power from the state have been 
successfully countered by political cooptation or direct confrontation.  In all 
cases, Islamist opposition movements face a moral-political crisis.  While their 
traditional political program focuses on government by shaira law and views 
sovereignty of the people as a form of idolatry and pre-Islamic jahilyya, this 
approach is widely seen as hopelessly mired in the past and the “rejection of the 
Muslim civilization, which had room for music, philosophy, poetry 
and…secularity.”251  The more moderate Islamists predict a bleak future under 
rule by the mullahs or a Taliban-style government.  Instead, they advocate a 
program of human rights and democracy, but this approach distances them from 
their roots and postures them to make common cause with secular political 
parties.252  
There is precedence for Muslim insurgent groups transforming themselves 
into democratic parties.  In Lebanon, the Shi’a Islamist organization, Hizballah 
“Party of God” formed in response to the 1980 Israeli invasion.  It conducted a 
brutally effective guerrilla campaign primarily targeting the Israeli Army and 
Israeli’s allies, the Southern Lebanese Army (SLA).  Like AQI, Hizballah’s attacks 
combined guerrilla raids and ambushes with suicide bombings and suicide truck 
bombings.  The Israelis, feeling the pressure of mounting casualties and falling 
domestic support for the occupation, withdrew, first into a southern Lebanon 
security zone.  Then in May 2000, the Israelis withdrew from Lebanese territory 
entirely.  After the Israeli withdrawal, Hizballah remained an armed militia, but 
faced a quandary – disband or transform.   
Unlike AQI, Hizballah was not a single-dimensional military organization.  
In addition to their military operations, Hizballah also provided social 
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organizations benefiting the areas they controlled.  These included building and 
running mosques, schools, community centers, and clinics.  These social 
organizations helped create a peaceful constituency that opened an opportunity 
for Hizballah to transform a portion of its organization into a peaceful democratic 
political party.  For these politically active Islamists, social services provide an 
important block of voters.  To protect its power base, this otherwise radical party 
moderated its militant stance to protect these programs and the resulting blocks 
of voters from intrusion by the government.  This political party has successfully 
competed in local and national-elections.253  
Today Hizballah is a mass mobilization political party that employs a 
pragmatic political calculus.  It has its own religious-based oppositional political 
party complete with campaign committees and electoral machine necessary to 
make a political effort successful.  This fact runs in direct contravention of those 
who believe Islamists are incapable of democratic aspirations.254  It has 
competed in all Lebanese elections since 1992.  It is a relatively strong political 
movement, faring especially well in municipal elections and translating their 
collaboration with the secular Shi’a Amal party and Christian parties into 12 seats 
in the Lebanese parliament.  Hizballah’s candidates run not based on their 
ideological stance, but instead focus on their “honesty and seriousness in their 
municipal work,” emphasizing their social welfare experience and advantages to 
the community.255   
Caution must be exercised in considering Lebanon as an example.  If 
anything, the tribal Sunni resistance, with their longstanding ties into the 
community and links of patronage, are more analogous to Hizballah than is AQI.  
As a single-dimensional insurgent group with little political constituency and no 
social network to build upon, peaceful political transformation is unlikely for AQI,  
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However, by fostering a stable democratic political system, it is believed 
this non-violent competition will replace violence as a means for the Sunnis to 
achieving influence.  In so doing, it will develop a sense of overarching Iraqi 
nationalism rather than sectarian or ethnic divisions.   
3. Countering AQI Political Opportunities by Providing a 
Economic Incentives and Opportunity 
As with the political and military dimensions, there is an economic 
dimension to the growth of the Sunni insurgency in Iraq – “a direct one-to-one 
relationship between deteriorating socio-economic factors and extremist 
recruitment is hard to make, there can be no doubt strong links exist.”256   
Normally a prosperous state with full employment and a growing economy has 
little to fear from an internal insurgency.  Where these factors have broken down, 
conflict becomes more likely.  In Iraq, the growth of the Sunni insurgency has 
likely been fueled by prevailing economic conditions.  Reintegrating insurgents 
into the civil economy can help demobilize and defeat the insurgency, removing 
their support for AQI.  This strategic vision is again mirrored in the Bush 
Administration’s National Strategy for Victory in Iraq that describes political, 
military and economic measures to defeat and demobilize the associated Sunni 
insurgents.257   
Nearly $27 billion has been allocated by the US in the past 3 years for 
Iraqi reconstruction.  In addition, donor countries pledged an additional “$3.6 
billion in grant aid and up to $13.3 billion in possible loans.”  The majority of this 
funding is allocated for large projects conducting infrastructure reconstruction to 
rehabilitate the abused and war-torn oil, sanitation and electrical power 
systems.258   
The demobilization of the Iraqi Army has been a contentious issue.  Some 
analysts observe the Iraqi Army had essentially self-demobilized at the end of the 
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war.  Others see the Coalition Provisional Authority’s (CPA’s) decision as crucial 
in providing a huge pool of unemployed young men into the unemployed labor 
market.  The end of financial support for demobilized troops coincided with a 
significant worsening in the insurgency.  Further, CPA’s blanket de-Ba’athification 
policies which placed restrictions on who could be employed, made these young 
men not only unemployed, but unemployable.  There are numerous sited 
examples of “casual insurgents”: out-of-work Iraqis drawn to the insurgency 
because it pays.  According to counterinsurgency writer Steven Metz, setting and 
exploding an IED can pay $100 to $200, killing an American can pay upwards of 
$1,000.259  Reintegrating former Iraqi Army soldiers into the new Iraqi Security 
forces can defuse these economic pressures.   
At the individual level, there are opportunities to conduct an economic 
counterinsurgency campaign.  Specifically a “job-orientated community 
development strategy” which focuses on supporting entrepreneurs and 
generating domestic employment could strengthen local development and 
reinforce the democratic political process.  This would be a decentralized 
program of direct micro-credit grants that puts people ahead of projects to 
materially improve the local-level economy and improve buying power.260  This 
process could be funded by creating an “oil fund” and Iraqi Development Bank to 
distribute revenues .261  These initiatives hinge on ensuring rule of law and 
observance of property rights.  They would leverage existing community 
development programs (CERP, LGP and OTI) already in place in Iraq.   
4. Countering Insurgent’s Use of Information Technology 
The US has not been effective in countering insurgent messages or 
gaining access to the Iraqi population’s “Circle of Influence”.262  The US 
Government’s efforts to hinder transmitting these messages have uncovered a 
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basic tension between the US Constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech 
and the prohibitions on hate messages.  The Patriot Act pushes the balance in 
toward government controls, but the issue remains contentious.  Nonetheless, 
the US government’s ability to interdict terrorist communication is limited by the 
shifting technical techniques being employed as well as conventional definitions 
of national sovereignty.  The US ability to aggressively shut down internet 
servers ends at the US border.   Any attempt to pursue radical web services 
beyond this is limited by the good-graces and cooperation of allied nations.   
The military and political strategies constitute the most commonly applied 
and well-developed approaches to counterinsurgency.  However, because the 
AQI are militarily resilient and politically rejectionist, these counterinsurgency 
tools will probably not be sufficient to counter the threat.  The next section will 
examine the mobilizing structures employed by AQI to capture the equally 
important, but often overlooked counterinsurgency strategies in the economic, 
cultural-ideological, psychological and international dimensions of the conflict.   
 
B. COUNTERING AQI’S MOBILIZATION STRUCTURES 
Mobilization structures are operational-level assets which, if undercut, 
would weaken its ability to conduct operations or demobilize the group. 
1. Countering Militant Reading of the Islamic Faith 
The Islamic Salafi doctrine is not synonymous with Jihad.  Jihadis 
comprise a portion of Salafis and among these Jihadis (those that ascribe to 
Zarqawi’s blanket takfiri ideology) are an even smaller group.  Within the Muslim 
world, there is currently a significant rift in opinion regarding Al Qaeda’s attacks 
on the west and AQI’s indiscriminate use of violence.   
Al Qaeda’s actions have hurt their ability to win in the “War for the Muslim 
Minds”263  In the contrasting ideas of righteous jihad and internal cultural 
disintegration, fitna, Al Qaeda 9/11 attacks on civilians lost the support of not only 
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the “majority of Islamists and Salifists, let alone most of the world’s Muslims.”  
Instead of being seen as the “umma’s blessed vanguard”, “most Muslims saw the 
massacre of innocents as opening the door to disorder and devastation within the 
house of Islam.” 264  The popular uprising of devout Muslims that was to reverse 
the Jihadi’s decade-long decline never happened.  
The conduct of the AQI’s insurgency in Iraq also holds the prospect of 
cultural-ideological destruction.  The bloody and indiscriminant methods used by 
Zarqawi’s group have split Muslim opinion.  The killing of Muslims by other 
Muslims is repugnant to not only moderate Muslims, but also political and purist 
Salafis.  Breaking with bin Laden’s inclusive, pan-Islamic doctrine, Zarqawi has 
declared war on the Shi’a.  He has followed up this declaration by conducting 
mass-casualty suicide bombing attacks directed at Shi’a religious events and on 
predominantly Shi’a sectors of the country.265  This practice has sparked a 
debate within the Muslim community regarding mass-casualty attacks against 
fellow Muslims and the use of indiscriminant suicide bombing and terrorist tactics 
by AQI.  These attacks on Iraqi Shi’a civilians, attacks on mosques, suicide 
bombings of markets, buses, and crowds is losing support of moderate Muslims 
as well as drawing the attention of the Iraqi government and the wrath of Shi’a 
militias.  In his Jul 2005 letter to Zarqawi, Zawahiri cautioned against these 
internecine attacks: 
many of your Muslim admirers amongst the common folk are 
wondering about your attacks on the Shia. The sharpness of this 
questioning increases when the attacks are on one of their 
mosques, and it increases more when the attacks are on the 
mausoleum of Imam Ali Bin Abi Talib, may God honor him. My 
opinion is that this matter won't be acceptable to the Muslim 
populace however much you have tried to explain it, and aversion 
to this will continue.266 
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In addition, Zarqawi’s ideological mentor, Muhammad al-Maqdisi, enraged 
some jihadists by publicly questioning the permissibility of some of Zarqawi’s 
tactics267 and “publicly opposed Zarqawi’s terrorism against civilians.”268  Al 
Qaeda’s Ayman Zawahiri also advised against Zarqawi’s brutal tactics against 
hostages and the battle taking place in the media: 
Among the things which the feelings of the Muslim populace who 
love and support you will never find palatable are the scenes of 
slaughtering the hostages. You shouldn't be deceived by the praise 
of some of the zealous young men and their description of you as 
the shaykh of the slaughterers, etc. They do not express the 
general view of the admirer and the supporter of the resistance in 
Iraq, and of you in particular by the favor and blessing of God. 
I say to you: that we are in a battle, and that more than half of this 
battle is taking place in the battlefield of the media. And that we are 
in a media battle in a race for the hearts and minds of our Umma. 
And that however far our capabilities reach, they will never be equal 
to one thousandth of the capabilities of the kingdom of Satan that is 
waging war on us. And we can kill the captives by bullet. That 
would achieve that which is sought after without exposing ourselves 
to the questions and answering to doubts. We don't need this.269 
Although the Iraqi Sunni insurgents were initially grateful for the support 
and training they gained from AQI, there is evidence AQI’s presence may be 
causing a rift between themselves and the Sunni population.  When trained AQI 
members arrive in Iraq with money and equipment, locals are becoming hesitant 
to support them for fear of government attacks.   
In addition, AQI has also taken a very hostile tack in their relations with the 
Sunni Iraqi constituency.  Holding true to their puritanical Salafi-Jihadist credo, 
AQI proclaims Sharia or Islamic law in the predominantly Sunni western Iraq 
towns they hold.  Under AQI rule, non-conforming behavior is punished harshly.  
Many Iraqi Sunnis object to the Taliban-like puritanical interpretation of Sharia.  
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One villager was quoted as saying, “Al Qaeda believes that anyone who doesn’t 
follow the Koran literally is a kifir (apostate) and should be killed.”270  This 
approach has alienated many Iraqi Sunni tribalists.   
AQI’s international constituency is largely committed to the Salafi-Jihadist 
cause.  Indeed, social scientists have found geographically distant or diaspora 
populations not only provide resources to the conflict, but are often more militant 
than those actively involved in fighting in the insurgency.271  The US is and 
outsider to this Muslim cultural-ideological debate, and as such, there is little 
direct action the US can take to influence the outcome.  Incremental stabilization 
of Iraq can undercut the Jihadists and stem the creation of a new generation of Al 
Qaeda.  It will also help regain lost ideological credibility in the region.  
Additionally, western policymakers can be aware of militant readings of the 
Muslim faith and take care not to needlessly reinforce their supporting frames.   
2. Countering AQI’s Resource Mobilization 
Historically, the government has been able to separate the insurgents 
from their base of popular support by addressing the material grievances of the 
population.272   Unfortunately, since AQI’s sources of support are primarily 
external to Iraq, an economically based counterinsurgency effort must focus on 
breaking these external links to choke off the insurgent’s source of funding 
support and create a “closed system” which includes only the government, the 
insurgents, and the people.   
US insurgency writer Bard O’Neil divided external support into four types: 
Moral, Political, Material and Sanctuary.  Statements of moral support help 
maintain a popular image of the insurgents, but by themselves provide little real 
value.  To be operationally effective, these statements must be coupled with 
political support to create substantial effects.  Political support includes not only 
statements of specific backing for the insurgent’s goals but also the sponsor 
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country taking concrete international legal or diplomatic steps to assist.  Material 
support covers a broad spectrum that includes weapons and war-making 
logistics; food, medical supplies, shelter and practical insurgent training.  
Insurgents use the sanctuary provided by neighboring sovereign countries in two 
ways.  Where the insurgents have been denied permanent bases within the 
country, sanctuaries provide fallback positions and logistics centers273 
Concepts for countering AQI’s moral support will be covered later in this 
thesis in the section regarding a comprehensive counter-narrative strategy. 
For the government, isolating insurgents via diplomatic means is the 
weakest form of action, but is also “the least likely to widen the conflict.”274  
Diplomacy is dependent on neighboring states voluntarily aligning themselves 
with the US and Iraqi governments and against the insurgents.275  Therefore, 
governments normally use diplomatic efforts as part of an initial response as well 
as a continuing theme used in conjunction with other means.   
In countering any formal international political support for AQI, the US is in 
a powerful position.  Not only is it a permanent member of the UN Security 
Council, but on 08 November 2005, the UN Security Council voted unanimously 
to extend the mandate of the US-led multinational force in Iraq for an additional 
year.276  In contrast to AQI’s political goals, on 12 Nov 2005, UN Secretary 
General Kofi Anan visited Iraq and called for a political transformation that is 
“inclusive, transparent, and takes into account concerns of all groups”.  In 
response, Iraqi President al-Jaafari called for UN help in the upcoming elections 
in December 2005, promoting democracy and “improving the performance of the 
security forces”.277   
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For its part, AQI enjoys essentially no formal international support.  Not 
since the fall of the Taliban has a state made public pronouncements supporting 
Al Qaeda objectives and are willing to take international legal action on their 
behalf.  No states formally endorse AQI goals or tactics. 
a. Countering AQI’s International Material Support 
While the Iraqi government is able to sustain its international 
support, it becomes especially important for the insurgents to obtain material 
support from outside sources.  For the Sunni insurgent, who enjoy popular 
support from within Iraq, international support is necessary.  Where popular 
support is weak or lacking, as in the case of AQI, international support is 
critical.278  
As an initial step in cutting material support, the US State 
Department has placed al Qaeda in Iraq on the Foreign Terrorist List, which has 
immediate legal and economic ramifications.  This measure freezes all 
identifiable assets in the US, makes it illegal for a US person to knowingly 
provide "material support or resources" to a designated FTO, and bars members 
of the FTO from the US279.  It also encourages our international allies to take 
similar measures, which is essential given AQI’s international character.  As of 
Jan 2003, an international effort has resulted in freezing “$124 million in assets 
located in some 600 bank accounts around the world, including $36 million in the 
United States alone.”280  Under the criminal aspects of this designation, since 
September 11, US and international governments have arrested and imprisoned 
numerous Al Qaeda-associated financiers.  When a terrorist group is not linked 
to any specific state sponsor, as AQI is not, there are limits to what US legal 
action and US policy can do.281    
US laws do not extend beyond US borders.  To defeat the Salafi-
Jihadist insurgency, the US must shore up its international coalition and sever                                             
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the insurgent’s international support.  The US can engage in constructive 
diplomacy with allies and moderate Islamic states to isolate terrorists and cut off 
resources.282  To isolate the insurgency from its outside support, an international 
counterinsurgency response to these challenges is to undercut the insurgent’s 
international legitimacy while strangling their sources of material support.  
Unfortunately, Al Qaeda’s use of front companies, international banks and 
hawala, renders many traditional methods of economic sanctions uncertain.283   
Many of the other forms of AQI financing are essentially criminal 
activities, fall under the purview of law enforcement, and are best handled by 
state law enforcement.  Wherever possible, the US should work to gain 
international cooperation to legally interdict fund-raising and Jihadi recruiting 
activities in the origin country.284   
b. Countering AQI’s International Flow of Recruits  
Historically, insurgents have taken advantage of remote locations, 
far from the center of government, to stockpile weapons, train recruits, and from 
which to stage operations.  In his writings detailing the organization of a 
successful insurgency, T. E. Lawrence, “stressed the importance of secure base 
areas and the exploitation of space by small and highly mobile forces.”285  
Secure bases proved the insurgents a place to “plan, train, rest, recuperate, 
marshal equipment, and organize people.”286  These locations are often poorly 
developed or sparsely populated areas in rough, forested or mountainous terrain 
with a primitive transportation network and are characterized by the absence of 
strong state influence.287  Deprived of these bases, the insurgents will be unable 
to present progressively greater challenges to the government.  Areas with 
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underdeveloped road, rail and river transportation systems are more difficult for 
the government to patrol, and so favor the insurgents.   
Currently, Syria is currently viewed in the same light as Cambodia 
was during the Vietnam conflict – a safe haven from US raids, a logistical base, 
and transportation conduit for the insurgent’s international support.  The White 
House claims, “Syria is allowing its territory to be used by those who wish to 
carry out attacks in Iraq”288.  Complicating the mater, Syria has become the 
fastest-growing tourist destination in the Middle East, hosting 3.1 million tourists 
in 2004.289  At a minimum, Syria is allowing the passage of foreign fighters 
through their country and into Iraq “with either tolerance or indifference – if not 
active support”290.  On 11 May 2003, The Bush Administration imposed 
economic sanctions on Syria charging it had “failed to take action to halt the flow 
of foreign fighters into Iraq.”291  In Sep 2005, US ambassador, Zalmay Khalilzad 
accused Bashar Asad’s regime of allowing terrorists to travel to Syria, train in 
camps within Syrian territory, and enter Iraq unhindered292.   
Zarqawi’s war against Americans and Iraqi Shi’a has also mobilized 
portions of Saudi’s Salafi population who provide funds as well as a large 
percentage (~12%) of AQI’s suicide bombers.293  For their part, Saudi Arabia 
insists it is supporting the war on terror and has taken “aggressive actions to 
prevent terrorists from crossing their borders into Iraq.”294  To this end, they have 
arrested radical clerics who incite Saudis to go to Iraq and have spent 1.2 billion 
in the last two years to secure their borders.295   
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In Iraq, physical control of the border is critical to countering the 
flow of insurgents where the military isolates the insurgents by physically 
interdicting their sources of supplies.  In this effort, geography plays a major role.  
The government can more easily secure isolated islands and borders which 
coincide with coastlines, wide rivers, impenetrable jungles, mountains, or 
deserts.  The insurgents in the Philippines, Malaya, and Tibet could all be 
physically isolated from their sources of support and were eventually defeated.  
South Vietnam and Afghanistan were more difficult to isolate.  Where the 
insurgents have access to secure safe havens and supply routes in neighboring 
countries, defeating them is far more difficult.   
The Syria-Iraq border is approximately 350 miles long and passed 
through inhospitable desert populated in the southern and central reaches by 
nomadic Sunni tribes who are sympathetic to the insurgency.  The favored 
crossing through the summer of 2005 passes through Dair Al Zawr province into 
western Iraq.  Other crossing areas are along the northern border, just south of 
the mountainous Kurdish    areas and in the south at the Bab al-Waleed crossing 
station.296   
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Figure 7.   Infiltration Routes From Syria297 
 
Iran also has a long and relatively unguarded border with Iraq.  But 
given Iran is a Shi’a state, and is giving support to the Shi’a political development 
in Iraq and Shi’a militias, it is far less attractive to AQI’s regional Salafi-Jihadist 
recruits.298 
Perhaps the most successful example of using military means to 
secure desert borders is the French counterinsurgency campaign in Algeria in 
the 1950s.299  To limit the international over-land support for the anti-colonial 
insurgency, the French constructed a long series of physical barriers along the 
Algerian borders with both Morocco and Tunisia.  To interdict the more active 
Tunisian frontier, the French built the “Maurice Line” along the entire length of the 
                                            
 297 Data Reference - Cordesman, Iraq and Foreign Volunteers,  7; Map Reference – SYRIA, 
Political Map, 1990 Pery-Castañeda Library Map Collection, Syria Maps, U of Texas, Austin TX. 
 298 Cordesman, Iraq and Foreign Volunteers, Center for Strategic and International Studies 
(CSIS), (18 Nov 2005), 8. 
 299 Paul Staniland, The Best Offense is a Good Fence, The Washington Quarterly (Winter 
2005-6), 31-32. 
86 
border.  This fortified line consisted of an elaborate barrier of electrified fences 
and minefields backed up by military patrols, armor, and helicopters.  By April 
1958, when the line was completed, it successfully isolated the Front de 
Liberation Nationale (FLN) insurgents from their international support.  Although 
the FLN made determined attempts to breach on the line, “the kill-rate for 
infiltrators was reported to be as high as 85%.”300   
In facing a revolt by the jebeli mountain tribes of Dhofar province in 
the early 1970s, Sultan Qaboos of Oman enlisted British SAS support and 
instituted a coordinated economic and social reform plan.  Militarily, the Sultan’s 
conventionally trained army was retrained for counterinsurgency duty.  The 
rebels were using the mountains as a safe haven.  The mountains were isolated 
between the government-controlled coastal plan and the desolate Rub al-Khali.  
The government built roads, extended lines of communications, and set up 
permanent bases in the mountains to project government control.301  
Internationally, the insurgents were receiving support from across the border with 
Yemen.  In response, the Sultan built the Hormbeam and Damavand lines to 
interdict insurgent support.302  These lines of coiled wire and minefields were 
backed by army patrols and airpower.  These measures proved effective in 
isolating the insurgents from their overland support.   
In the more open terrain of northwest Africa, the secessionist Front 
for the Liberation of the Rio del Oro and Saguia el-Hamra (Polisario) guerrillas 
exploited the vast expanses of desert and lack of government airpower to 
conduct attacks into Western Sahara in 1977 and southern Morocco in 1984.303  
In response, the Moroccan government concentrated its security in the “useful 
triangle” which contained most of the population and the state’s primary natural 
resource (phosphates).  In a strategy similar to that used by the Nationalists 
against Mao and by the British against the Boars, the Moroccans build a series of 
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sand, dirt, and rock walls with intermittent military outposts and sensors.  These 
measures blunted the insurgent raids by forcing the raiders to either attack the 
lines or go around them making these forces easier to detect in the open 
terrain.304   
Physically closing the Syria-Iraq border is not as outlandish as it 
might first appear.  After years of distrustful international relations between 
President Hafez al-Asad and Saddam Hussein, there are a significant number of 
border posts, communications roads and small bases along both sides of the 
border.  These bases could be reoccupied and border guards conduct 
aggressive patrolling with the support of airborne ISR aircraft and ground forces.   
 
Figure 8.   Syrian-Iraqi Border Area NW of Tal Afar and Iraqi Border Forts305 
 
The use of airpower to control disputed lands and provide “aerial 
policing,” was favored for its frugal approach during the post-WW-I 
demobilization.  Its chief proponent was Secretary of Sate for War and Air, 
Winston Churchill, who had to reduce the number of ground forces in 
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Mesopotamia from 105,000 troops to 14,000 troops.  Although often referred to 
as a stand-alone operation by the RAF, in practice, the air-control method was a 
coordinated joint operation, involving considerable cooperation between the land 
and air assets.  In its leading role, the RAF bombed targets, but also ferried 
troops, air-dropped supplies, and evacuated the wounded.306  Its chief 
weakness, of course, was that air control alone could not hold territory.  The 
British eventually concluded, “troops on the ground was much more effective 
method of policing the recalcitrant, since aircraft could not occupy disputed 
ground.”307   
The ability to conduct “air control” over western Iraq today has been 
improved by advances in our technical ability to conduct surveillance of the 
border areas, move troops to blocking positions, accurately bomb targets, and 
evacuate the wounded.  This process would be most effective where in 
insurgencies are organized more as guerrilla armies rather than small groups of 
terrorists.308  In Iraq, to secure the border regions would most likely require 
setting up a network of border posts and committing ground forces.   
C. COUNTERING AQI’S FRAMES 
Framing is about persuasion.  Zarqawi’s anti-system frames highlight his 
goals as being at odds with essentially every aspect of US-led political reform, 
social integration, economic reconstruction, and globalization.  In countering AQI 
frames, the US is engaging in the “battle of the story” using a counter-narrative 
strategy.  In countering these AQI frames, the US is engaging in a contest for 
what Baylis would refer to as the cultural-ideological dimension of conflict.  In this 
dimension, the insurgents seek to capture the moral high ground by highlighting 
government corruption, exploitation, torture, black-marketeering, prostitution, 
inequality, and contrast it to their own honesty, purity, selflessness, self-sacrifice, 
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poverty and discipline309.  This dimension is primarily concerned with gaining and 
maintaining organizational and personal legitimacy.   
The counterinsurgency effort turns this argument on its head to show the 
government as a good and positive force which will bring about a bright, 
prosperous, future and the insurgency as backward, brutal, “evil-doers”.  Where 
the insurgents rely on religious appeals, the government can counter by “posing 
alternative ideologies or, short of that, general values.”310  Given Al Qaeda’s 
decentralized organization, and resistance to direct military, political and 
economic influence, “US and allied counter-terrorism efforts might be better 
spent on countering the ideology that is promoted by Al Qaeda… [and] 
delegitimize Al Qaeda tactics”311  The purpose of the cultural-ideological struggle 
is to maintain morale and sense of purpose.  In practice, it is fought using both 
propaganda as well as honest and accountable information.   
1. Countering AQI’s Violent Frames 
Al Qaeda and the Saudi ulama or religious scholars are engaged in a 
heated framing battle, 312 the outcome of which will determine who has the 
“authority to speak on behalf of religious authority.  In this battle, each side is 
employing four basic framing strategies that demonstrate their own credibility 
while attacking the opponent.  These strategies include: “1) vilification - 
demonizing competing popular intellectuals; 2) exaltation - praising in-group 
popular intellectuals; 3) credentialing - emphasizing the expertise of the in-group 
intellectuals; and 4) de-credentialing - raising questions about the expertise of 
rivals.”  In this battle, the religiously educated ulama consider Al Qaeda as 
unlettered and their pronouncements flawed.  Al Qaeda portrays Saudi ulama as 
“sheiks of authority and “palace lackeys” closely linked to corrupt Muslim regimes 
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while exalting their own religious authorities as “honorable, independent and 
scientific” in their interpretation of Islam.313   
Within Al Qaeda, there is a second framing struggle with non-violent 
Islamic fundamentalists over the permissibility of violence. The intentional attacks 
on Shi’a Muslims are a departure from bin Laden’s ideology of minimizing intra-
Islamic differences in the interest of defeating the west.  In an attempt to assert 
its right to sacred authority, the movement portrays scholars who support its jihad 
as logical, religious experts of good repute while characterizing opposing clerical 
popular intellectuals as emotional, corrupt, naïve, and ill-informed about 
politics.314 
From an international law and moderate world opinion standpoint, AQI’s 
terrorist tactic of deliberately targeting civilians is indefensible.  Intentional 
targeting and/or lack of discrimination between combatants and civilians is a 
direct violation of international humanitarian law and a crime against humanity.315  
In addition, the Iraqi Association of Muslim Scholars, an Iraqi Sunni Muslim 
group, condemned the targeting of civilians and indiscriminant attacks.   
As discussed previously, AQI’s mass-casualty attacks have created a 
widening rift with the world community of Muslims.  In a caution that AQI tactics 
are hurting Al Qaeda in the battle of the story, Zawahiri indicated to Zarqawi that 
Muslim support for AQI’s more extreme actions is not unconditional.316  For 
example, in the wake of the 9 November 2005 hotel bombings in Amman Jordan, 
Zarqawi’s group claimed the attack struck “dens of wickedness, infidelity and 
prostitution”.317  In Jordan, however, the popular reaction was immediate with 
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demonstrations in the “Arab Street” chanting “Zarqawi, burn in hell!”318  The 
United Nations and most world and regional governments uniformly condemned 
the act.319  In addition, the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood, Palestinian Authority, 
and Palestinian organization HAMAS also “strongly condemned” the bombings 
as “criminal actions targeting innocent people.”320  Because of its 
Jordanian/Palestinian roots, these events highlight a key weakness for AQI.   
Other Muslim notables are denouncing AQI’s tactics.  The Grand Imam of 
Al Azar, sheikh Mohammed Sayyid Tantawi, called for an end to terrorism in Iraq 
and punishment for Zarqawi for killing civilians and violating Islamic principles.  
He called on the international community to pursue AQI as criminals and, where 
they are convicted of murder, sentenced to death.321  Members of Egyptian 
Islamic Jihad, and Tanzim a-Jihad and the radical Islamic Group (IG) have all 
denounced Zarqawi.  In an IG statement, they accused Zarqawi of trying to 
annihilate Shi’ia, not liberate Iraq.”322  Even his spiritual mentor, Mohammed al-
Maqdisi, has opposed Zarqawi’s targeting of civilians, stating, “violence that does 
not differentiate among women, children, civilians, soldiers and American troops 
is wrong.”323 
While these statements and actions undermine Zarqawi’s status as a 
pious Muslim vanguard, none of these pronouncements indicates any level of 
support for US goals or issues with AQI targeting coalition or Iraqi security forces.   
Even so, for Zarqawi, this is a problem.  Shocking terrorist actions are 
what bring him notoriety, recruits, and funding, but his targeting of civilians is also 
bringing him condemnation from his crucial Palestinian and Islamist Jordanian 
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constituency as well as condemnation on the world stage.  To some degree, he 
is losing the cultural-ideological battle.  Should he change this targeting strategy, 
there would be several immediate results.  AQI could redirect suicide attacks at 
less vulnerable military assets making his organization just one of 40 insurgent 
groups in Iraq.  US, Iraqi, and coalition force-protection measures would be more 
effective in preventing him from translating his suicide bombings into an effective 
counter-force strategy.  Since AQI’s mass-casualty attacks cause a 
disproportionate number of casualties, discontinuing them would produce an 
immediate rise in the perceived sense of security.   
2. Countering AQI’s Frames of US Imperialism 
It is a curious duality that American military presence in Iraq is both 
stabilizing and destabilizing at the same time.  US military presence is stabilizing, 
because US forces provide security, patrol towns, and attack active insurgent 
safe areas.  However, 2005 Pew Global Attitude surveys indicate that, between 
2000 and 2003, the Muslim world’s view of the US declined steadily.  Since 2003, 
there has been a slight rebound, but the numbers remain low.  This fall in 
popularity is not seen as a rejection of Americans in general or a rejection of 
American political economic or cultural norms, but a strong reaction to US 
policies and military presence in the region.  The presence of large numbers of 
US military forces is framed as an army of occupation.  It acts as a lightning rod, 
inviting Al Qaeda Jihadis to travel to the country and join the fight.324  The longer 
US military forces remain in Iraq, the longer AQI’s occupation frame resonates, 
gains recruits and enables Jihadi operations.   
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Figure 9.   Pew Global Attitude Survey: Is The US A Threat to Our Country?325 
 
A long-term large US military presence in Iraq reinforces AQI’s anti-
imperialism frames and fosters distrust of western forces.  Al Qaeda has taken 
advantage of this presence to make Iraq equal with the Israeli occupied territories 
as the center-stage of their propaganda and recruiting efforts.  The continued 
fighting has given the transnational Al Qaeda a “new lease on life and a second 
generation of recruits”.326  Throughout the region, the war is undercutting 
moderate Muslims and radicalizing public opinion.   
However, both Al Qaeda and the Iraqi Sunnis are targeting the Shi’a 
population and Iraqi government Sunnis.  This action indicates both insurgent 
groups want more than the just for the US to leave, it also indicates they want to 
destabilize a Shi’a-dominated government so that when the US does leave, 
radical Sunnis can reestablish control.327   
The US military will need to remain in Iraq not only through the December 
2005 elections, but also until the Iraqi security forces can take a leading role in 
engaging the insurgents and holding cleared territory.  This “Iraqifacation” will 
take time with US forces conducting joint patrols with Iraqi forces.  As the Iraqis 
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gain capability, the US should actively seek opportunities to hand over primary 
responsibilities while continuing to support in a less-prominent role.  In T.E. 
Lawrence’s 15th article, he wrote: 
Do not try to do too much with your own hands. Better the Arabs do 
it tolerably than that you do it perfectly. It is their war, and you are 
to help them, not to win it for them. Actually, also, under the very 
odd conditions of Arabia, your practical work will not be as good as, 
perhaps, you think it is.328 
3. Countering AQI Frames Through Positive Action 
To maintain support for the counterinsurgency effort, the government 
needs to implement a convincing counter-propaganda campaign.  Actions speak 
louder than words and military victories and an appealing political agenda are 
essential.  The military “oil-stain” strategy is a visible signal the government has 
moved it to stay and is willing fight to defend them.  However, military actions by 
themselves will not mobilize the population to support the government.  Follow-
up actions can demonstrate the government cares about the well-being of its 
people.  Leveraging an umbrella of security, governments who have reinforced 
their position by providing political rights, economic incentives, public utilities and 
social services have made it difficult for the insurgency to regain psychological 
dominance in lost territory.  The projected political future must be clear; the 
government’s position must be appealing and the information made widely 
available.329 
4. Countering AQI Frames Through News and Interactive Debate 
One method to promote a western point of view is to provide moderate 
news outlets to break the perceived monopoly the insurgents have on the “Arab 
street”.330  This methodology has produced Alhurra (translated as “The Free 
One”) satellite TV.  This station provides news, sports, travel, documentaries, 
fashion, cinema, and music programming.331  While the station’s charter is 
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designed to influence opinion in the Middle East, its main attraction has been its 
non-news programming.  This is because its format is weighted heavily towards 
US government statements and is poorly postured to cover late-breaking stories.  
Recent surveys have indicated a very small percentage of viewers tuned to 
Alhurra as a primary source of news.  Instead, the far more agile Al Jazeera, Al 
Manar and Al Arabiyya, garnered the vast majority of Arab news viewers.332   
As opposed to a one-way monologue, another approach would be to 
provide qualified spokespersons to engage these established news sources to 
provide western insights and debate issues in a dialogue of ideas.333  This 
process is beginning.  For example, on 09 Nov 2005, British Foreign Secretary 
Jack Straw, was interviewed on Al Jazeera’s “Today’s Encounter” show.  On that 
program, he fielded questions on British military posture and political issues in 
Iraq, the impact of the Mehlas report on Syria, and other regional concerns.334  
This approach leverages an existing popular framework of Middle Eastern news, 
and provides direct western perspective to regional concerns.  
5. Countering AQI Anti-Democracy Frames 
In countering AQI’s politically rejectionist frames, the government has only 
to point out a number of positive political factors.  The expanding roles of 
registered voters and the increasing number of Iraqis participating in the 
elections.  While many Sunnis may have voted in the October 2005 elections as 
an expression of their Iraqi-based insurgency against the government in an 
attempt to block acceptance of the Draft Constitution, they did vote.  Whether this 
positive political trend will replace violence as a means of affecting political 
outcomes remains to be seen.   
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6. Countering AQI Frames Through Close Scrutiny of Friendly 
Operations 
In addition to engaging in a counter-narrative campaign focused on AQI’s 
violent tactics or providing positive news on Iraqi reconstruction, the US must not 
provide Al Qaeda ammunition with which to attack our legitimacy.  Specifically, 
accusations of prisoner abuse by members of the US military at Abu Ghraib 
prison have seriously hurt the legitimacy of the US effort in the Middle East.  In 
addition to being deeply troubling for US military members, these cases have 
opened an opportunity space in which the insurgents can challenge the US’s 
credibility as a legitimate defender of human rights.335  Armed with published 
examples, the insurgents draw parallels with the Hussein regime’s abominable 
history of torture and murder.  This opportunity space allows the AQI to 
exaggerate claims and falsely accuse coalition forces of atrocities while providing 
them with an unearned appearance of moral legitimacy.  The perception of 
prisoner abuse creates a detrimental effect on a local moderate population’s 
perception of the US forces and reduces the civilian’s willingness to cooperate.  
The current interrogation policy of intentional ambiguity was designed to provide 
interrogators with the ability to respond to “ticking time bomb” scenarios and 
potentially save American lives.  However, numerous historical examples 
demonstrate that “arrest without clear cause, imprisonment without trial, torture 
and summary executions can produce short-term results, but undermine the 
government’s legitimacy and eventually lead to defeat.”336   
There are a number of negative mechanisms at work.  From a purely 
practical standpoint, torture has little demonstrated value in gaining actionable 
intelligence, but instead produces, ”unreliable results and often impede further 
intelligence collection.”337.  When in pain or under great duress, a prisoner “will 
tell his interrogator what he thinks he wants to hear”, not necessarily what is 
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factual.338  Prisoner abuse by the French in Algeria yielded “little additional 
information not already being obtained through surveillance, bribery, informants 
and civilian cooperation”.  In Malaya and Vietnam, captured Viet Cong guerrillas 
often changed sides when treated well - providing higher quality information.  
Retired FBI agent Dan Coleman, who worked counter-terrorism cases for ten 
years employed methodical detective work and “interrogations aimed at forging a 
relationship with detainees … which yielded major results.”  Coleman continued, 
“detainees expect to be tortured and were stunned to learn they had rights under 
the American system.  Due process made them more compliant, not less.” 339   
Detainee abuse can also provide the local insurgency with sympathizers 
and recruits.  According to Human Rights Watch, detainees at Forward Operating 
Base (FOB) Mercury “typically spent three days at the base before being 
released or sent to Abu Ghraib.  These “Persons Under Control” (PUCs) were 
subjected to a process locally referred to as “smoking”, an exhausting 12-24 hour 
softening-up process prior to interrogation.  After interrogation, an estimated 50% 
of the detainees determined to be “not involved in the insurgency” and 
released.340  If corroborated, this type of process would expose a significant 
segment of the population to abuse.  In other insurgencies, this type of 
widespread abuse only exacerbated the situation, and radicalized the entire 
population.341 
Beyond the advantage presented to the insurgents, torture presents 
distinct disadvantages for the US military.  The perception of abuse could 
endanger US soldiers.  If US troops are captured, they could be subjected to 
reciprocal treatment.342  This “new paradigm” threatens to remove Geneva 
Convention combatant status from US combat soldiers and expose them to 
                                            
 338 Guiora, Unholy Trinity, 7. 
 339 Jane Mayer, Outsourcing Terror: The Secret History of America’s “Extraordinary 
Rendition” Program, The New Yorker (14 Feb 2005), 5-6. 
 340 Human Right Watch, Leadership Failure: Firsthand Accounts of Torture of Iraqi 
Detainees by the US Army’s 82nd Airborne Division, vol 17, no 3(G), (Sep 2005) 3-5. 
 341 Mayer, Outsourcing Terror, 10. 
 342 JAG Memos introduced into Congressional Record by Sen Lindsey Graham, 25 Jul 2005, 
Memos originated from all the Armed Services Judge Advocate General offices. 
98 
prosecution for crimes – including murder.343  Residual effects may also “weaken 
the protections afforded by the Conventions to our troops in future conflicts.”344 
Alleged mistreatment creates a credible political opening for AQI 
apologists to launch a barrage of outrageous and often absurd accusations 
concerning US operations and methods.  The goal of these statements is to 
insight over-restrictive constraints on military operations by imposing “hyper-
legalistic expectations of zero collateral damage.”345   
Government rectitude toward prisoners has several beneficial 
counterinsurgency effects.  Prisoners can be a source of intelligence; humane 
treatment avoids creating new recruits for the insurgency and, where insurgents 
recruit by force, a policy of easy surrender. Decent treatment can deplete forces 
from the insurgent ranks and eases post-conflict reconciliation.346  Releasing 
well-treated prisoners also has a great propaganda value undercutting claims  
that prisoners will be harmed.  Mao wrote that to gain valuable intelligence as 
well as undercut the enemy’s will to fight to the death, “the most effective 
propaganda directed at enemy forces is to release captured soldiers and give 
wounded medical treatment”.347  The military’s role in defeating an insurgency in 
the cultural-ideological battle of the frames depends on their ability to maintain 
discipline and punish those found guilty of abusing civilians and detainees.   
Framing is about persuasion and shared vision more than media 
specialists fight the battle of the stories.  It is also fought by politicians, national 
policies, and by day-to-day actions by government forces and by AQI insurgents 
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– each can make a positive or negative impression that supports or harms the 
operation.   
7. Countering AQI Frames Using Nationalist Frames 
Nationalist frames can be used to psychologically isolate AQI from the 
Iraqi Sunnis.348  In a direct counter-narrative campaign focused on the countries 
of origin of AQI’s foreign-born fighters and violent and indiscriminate tactics.  The 
Iraqi government can frame AQI as foreign infiltrators and representing a foreign 
ideology.  Zarqawi’s oath of loyalty to bin Laden and bin Laden’s appointment of 
Zarqawi as “emir in Iraq”349 can be used to highlight a Saudi, instructing a 
Jordanian to come to Iraq and kill Iraqis.  In contrast, The government can 
highlight its inclusive nature, democratic processes.   
D. COUNTERING AQI’S ACTION REPERTOIRES 
AQI’s dependence on military action repertoires render them a one-
dimensional insurgent organization focused on the military and terrorist aspects 
of insurgency.  It has no discernable political wing, no political platform beyond 
religious proclamations, and has demonstrated significant hostility toward the 
entire process.  Unlike Hizballah or HAMAS, AQI does not provide significant 
social benefits in areas it controls.  For those tactics directed at Iraqi Government 
assets, AQI’s non-suicide bombing actions are typical of an insurgent 
organization and can be mitigated using effective military tactics and force-
protection measures.  IEDs & VBIEDs attacks can never be completely defeated.  
They can be moderated by effective force-protection measures, un-predictable 
patrolling and expanding areas of continuing coalition or Iraqi Army presence.   
To mitigate the effect of insurgent attacks on NGOs, aid organizations 
have reduced their foreign staff to minimum levels within Iraq, set up operations 
in neighboring countries, and hired Iraqis to staff the operations within Iraq.  
Unfortunately, this has also reduced these organizations effectiveness. 
To counter AQI’s suicide bombing tactic, checkpoints, barricades, and 
physical stand-off from government buildings can protect military and 
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government facilities from car bombs.  To counter individual suicide bombers, 
intimate knowledge of who belongs in an area and issuing ID cards can prevent 
bombers from gaining access to restricted areas.  Unfortunately, AQI’s tactic of 
targeting civilian workers, restaurants, Shi’a religious observances and other soft 
targets are nearly impossible to defeat once set in motion.   
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IV. CURRENT STATUS  
The most often asked questions in any war are “how are we doing?” and 
“are we winning?”  Because of the indecisive nature of insurgency warfare, these 
questions are open to a number of interpretations.  A number of official and 
unofficial data sources attempt to answer these questions regarding the conflict 
in Iraq. These look at a wide variety of aspects of the war to determine trends 
and predict outcomes.  The following section will survey some of these sources 
to interpret progress made and suggest areas which would benefit from 
additional attention.   
A. CURRENT STATUS 
1. Current Status – Military Dimension 
A variety of sources publish and regularly update status reports on Iraq’s 
transition. The US Department of State (DoS) publishes a “Weekly Status 
Report” that focuses on the “pillars of US Government policy.”350  The 
Department of Defense (DOD) provides official reports to Congress in 
accordance with Conference Report 109-72 Emergency Supplemental 
Appropriations Act, 2005.”351  The Brookings Institution collects a wide array of 
unclassified trend data and publishes these in their weekly “Iraq Index”.352  In 
these and other studies, no one indicator provides an indisputable measure of 
the current status.   
US Government reports define security goals for US forces as follows: 
“Defeat the Terrorists, Neutralize the Insurgents;” and “Transition Iraq to Security 
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Self Reliance”.  The Bush Administration’s National Strategy for Victory in Iraq 
tracks the following security measurements:  
 
The quantity and quality of Iraqi units 
Number of actionable intelligence tips received from Iraqis 
Percentage of operations conducted by Iraqis alone or with minor Coalition 
assistance 
Number of car bombs intercepted and defused  
Offensive operations conducted by Iraqi and Coalition forces  
Number of contacts initiated by Coalition forces, as opposed to the enemy”353   
 
The US strategy depends heavily on reconstituted Iraqi forces. As a 
measure of security self-reliance, the total number of Ministry of Interior and 
Ministry of Defense forces currently trained and equipped stands at 
approximately 211,000.354 US and Iraqi forces have conducted offensive 
operations against insurgent infiltration routes in operation Steel Curtain.  In a 
change from the previously predominant “cordon and search” to the “clear and 
hold” strategy, at the conclusion of this operation, local area security 
responsibilities will be handed off to Iraqi forces for continued control.355   
Border security is essential to stem the flow of insurgents and resources 
into Iraq.  As of October 2005, approximately 17,000 Border Police have been 
trained and equipped out of a total projected force of more than 28,300 whom the 
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Multinational Security Transition Command (MNSTC) plans to train and equip by 
May 2006.356   
The US Marine Corps supports Iraqi border units with ten-person Border 
Transition Teams (BTTs). These provide specialized capabilities in logistics, 
communications, personnel management, intelligence, operations, budgeting, 
and equipment maintenance.357  Because the primary insurgent threat is from 
the Sunni insurgents and Salafi-Jihadists, the priority is completing work on forts 
along the Iraqi-Syrian border.  To that end, the Ninewah and al-Anbar Brigades 
are converging towards the Euphrates River and restoring border control. 358 
Beyond this numerical approach to assessing security, Andrew 
Krepinevich, argues security strategy should “concentrate on providing security 
and opportunity to the Iraqi people.”359  The corresponding measures should 
examine the extent to which the population feels secure as opposed to an 
exclusive focus on insurgent strength, casualties, engagements, or fielded 
forces.  There continue to be large numbers of volunteers for the Iraqi security 
forces, despite apparent dangers.  In addition, while a February 2005 opinion poll 
shows widespread lack of confidence in the US military, the Iraqi security forces 
enjoy the confidence of the majority of Iraqi people who want their protection and 
view the insurgents as increasingly incapable of providing security.360   
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Figure 10.   Perception of Who Can Improve Situation in Iraq361 
 
A key question in an insurgency is, “do Iraqi civilians feel secure enough 
and confident enough in the government to provide actionable intelligence?”  In 
another positive sign, there has been a “dramatic increase in intelligence tips 
received from the population.  While there has been an increase in AQI activity 
over this same period, the number of tips is a far greater, seven-fold increase.  
This trend is indicative of increasing popular confidence in the government and a 
rejection of the insurgency.362 
 
Figure 11.   Tips Received From Population 
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The number of Iraqi-born insurgents who voluntarily demobilize is a useful 
measure of security.363  As of November 2005, there have been press reports of 
Iraqi insurgent groups contacting government officials indicating their desire to 
join the political process.364   
Unfortunately, this measure would be less sensitive to the morale of AQI’s 
foreign fighters.  Salafi-Jihadists have traveled to Iraq to fight.  Instead of 
surrendering to the Iraqi government, they would likely simply return home.  As of 
December 2005, data indicate recruiting is continuing, and the Jihadists do not 
appear to be demobilizing.   
DoD reporting highlights the insurgent’s inability “to derail the political 
process or foment ethno-sectarian violence” as a key indicators of success 
against the insurgency.365   This is probably better depicted as a qualified 
success.  The democratic process is continuing, but with deep sectarian divides, 
while sectarian violence continues to rise.   
The number of daily attacks continues to rise.  However, insurgent attacks 
are geographically clustered in the four of Iraq’s 18 provinces with large Sunni 
populations.  The other 14 provinces have a significantly reduced level of 
insurgent activity.  While the majority of overall insurgent attacks target coalition 
forces, the majority of casualties are Iraqi civilians and largely the result of AQI 
operations.  This targeting of Shi’a civilians by the Jihadists is an effort to disrupt 
the political process and breed sectarian civil war.  The psychological effects of 
these indiscriminant attacks have made AQI the “main threat to achieving Iraqi 
control of and responsibility for security in the provinces”.366   
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Figure 12.   Number of Daily Attacks by Insurgents367 
 
Figure 13.   Attacks by Province368 
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Figure 14.   Map of Provinces Where Attacks Most Common369 
 
The insurgent targeting trends are mirrored in the Iraqi population’s 
perception of security.  Surveys of Iraqi civilians found respondents from the 
Kurdish north, the mid-Euphrates, and the Shi’a south indicate they “feel safe in 
their homes and in their region”.  The vast majority of respondents from Baghdad 
and Mosul indicated they felt either “not very safe” or “not safe at all”. 370   
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Figure 15.   Popular Perception of Security371 
 
Given the increasing daily attack rates, increasing civilian casualty rates, 
steady number of Americans and civilian killed, steady number of assessed Iraqi 
insurgents, and a slowly increasing number of foreign fighters, many unclassified 
indicators show negative trends in security.   
The indicators showing a positive trend are the growth of Iraqi security 
forces, a decreasing number of Iraqi military and police casualties, strong Iraqi 
confidence in their own forces, and an increase in tips gained from the 
population.  The change in strategy from “cordon and sweep” to “clear and hold”, 
is probably a positive strategic move as well.   
US combat units are beginning to report operational military progress in 
terms of insurgents killed and captured.  As a measure of either progress or 
success in an insurgency, this process was discredited during the Vietnam War 
because the insurgent forces come from a variety of sources and can be 
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regenerated372, nor does counting killed or captured Iraqis address the primary 
goal of population security.   
Together, these measures present a mixed picture of AQI in the military 
dimension.  Clearly, the AQI insurgency is limited in popular appeal and 
geographic reach.  It continues to be rooted in a narrow Sunni population base 
and shows no trends toward becoming a truly mass movement throughout Iraq.  
It shows little capability to transition from the organizational and terrorist phase to 
a more substantial military presence.  It remains a tool the Iraqi Sunni insurgent 
groups can leverage to create chaos and instill fear.  However, AQI remains very 
active, dangerous, and destabilizing.  Its suicide bombing tactics against soft 
targets are difficult to anticipate or halt. Although the increase in intelligence tips 
is encouraging, the effect of the oil-stain strategy has yet to be translated into 
lower levels of violence or greater sense of security.  AQI remains engaged in 
Iraq training and fielding Al Qaeda associated Jihadis and destabilizing the 
environment.  Purely military actions will be incapable of defeating or 
demobilizing them. 
2. Current Status - Political Dimension 
According to the DoS “Weekly Status Report”,373 and DoD Report before 
Congress, the US’s politically-related goals in Iraq are: “Help Iraqis Forge 
National Compact for a Democratic Government” and “Help Iraq Build 
Government Capacity and Provide Essential Services”. The is a national 
compact for democratic governance and the tasks include a timetable for the 
electoral process, an effort to include all communities’ participation in the political 
process, and the international communities support for the process in action as 
well as rhetoric.374  The Bush Administration’s National Strategy for Victory in 
Iraq states the most important metrics they track as political measurements are:  
1. The political benchmarks set forth in UN Security Council Resolution 1546 
and the Transitional Administrative Law 
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2. The number of Iraqis from all areas willing to participate in the political 
process as evidenced by voter registration and turnout.375   
In measuring progress toward establishing viable political progress as 
described in the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL), the Iraqis have 
successfully held elections for the Transitional National Authority (TNA) and 
conducted a popular referendum on the draft constitution.  These events have 
paved the way for a December 2005 election for a constitutionally viable Iraqi 
government.   
There are positive signs of political life.  During the 30 Jan 2005 elections, 
Sunni voters largely boycotted the process, but the Shi’a and Kurds turned out in 
large numbers.  The insurgent’s inability to halt the democratic process 
highlighted a significant insurgent weakness and produced a qualified success 
for the central government.  After these elections, the Sunni boycott was seen as 
a grave error by some Sunni clerics who believe it has further limited their voice 
in future national elections.  Since January, there has been a significant reversal 
of Sunni political views.  In the run up to the October 2005 constitutional 
referendum, there was a tremendous growth in registered voters, primarily in the 
Sunni community.376  However, the Sunni voters were mobilized to attempt to 
defeat the Constitution. 
Voting patterns in the October 2005 Constitutional referendum closely 
followed religious-ethnic lines with the Shi’a and Kurds voting “Yes” and the vast 
majority of Sunnis voting “No”.377  Geographically, the “Yes” votes correspond to 
the more stable areas experiencing moderate to low insurgent activity and 
majority “No” votes in Al Anbar, Salahuddin and Ninevah provinces are those 
which suffer the majority of insurgent violence.  The constitution was ratified with 
a resounding majority of 78.59% of the national vote378, but insurgent violence 
has continued unabated.   
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The October election heralded an insertion of the Sunni nationalist 
insurgency into the governance process.  Social mobilization theory holds that 
political inclusion and the ability to influence political outcomes will moderate 
extremist positions. However, democratic events in and of themselves, do not 
necessarily indicate a peaceful democratic competition for power.  Only Sunni 
political activism fueled by the belief they can peacefully influence political 
outcomes moderate the violence.  For indicators of definitive political progress, 
we should look for a corresponding decrease in violence, voting patterns that do 
not follow strict religious or ethnic lines or the formation of crosscutting political 
alliances promoting common-concern issues. 
The UN has energetically supported the constitutional development 
process by providing technical assistance and assistance to the Independent 
Electoral Commission of Iraq.379  On 08 November 2005, the UN Security 
Council voted unanimously to extend the mandate of the US-led multinational 
force in Iraq for an additional year.380  On 12 Nov 2005, UN Secretary General 
Kofi Anan visited Iraq and called for a political transformation that is “inclusive, 
transparent, and takes into account concerns of all groups”.  In response, Iraqi 
Prime Minister al-Ja’fari called for UN help in the upcoming elections in 
December 2005, promoting democracy and “improving the performance of the 
security forces”.381  The UN Special Envoy Ashraf Qazi “called for a transparent 
political process that is responsive to the aspirations of all of Iraq’s 
communities.”382 
Iraqi President Talabani has proposed a broad amnesty program to 
separate the Iraqi Sunnis from the foreign Jihadists and to win over Iraqis to an 
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Iraqi nationalist theme383.  This has resulted in some positive countermoves from 
the Sunni community, including clashes between Iraqi Sunnis and foreign 
jihadists, and a call by 64 Sunni clerics for Sunni Iraqis to join the security 
services384.    
Unlike the Iraq’s Sunni insurgent groups, AQI’s political stance is 
completely rejectionist.  Instead of working within the available political 
opportunity space, the Salafi-Jihadists not only abstained from the organized 
political realm, they actively reject the political opportunity space to influence the 
government or take political power by peaceful means.  On 23 Jan 2005, Zarqawi 
issued a statement claiming only “Allah has the right to govern” and “democracy 
is contrary to Islam”.  Using this logic, he declared an “all-out war on this evil 
principle of democracy”385.  The success of the Shi’a and Kurds in the elections 
have provided substantially more international volunteers for Zarqawi’s Salafi-
Jihadist group indicating that no matter the election results, these groups will 
continue to violently contest the political outcome.  Zarqawi’s rejectionist position 
of the entire democratic political process indicates the political dimension may 
prove ineffective in moderating or demobilizing his movement directly – by 
demobilizing the Iraq Sunni insurgency.   
3. Current Status – Socio-Economic Dimension 
There are two critical elements in the economic counterinsurgency effort.  
The first is the effort to undercut the insurgent’s financial resources; the second is 
to strengthen the government’s ability to provide stable economic conditions. 
There is little hard data on Zarqawi’s international financial sources and 
what is available is often anecdotal in nature.  Much of AQI’s funding flows 
outside state-controlled financial and formal banking channels.  Influencing the 
heretofore-uncontrolled stream of money from Islamic zakat and Islamic charities 
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remains a largely taboo subject in regional states.  The popular use of hawala 
(informal money brokers), front businesses, and untraceable liquid assets has 
allowed financials to flow freely within the region.386  AQI’s suicide operations are 
relatively inexpensive and the available resources are probably more than 
sufficient to cover the meager costs of these operations.   
AQI and Iraqi nationalist insurgents have been active in attacking the 
sources of government finances.  Their attacks have had both direct and indirect 
effects on the Iraqi economy.  The direct effects include the loss of valuable 
infrastructure, natural resources, and skilled human resources.  The indirect 
effects include raising the cost of any operation in Iraq because of the pervasive 
need for additional security.   
The DoS “Weekly Status Report” tracks economic progress indicators.387 
The economically related goals include: “Help Iraq Build Government Capacity 
and Provide Essential Services” and “Help Iraq Strengthen Its Economy”.  The 
Bush Administration’s National Strategy for Victory in Iraq states the most 
important metrics they track as security measurements are as follows:  
1. GDP 
2. Per capita GDP 
3. Inflation 
4. Electricity generated and delivered 
5. Barrels of oil produced and exported 
6. Numbers of businesses opened 388   
The few macroeconomic indicators available indicate the Iraqi economy is 
showing signs of recovery.  As under Saddam, the dominant oil sector, which 
accounts for over two-thirds of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), largely 
determines the performance of the overall Iraqi economy.  By 2004, the GDP had 
recovered from the war, but is not expected to grow beyond approximately 3.7% 
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in 2005 because of “flat oil production and exports”389 which remain below pre-
war levels.390   
Inflation is in the 5-10% range with price increases accelerating in later 
2005 due to Increasing demand and increasing cost of security.  Brookings data 
indicate higher inflation rates, but show inflation decreasing in their three-year 
trend.  Unemployment data is notoriously difficult to determine making projected 
trends suspect.  MNF-I sources estimated it was 28% in Jul 2004 and 21% in 
October 2005.391  The Brookings Institution estimates are uniformly higher 
(currently 27-40%), but also show a similar decreasing trend.392   
The exchange rate for the New Iraqi Dinar has remained stable (1455-
1480/USD).  In the private sector, Iraqi new business starts continue to grow 
rapidly due to the more than 17,000 US microfinance loans distributed in the past 
two years.393  December 2004 Zogby International opinion polls indicate a 
general economic optimism with 70% of business owners responded as 
optimistic and only 10% pessimistic regarding economic growth over the next two 
years.  The report goes on to cite security, effective law enforcement, corruption, 
and education as primary concerns.394   
 
Figure 16.   Iraq: Economic Indicators – GDP & Per Capita GDP395 
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Figure 17.   Iraq: Economic Indicators – Inflation396 
 
 
Two economic sectors are critical: oil and power.  Iraq’s aging and poorly 
maintained oil infrastructure, coupled with insurgent attacks, continues to limit 
production and export.  Over time, the insurgents have shifted targeting from 
short-term pipeline attacks to more lasting pump station attacks making their 
attacks more efficient while continuing to restrict the export of oil to below pre-
war levels.   
To protect these vital sectors, the Iraqi government is generating Strategic 
Infrastructure Battalions (SIBs) as a supplement to the regular Iraqi Army.  
Organizationally, under the Ministry of Defense and organized as light motorized 
infantry battalions, the first four of the units began being deployed in October 
2005.  Their primary missions include patrolling oil pipelines and electrical 
transmission lines and augmenting defenses at oil pumping stations and 
electrical transmission nodes.  Because of this limited defensive mission, SIBs 
undergo less training than their infantry counterparts, allowing new SIB units to 
be fielded faster.  A total of between 11 and 17 SIBs are planned.397   
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Figure 18.   Attacks on Iraqi Oil and Gas Pipelines, Facilities & Personnel398 
 
 
Figure 19.   Crude Oil Export399 
 
In the electrical power sector, reconstruction problems, poor maintenance, 
terrorist attacks, lack of refined fuels, and an unchecked increase in demand, has 
outstripped the electrical sector’s ability to meet the demand.400   
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Figure 20.   Daily Electricity Supplied and Estimated Demand in Iraq.401 
 
The US objectives for integrating Iraq into the international economy and 
providing services are “help Iraq develop a sustainable national budget and 
integrate Iraq into the world economic community, help support development of a 
strong and viable private sector, helping Iraq develop the capacity to deliver 
sufficient essential services, and revitalizing and rehabilitating the Iraqi economy 
through promotion of economic and market-based reforms.”402 
In addition to ongoing US economic aid, Iraq is receiving assistance from 
the World Bank and IMF.  Specifically IMF granted a “$436 million emergency 
loan to help rebuild the economy.”403  While the economy remains fragile, IMF 
expressed cautious optimism.  The World Bank plans to provide $500 million in 
loans through the International Development Association, with an additional $500 
million in loans through the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, if Iraq improves its creditworthiness.  
The coalition is also receiving financial support form international donor 
nations.  The majority of international pledges for financial support for Iraq’s 
reconstruction were made at the Madrid donor’s conference in October 2003.  At 
that time donor nations pledges $13 billion in grants and loans.  However, as of 
                                            
401 DoD, Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq, 14-15. 
402 DoD, Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq, 9. 
403 DoD, Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq, 10. 
118
November 2005, these states “have only disbursed about $3 billion to the UN or 
World bank trust funds for Iraq.”404 
Amid signs of recovery, AQI and the Sunni insurgency have been able to 
cause significant problems in reconstructing vital sectors of the Iraqi economy.  
Persistent high unemployment continues to provide a pool of “casual insurgents” 
and fuel popular dissatisfaction.  In contrast, AQI’s external sources of financial 
and manpower support are independent of changes in Iraq’s economy and 
appear to be sufficient to support continued operations.  Material improvements 
in the Iraq economy would reduce the pool of potential Iraqi insurgents, help 
strengthen the Iraqi government’s ability to govern and extend rule of law, but 
would not affect AQI directly.   
4. Current Status – Cultural-Ideological Dimension 
The cultural-ideologically-related goals, according to the Department of 
State, are to “Help Strengthen Rule of Law and Promote Civil Rights” and 
“Strengthen Public Understanding of Coalition Efforts and Public Isolation of 
Insurgents”.405   The DoS measurements for rule of law included three discrete 
events - two UN declarations and an announcement of a justice integration 
workshop.  These are positive events but provide no sense of the current status 
or trends through time.   
The DoD report to Congress mentions concerns with law enforcement and 
government corruption in relation to general economic optimism and expresses 
the goal of “helping Iraq strengthen rule of law capabilities – law enforcement, 
justice, and the corrections system”.  The DoD report states that the current 
crime estimates are unreliable.406  The Bookings Institution references an 
estimated number of per-capita crime-related deaths in Baghdad.  The data 
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indicate a uniformly high level of violent crime for the last year that is at least an 
order of magnitude greater than the regional averages. 407 
 
Figure 21.   Murder Rate in Baghdad408 
 
In other measures of “rule of law”, all Iraqi judges have been reviewed for 
corruption and Ba’ath party affiliations.  Provincial courts are operational but 
results vary based on the “ability of police and prosecutors to collect evidence 
and prepare cases for trial.” 409  The report describes training judicial 
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investigators, judges, and corrections officers, and to ensure judges and witness 
security, has established a witness protection program and judicial security 
program.  As a measure of system operations, the Central Criminal Court of Iraq, 
which is responsible for trials relating to terror suspects and anti-coalition crimes, 
has “conducted 544 trials and handed down 522 convictions”.410 
As part of a justice and reconciliation effort, the Iraqi Special Tribunal (IST) 
has begun its first trial of Saddam Hussein and other top regime officials.  “Under 
the Iraqi system, a defendant is given a separate trial for each accused crime. 
Saddam is therefore likely to face multiple, different trials.” 411 
The goal of “strengthening public understanding of the coalition and 
Isolating the Insurgents” was being measured by the DoS using two discrete 
events, but does not track conduct trend analysis of culturally-sensitive variables 
to aid iterative decision-making.  The DoD report does not materially address 
these goals.   
Measuring understanding and legitimacy is a difficult task in that it is 
measuring the degree to which people feel affinity and confidence in the 
government or, conversely, in the insurgents.  Zogby International opinion polls 
of Middle Eastern Arabs and Muslims taken during the summer of 2005 indicate 
a uniform decline in positive feelings for the US forces and policies in the Middle 
East.  An interpretation of this report sites “the American presence in Iraq, its 
treatment of Arabs and Muslims abroad,  the continued abuses the military has 
employed on its prisoners of war” and a hard-line stance toward Syria and Iran 
as sources of these opinions.”412    
Other measures of legitimacy for the coalition and the Iraqi government 
could be the number of volunteers to hold government positions, the 
government’s ability to raise forces for the national army, or its ability to collect 
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taxes.413  The empirical data suggests the government has had little problem in 
gaining sufficient volunteers to join the army or government although this may 
also be a function of economic need.   
Conversely, a measure of the legitimacy of the insurgency could be its 
ability to gain volunteers and resources.  By framing the conflict effectively, AQI 
has used these “shared meanings and definitions”414 to motivate people to act 
and become convinced they can make a difference.  Al Qaeda has created a 
convincing and compelling foundational myth, pitting the pious global Umma 
under attack by a foreign and decadent culture415.  Expanding this definition, the 
Salafi-Takfiri insurgents label Muslims working in government or in any capacity 
with the coalition as collaborators or worse, takfir (heretics & apostates).  In their 
mind, this anti-God label justifies Jihadist attacks and ritualistically brutal murder.  
These attacks further serve as effective psychological weapons as they gain 
substantial media coverage, confirm the West’s alienation from the Islamic world, 
and reinforce the perceived “Clash of Civilizations”416. 
Unclassified data gathered by the Brookings Institution show both the 
Jihadi and Sunni insurgencies have been able to continue operations in the face 
of government military, political, and economic action.  Although not an exact 
tally, nor a reliable, stand-alone measure of success, these estimates show a 
significant number of insurgents have been captured or killed.  At the same time, 
the Bookings Institution data show a steady growth trend in the manpower 
strength of both insurgencies.   
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Figure 22.   Total Number of Insurgents Detained of Killed417 
 
     
Figure 23.   Estimates of the Strength of the Insurgency418 
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What these trends do show is, in the face of significant counterinsurgency 
operations, the insurgency has maintained its legitimacy and ability to attract 
recruits, both from within Iraq and from a regional Salafi-Jihadist manpower pool.  
In addition, the growth in the number of foreign fighters indicates the continuing 
porous nature of the borders. 
The insurgents are gaining influence by repeating reference to published 
instances of American prisoner abuse.  This message has gained credence even 
though, for the past 50 years, the US has been a central pillar upholding the laws 
of armed conflict (LOAC).  The US is a signatory of the 1948 Declaration of 
Human Rights, the four 1949 Geneva Conventions Relative to the Treatment of 
Victims of War (more commonly referred to as the Geneva Conventions), and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.  The US military has a 
standing DOD prohibition on torture and cruel treatment of prisoners which is 
enshrined in the US Army Field Manual on Interrogation.  However, recent 
interpretations of the US position have created ambiguities indicating the 
operations in Afghanistan represent a “new paradigm that renders obsolete 
Geneva’s protections.”419   
Recently, there have been challenges to the laws of armed conflict 
indicating these longstanding rules may not apply to American interrogation of 
foreigners held outside of the US420  According to Capt Ian Fishback, detainee 
abuses have taken place because of the lack of “clear, consistent, lawful 
treatment of detainees, and confusion over standards.”421  These ambiguities 
have opened an opportunity for AQI to frame the US in strongly negative terms.   
In contrast to US missteps, AQI insurgents conduct has been brutally 
indiscriminant by design.  In contrast to Mao’s People’s War approach, this has 
done little to characterize AQI as self-sacrificing friends of the people.  Their 
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hostage-taking and broadcast beheadings have revealed them to be a 
particularly malevolent group.  Their indiscriminate attacks on unarmed Shi’a 
civilians and their defense of their atrocities as an acceptable cost of driving out 
the Americans, has brought them little popular support.   
A successful counterinsurgency campaign makes the population, “see the 
insurgents as outsiders, as outlaws.”422  One of the government’s more adept 
cultural/psychological operations is to broadcast confessions by captured 
insurgents.  The prime-time television program, “Terrorism in the Hands of 
Justice,” features captured insurgents confessing their acts of terrorism against 
the Iraqi people.  This highly popular program has been effective in deflating the 
stature of the insurgents by showing them to be small, mean, greedy creatures 
worthy only of contempt.423   
In the battle of the narrative, Al Qaeda and its Iraqi franchise, the attacks 
of 11 Sep 2001, the insurgency in Iraq are part of a historiography which can be 
traced from the Crusades and original articles of Muslim faith regarding the 
conduct of Jihad.  These Salafi frames include narratives that depict themselves 
as just and holy warriors upholding the faith.  To counter AQI, the US needs to 
defeat not just their military operations; the US narrative must defeat the AQI 
narrative.  The US has not done particularly well in the battle of the narrative.  
Aggressive political statements and unilateral actions have created international 
anxiety regarding the future use of America’s newfound predominance.424  The 
Middle East’s recent experience with colonialism colors their view of an extended 
US presence and makes them cautious of US motives. 
Overall, the reconstruction and counter insurgency effort in Iraq have 
yielded mixed results.  While there are signs of progress all the dimensions of  
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conflict, there are also significant setbacks and insurgent strengths which require 
attention.  The following section will address some of these areas which could 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
The war in Iraq is neither won nor lost.  Implementing a coordinated multi-
dimensional strategy presents a strong counter to AQI’s political opportunities, 
mobilizing structures frames and action repertoires.   
The internationally-supported, ideologically-committed Salafi-Jihadist 
group Al Qaeda in Iraq is a numerically minor organization but is important to 
understand because they pose a unique and particularly difficult 
counterinsurgency challenge.  Because AQI draws much of its motivation and 
resources from a larger international Salafi-Jihadi movement, it is resistant to the 
direct effects of an Iraq-centric counterinsurgency strategy as outlined in the 
National Strategy for Victory in Iraq. In addition, other Sunni-nationalist insurgent 
groups engage in instrumental, cross-group cooperation in order to leverage 
AQI’s destabilizing operations for their own purposes.  Defeating or demobilizing 
AQI is essential to stabilizing Iraq. 
This thesis drew upon social mobilization theory to investigate the nature 
of this group in order to determine what counterinsurgency strategies hold the 
greatest promise of defeating or demobilizing them.  Zarqawi’s AQI is a militant 
insurgent group with few political or social strengths.  Its’ opportunity structures 
are both international and Iraq-specific. The rise and subsequent decentralization 
of bin Laden’s Al Qaeda was one of the most significant enabling conditions; 
instability in the wake of Operation Iraqi Freedom was the other.  AQI draws 
strength from mobilizing structures that include a militant reading of the Islamic 
faith, which commands the faithful to fulfill their duty to conduct Jihad against 
foreign invaders and an ability, partly through pre-existing Al Qaeda networks, to 
draw on international sources of manpower and financial resources. AQI is 
sophisticated and consistent in its use of anti-system frames, which reject 
western and democratic influences.  AQI depicts itself as an organization focused 
on Jihad in order to materially weaken the United States and punish takfir 
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apostate groups.  In the short term, AQI is focused on continuing the fight to drive 
the US out of the Middle East, preventing Iraq from becoming a Shi’a-dominated 
state and, in the long-term, restoring the caliphate.  A mix of guerrilla tactics and 
terrorist methods comprise AQI’s action repertoire. They break with the norms of 
insurgency in their widespread use of suicide bombings that target Shi’a civilians 
to create indiscriminate mass-casualty events and their practice of videotaping 
hostage beheadings.   
The US-led effort has also yielded mixed results.  To counter AQI, the US 
should use a multi-dimensional approach which negates its political opportunity 
structures, undercuts its’ mobilizing structures, creates dissonance in its frames, 
and protects against its actions.  The following measures are needed against 
AQI.   
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The following recommendations are based on the nature of the insurgency 
and a survey of counterinsurgency methods which could be translated into the 
Iraqi effort. 
1. Recommendations – Military 
The insurgency in Iraq emerged under conditions of instability after OIF.  
To regain stability, it is necessary to address the Iraqi Sunni insurgency as well 
as AQI.  Training and fielding a US-supported Iraqi army is critical to the ‘Clear, 
Hold and Build” approach in the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq.  However, 
the military, political, and economic methods described in that strategy alone will 
be much less effective in demobilizing AQI.   
a. Secure the Population, Systematically Extend the 
Control of the Government and Operate Using Minimal 
Military Force 
The traditional “American Way of War” stresses firepower, 
communications, and maneuver to close with, decisively engage and swiftly 
defeat an opposing conventional force.  A strategy focused on engaging 
insurgents using large military sweeps without a concurrent plan for population 
security is often unsuccessful and counterproductive.  Counterinsurgency 
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“requires an almost diametrically opposite approach: patience, circumspection, 
and the strict limitation on violence”.425   
In conjunction with political, economic, and social programs, 
protecting the population from insurgent occupation or attacks should form the 
basis of US and Iraqi government strategy.  A local defense strategy should work 
well against AQI insurgents operating in Sunni-tribal areas because AQI operates 
in small terrorist cells, not large guerrilla formations capable of overwhelming US 
and Iraqi defenders.  In addition, AQI cells are composed of puritanical foreigners 
who have made little attempt to generate popular good will within the Iraqi 
population.  Local tribal Iraqis have little attachment to these foreigners, creating 
a situation an adapted “oil stain” strategy would be effective for the newly trained 
Iraqi army or local militia forces to ferret out those among the population who are 
out of place.   
b. Train and Support Iraqi Military  
The US is training Iraqi Security forces and they are beginning to 
take on a more significant portion of the security load.  US direct involvement in 
combat operations should begin to drop off as the Iraqis assume this more 
prominent role.  To ensure these Iraqi forces remain more capable than their 
opponents, small US military advisory and support teams should be embedded in 
lower-level Iraqi field forces to provide coordination, communications, ISR and 
fire support.  This natural evolution of the mission from large formations to small 
teams will allow US field forces to shrink, our logistics requirements to transfer to 
the Iraqis. and the reduction of the overall US military footprint in Iraq.   
c. Deny the Insurgents Secure Base Areas 
The insurgents have been able to operate far more freely in the 
west and central, Sunni-dominated provinces.  Specifically Al Anbar province, 
with its predominantly Sunni population, sparse desert landscape, and proximity 
to the Syrian and Saudi Arabian borders offers favorable conditions for insurgent 
secure-basing.  While the oil stain strategy should comprise the main military 
effort, where insurgent bases are identified, active counterinsurgent operations 
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should be used to keep the pressure on insurgent safe areas.426  Once 
completed, these operations should not leave the area for the insurgents return.  
An expanding presence of US and Iraqi forces should assume security duties in 
captured areas.   
2. Recommendations – Political 
a. Continue Democratic Political Process to Demobilize 
Iraqi-Nationalist Insurgents 
A common theme among social mobilization authors is effective 
political voice and the ability to influence political outcomes that has a moderating 
effect on popular discontent.  To isolate and deprive the Salafi-Jihadi insurgency 
of indigenous support, the Sunnis must have access to real political power.  A 
political solution and not a purely military one is the key in Iraq.427  To this end, 
the Iraqi government must continue to hold constitutionally regulated free and fair 
elections to keep this political opportunity space open.   
b. Amnesty and Reconciliation Program 
To facilitate a move to peaceful government, governments have 
used amnesty programs to demobilize the insurgency without having to either 
surrender or to “fight to the end”.  Iraqi President Talabani has proposed a broad 
amnesty program to separate the Iraqi Sunnis from the foreign Jihadists and to 
win over Iraqis to an Iraqi nationalist theme428.  This has resulted in some 
positive signs from the Sunni community, including clashes between Iraqi Sunnis 
and foreign jihadists, and a call by 64 Sunni clerics for Sunni Iraqis to join the 
security services429.  To reduce the probability of returning to the insurgency, 
vetted amnesty-takers must have the means of making a living.  Allowing former 
soldiers who are not charged with capital crimes should be encouraged to join 
the Iraqi Army.  This would have broad beneficial effects of giving amnesty-takers 
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a stake in the government, reducing the insurgency’s pool of possible recruits, 
increasing the level of trained soldiers, and putting more people back to work 
thereby reducing unemployment.   
In the same vein, the Iraqi government should scale back their de-
Ba’athification process and allow vetted former administrators back into the 
government.  This could again be successful in countering the Sunni insurgency 
by giving them a stake in the government.  Since AQI consists of foreigners who 
have come to Iraq specifically to fight Americans, this program could have only 
the indirect effect of reducing the number of Iraqi insurgent allies available to 
AQI, but would put the foreigners at odds with Sunni Iraqi nationalists and 
discredit AQI themes of fighting imperialism.  
c. Legitimize the Democratically-Elected Government 
There is no guarantee the democratically elected government will 
hold all US interests sacred.  If the legally elected government demands 
concessions from the US, the US leadership should consider these demands in 
light of their beneficial and legitimizing effect for the new government.  By 
yielding to Iraqi demands on issues that the US would prefer not to, the new Iraqi 
government will gain the legitimacy as a provider of public goods.  In the long 
run, it may be in the US’s best interest to incrementally make concessions to the 
new government.  This would have the beneficial effects of incrementally 
legitimizing the government, incrementally building capacity in the government to 
administer internal functions, and allowing the US to incrementally disengage 
from running Iraqi governmental institutions. 
d. Discredit the Salafi-Jihadist Political Platform 
Discrediting the Salafi political platform may prove relatively easy 
as the foreign-born insurgents display poor political instincts.  By highlighting the 
fact the AQI has not presented a recognized political leader, does not possess a 
political organization or a widely appealing vision for Iraq, they demonstrate their 
unsuitability to govern.  The government should highlight AQI attacks on Iraqis as 
an attack on the nation by fanatical external belligerents.  Recalling the dubious 
benefits of Afghanistan under Taliban rule may help to provide an apt, if 
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apocalyptic, illustration of the Salafi-Jihadist insurgent’s vision of the post victory 
future. 
3. Recommendations – Socio-Economic 
An economy in wartime is a fragile asset.  Since AQI insurgents are 
receiving outside aid and do not have significant costs to sustain their operation, 
they do not need to control the economy to win in this dimension.  To hurt the 
government, they only have to be able to continually disrupt the economy’s 
smooth running.   
AQI is dependent on resources from outside Iraq, making them 
economically vulnerable as well, especially if US can cut off AQI’s international 
sources of finance and close Iraq’s border to separate AQI from its supporters 
abroad.  
a. Provide Employment and Opportunities 
In disbanding the Iraqi Army and conducting an aggressive de-
Ba’athification program, the CPA created a huge pool of unemployed and 
disaffected young men.  By sourcing micro-loans and providing jobs, the US can 
provide an alternative occupation for would-be insurgents.  Employment also 
provides self-esteem by allowing an unemployed population to peacefully provide 
for their families.  
b. Secure the Economic Elite 
The insurgents also have targeted Iraq’s educated professionals 
and intelligentsia by killing university professors, researchers, students, 
journalists, physicians, and administrators, thus depriving the state of a skilled 
populace and weakening the economy430.  These attacks create a chaotic 
atmosphere which dissuaded international financial investment necessary for real 
reconstruction of the vital oil sector of the Iraqi economy.   
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c. Secure Oil-Revenue-Producing Assets 
The insurgents regularly attack oil facilities to reduce oil exports 
from which the government gains revenue and limits the economic power the 
government can wield.  The insurgents also target electric power, water, and 
other critical infrastructure, which not only offsets the positive effects of US aid, 
but creates popular discontent due to the lack of reliable services and anger 
against the coalition and Iraqi government. This money will be wasted if the 
reconstructed infrastructure is not secured.  Training and deployment of the 
Strategic Infrastructure Battalions (SIBs) should be continued. 
4. Recommendations - Cultural-Ideological 
AQI’s cadres of foreign fighters are vulnerable on the cultural ideological 
dimension.  AQI’s religiously uncompromising occupation methods, 
denouncement of the concept of democratic self-rule, and mass-casualty attacks 
against fellow Muslims threaten to alienate them from their Sunni base of local 
support.  If the current trend towards abuse and isolation continues, Sunni 
tribalists may turn on the Jihadists and support Iraqi government efforts to drive 
them out of Iraq. 
a. Foster a Positive Concept of Iraqi Self-Identification 
The Iraqi governmental leaders must build bridges into all moderate 
religious communities.  One way would be to take council with the Sunni 
Association of Muslim Scholars and Shi’a Grand Ayatollah Sistani.  The goal of 
the Iraqi government must be to foster a sense of Iraqi self-identification, vice 
sectarian, tribal or regional group identities.   
Iraqis are critical to defeating the foreign-born Salafi-Jihadist 
insurgency.  The government must build the idea of a popular, viable Iraq and 
this common-ground is essential to defusing a possible sectarian civil war.  This 
idea will find support from the moderates.  So insistent is Grand Ayatollah Sistani 
on his Shi’a followers keep the peace, he issued a fatwa against using the terms 
“Shi’a, Sunni and Kurd” in favor of the word “Iraqi”431.  The central government 
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should also adopt a similar process to unite the country rather than emphasizing 
sectarian divides.  The only credible sources for these claims are the Iraqi 
government and security services.  Any claims by the US administration or 
coalition forces would result in the message appearing disingenuous.   
b. Uphold High Human Rights and Rule of Law 
Publicized abuse at Abu Gharib and elsewhere are deadly to 
winning the battle of the story.  In a legislative branch effort to provide clear 
guidance, Sen John McCain (R-AZ) introduced amendment #1977 to the 2006 
Military Appropriations Bill which would: (1) establish the Army Field Manual as 
the uniform standard for the interrogation of Department of Defense detainees 
and, (2) prohibit cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment of persons in the 
detention of the US government432 
In confronting the AQI and Sunni insurgency on the cultural-
ideological battlefield, Sen McCain’s legislation is a positive strategic move.  It 
provides soldiers with unambiguous standards of internationally accepted norms 
of behavior; it provides their commanders clear standards by which they can 
maintain discipline; it reinforces the US Armed Forces’ honorable culture and self 
image, it undercuts insurgent claims of torture and eases population fears of 
indiscriminant abuse by coalition armed forces caused by the insurgent’s 
exaggerated claims. 
c. Apply International Law to AQI 
This approach recognizes military action and the international law 
system are mutually reinforcing vice mutually exclusive.433  The US should 
support a comprehensive program using international law, specifically the Law of 
Armed Conflict (LOAC), to conduct cultural-ideological operations against 
terrorist organizations whos primary weapons are contrary to these conventions.  
This process exploits the US’s own superior claim to legitimacy on the 
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international and legal stage and allows the US to seize the moral “high ground” 
and “unmask terror warfare as inherently in contravention of the spirit of the 
Geneva Convention.”434   
A weakness in the current approach is the Geneva Conventions 
currently only apply to signatory nations, which opens a legal loophole allowing 
non-signatory nations and non-state organizations to hold themselves above the 
law.  As with the Law of the Sea, the UN should apply the Geneva Convention’s 
international standards of conduct on state and non-state actors alike and deal 
with terrorists in the same vein as pirates.  The UN should establish an 
international court to adjudicate terrorist cases.435  In this way, LOAC would 
apply to non-signatories and non-state terrorist organizations.  It would require all 
states and organizations to ensure their operations target only military personnel 
and facilities and make every effort to “minimize loss of civilian life, injury to 
civilians, and damage to civilian objects.”  As a second step, it would toughen 
standards by explicitly stating sanctions for those states or organizations found in 
grave breach of the Geneva Convention.  It would place terrorism as a form of 
warfare on trial and render politically, economically, religiously, or ethnically-
motivated arguments for terrorism invalid.  Finally, it would require states to “take 
positive action to prevent or curtail the grievous harm deliberately done to 
civilians.”436  Where states or organizations fail to comply, civilized states of the 
world would have legitimate legal recourse to impose sanctions or punitive 
measures.   
The effect on US operations would be minimal - the US will 
continue to fight wars in compliance within the provisions of the LOAC.  This 
involves training officers, soldiers, contractors, and embedded media associated 
with US operations in their role, responsibility, and consequences with respect to 
LOAC.  The end-result will be to put terrorist organization’s primary tactics on trial 
and subject their methods and justifications to close public scrutiny.  .   
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d. Publicize and Prosecute Terrorist Abuses 
The popular TV show, Terrorists in the Hands of Justice may be 
effective in publicizing terrorist abuses, but it sidesteps legal issues by showing 
accused terrorists, many with obvious bruises and without representation 
responding to off-camera questions.  A better approach would show these 
terrorists being tried in an Iraqi government court with the facts of the case 
clearly revealed consistent with due process.   
e. Engage in a Comprehensive Counter-Narrative Strategy  
(1). Engage AQI’s Narratives - The US should coordinate a 
comprehensive counter-narrative operation.  The first prong should be directed at 
the Islamic moderates and intellectuals.  In this strategy, each of AQI’s points of 
ideology would be dissected and refuted by a qualified and respected Muslim 
spokesman.  AQI’s goals and methods should be shown to be detrimental to the 
interests of the educated class.  The second prong should counter AQI’s religious 
messages directed at the urban poor.  Here, respected regional, religious, 
moderates must be convinced to speak out.  Their statements should not be in 
direct support of the US as this would immediately discredit them in the eyes of 
their fellows, but should focus on the indefensible abuses of the insurgents and 
self-destructive nature of violent political Islam.  They should couch their 
arguments in familiar articles of faith and demonstrate AQI are disingenuous 
hypocrites who violate the most sacred norms of the faith.”437  Finally, there are 
former terrorists currently in custody who have renounced violence and actively 
assisted counterterrorism efforts.  These people could provide compelling, first-
person, narratives and are able to address and defuse issues current and would-
be jihadists they engage in violent action.438   
The Iraqi message to its people should be AQI is destroying Iraq’s 
economy, killing its people, and does not have a positive political/economic/social 
capacity beyond the negative effects of Jihad.  It should portray the Iraqi 
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government as legitimate and working to protect Iraqis from this threat and the 
government will prevail and Iraq will be better off when the Jihadists are gone.   
(2). Gain Closure on the War - To gain closure on Hussein’s 
regime and promote the legitimacy of the new government, the abuses and 
mass-murders that took place during Hussein’s rule need to be examined in a 
court of law and, if found guilty, Saddam and his ranking subordinates held 
accountable.  The forum must be an Iraqi court and result in Iraqi justice.  A 
public trial and formal assignment of blame will help undercut Ba’athist 
nationalism and indirectly undercut the Salafi-Jihadist insurgents.  In court, 
Saddam has been alternately defiant - aggressively berating the court and 
subdued - responding quietly, after careful thought.439  For this trial to achieve its 
goals of justice and reconciliation, Saddam’s trail must be conducted with 
fastidious legal procedure.  It must highlight the blatant misrule by Saddam and 
his subordinates and remove any legitimacy or sense of innate superiority from 
the Sunni Ba’athis currently engaged in the insurgency. 
(3) Engage AQI’s Anti-Colonial Frames - Popular views of the 
US presence in Iraq today are colored by Iraqi and regional experience with 
colonial occupation and exploitation.  The US has alternately been accused of 
invading Iraq as part of a general war on Muslims, as a way to assist Israeli 
regional domination, or as a grab for Iraq’s proven oil reserves.  These prevalent 
narratives make the population resentful of US presence and distrustful of US 
long-term intentions.  Ultimately, they create uncertainty in the future and 
strengthen the factional militias and the insurgency. 
Declaring a chronologically-driven timetable for withdrawal would 
be a strategic mistake.  Setting arbitrary dates for withdrawal would embolden 
the insurgents to persist until the Americans leave, undercut the fledgling political 
process, and would negate any cooperation from the population in security-
building efforts.  Beyond the immediate possibility of leaving Iraq politically 
shattered, militarily weak, economically disabled, socially divided and on the 
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verge of civil war, departure would present the Salafi-Jihadists a propaganda 
windfall and initiate a series of cascading negative effects.  With a declared 
withdrawal date, Al Qaeda could expand their self-promoting narrative of 
defeating the Soviets and allow them to also claim to have defeated the US  This 
narrative would enhance Al Qaeda’s international appeal for new recruits and 
resource providers, ultimately raising the risk of further international terrorism.  It 
would leave Iraq a weak state, unable to control its internal territory and supply Al 
Qaeda a training venue and “haven for terrorists.”440  Overall, withdrawing from 
Iraq without explicitly meeting stability objectives would constitute a major defeat 
in the Global War on Terror.   
In contrast, an internationally acceptable, jointly agreed upon, 
conditions-based withdrawal plan would serve as a touchstone for US policy-
makers, military planners, international supporters, Iraqi leaders and the Iraqi 
people.  The plan should describe the desired endstates in terms of mutually 
acceptable levels of security, political self-governance, economic prosperity, and 
social stability.  Working toward a common set of goals would allow Iraqi leaders 
to discredit the insurgent attacks as anti-Iraqi and the reason for continued US 
military presence in Iraq.  Within Iraq, there is cross-cutting support for this type 
of disengagement.  During a November meeting of the Arab league in Cairo, a 
joint statement by Arab Shiite, Arab Sunni and Kurdish political leaders agreed 
on mutually acceptable constitutional amendments, mandated no specific 
withdrawal timetable, and couched their arguments in the language of 
compromise.441  The closing statement did call for “milestones,” but not specific 
dates for withdrawal.442   
Public discussions between US and Iraqi political leaders should 
set the agenda and the results made transparent to both populations.  
International facilitators, such as the UN, World Bank, Arab League and NATO, 
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should be included in the discussions to reinforce international legitimacy and 
undercut Al Qaeda’s negative messages.  In practice, the UN should host a 
stability conference and follow up status meetings with full participation from all 
legitimate Iraqi political parties, regional neighbors, and internationally supportive 
nations.  Instead of a fighting withdrawal, this process would initiate a peaceful 
and purposeful US military disengagement.  Finally, declaring the conditions for 
success and withdrawal would demonstrate goodwill as well as our ultimate 
intention to restore Iraq to a fully functional independent member in the 
community of nations. 
(4). Engage Middle Eastern Opinions Through Existing Media:  
The US should engage Al Qaeda’s message in a forum which will reach the most 
Muslims.  Rather than ceding the existing informational space to extremists, 
moderate American Muslim spokesmen should present US views and engage in 
debates on Al Jazeera, Al Manar and Al Arabiyya.443  Here they could contest 
the Salafi-Jihadist’s vision of the future and project one not based on conflict.  
They could highlight Al Qaeda’s negative message and lack of coherent political 
and economic capacity.   
5. Recommendations – International 
In presaging the US experience in Iraq, Machiavelli stated “there will never 
be wanting foreigners to assist a people who have taken arms against you”444.  
Indeed, US policies with respect to the Gulf monarchies, Egypt, and Israel have 
served to strengthen Al Qaeda’s regional appeal.  The current US activist role 
has many governments nervous regarding future US intentions.   
a. Gain Control of Iraqi Border Areas 
AQI draws a significant percentage of its resources from outside 
Iraq making the mission of isolating the battlefield central to defeating the 
insurgency.  Currently, AQI insurgents are able to cross into Iraq relatively freely.  
This allows them access to their vital, external sources of financial resources and 
manpower.  Cutting this link will be decisive in defeating the AQI threat.                                               
443 Anne Marie Baylouny, Alhurra, The Free One: Assessing US Satellite Television in the 
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An initial effort should be to make common cause with Iraq’s 
neighbors.  The US should first realize that, with large and restive young 
populations, none of the neighboring states has a great interest in seeing US-
style democracy grow in Iraq.  But neither do they gain if Iraq disintegrates into 
sectarian civil war or becomes a Salafi-Jihadist Islamic state.  Using these 
visions of a possible Middle Eastern future may allow US diplomats to privately 
engage Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Iran.  The goal of these negotiations would be 
for these states to quietly strengthen their own borders with Iraq and 
systematically make insurgent transit through their countries more difficult.   
The US should reengage with Syria to influence Syria’s perceived 
support of the insurgents.  The Syrians insist they are doing all they can and the 
current hard-line method may have diminished the flow of Jihadists.  The 
administration should move beyond “axis of evil” ideology and engage President 
Asad as a rational political actor.  US rhetoric, policies, and actions should focus 
on altering Asad’s pragmatic political calculations in order to make future US 
friendship more valuable than continuing terrorist support.   
Along the physical border, there is a newly constructed earthen 
berm to delineate the national boundary.  At a minimum, the US and Iraqi 
security forces need to physically gain control of the border areas and road 
networks leading into Iraq.  Training border security forces and refurbishing 
border forts is an essential first step.  Establishing coordinated working 
procedures for air surveillance and close air support will be essential for these 
small, scattered, units to effectively coordinate with each other and provide an 
effective defense in depth.  Should the security provided by mobile border police 
forces prove too porous, a more robust defended physical barrier with intrusion 
sensors, roving patrols, air patrols, and spaced garrison blockhouses, such as 
the French-Algerian “Maurice Line,” may become necessary.   
b. Engage Saudi Arabia and the Sunni Gulf States 
As a neighbor and the world’s largest Salafi state, Saudi Arabia is a 
critical international actor in mobilizing or demobilizing the Iraqi insurgency.  By 
empowering Sunni insurgency groups, the Saudis risk an Iraqi sectarian civil war 
141
and possibly a larger regional war.  Instead of inflaming the situation, the Saudis 
and other Sunni Gulf states need to be engaged in stabilizing Iraq, reducing the 
rhetoric of Jihad, and interdicting the flow of militants and money into Iraq.   
Just like Syria, Saudi’s border with Iraq is also long and porous.  It 
was not until al-Qaeda began attacks on the Saudi government and Saudi 
economic targets that the Saudi government demonstrated any inclination 
towards assisting in a greater war on terror.  The Saudi Ambassador to the US, 
Prince Turki al-Faisal, is not entirely behind the US effort in Iraq, having 
“described the US invasion of Iraq as a colonial war” and Arab press continues to 
refer to the insurgents as “resistance fighters”.445   
For its part, the new Iraqi government needs to reassure the 
traditional Sunni states Iraq will not become a revolutionary Shi’a satellite of Iran 
and the oil-based economy of Iraq will be a responsible member of OPEC. 
c. Work with Allies 
The US needs to shore-up international support and gain legitimacy 
for the effort to build a stable post-war Iraq.  European allies are critical in this 
effort.  The decision to go to war was contentious, but should be put into the past.  
The US should mend political fences with the French, German, and Russian 
governments and offer economic incentives by encouraging foreign private 
companies to participate in rebuilding post-war Iraq.   
6. Recommendations – Psychological 
a. Build and Visibly Demonstrate Iraqi Military Capability in 
Attacking Insurgent Held Areas 
The US military has won every major battle in which it has fought, 
but because the Iraqi security environment is dominated by US forces, it 
reinforces Al Qaeda’s US occupation frame.  This situation also provides the 
insurgents fuel for propaganda in the form of civilian casualties, collateral 
damage, and damage to religious structures.  Only a viable Iraqi police force and 
Iraqi Army can bring legitimate security and restore law and order.  Public 
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demonstrations of Iraqi forces clearing Sunni tribal areas of AQI insurgents, such 
as at Tal Afar, should be a model of US/Iraqi combined operations.  In the wake 
of these operations and as Iraqi forces become available, they should be 
assigned garrison duties protecting captured areas.   
b. Demonstrate Independent Positive Leadership 
The Iraqi Government must project determined, confident 
leadership and present its populace a credible face of governance.  It can do this 
by being present at the site of military victories as was Prime Minister Ja’fari’s 12 
Sep tour of the battlefield at Tal Afar.  President Talabani should be seen 
meeting with the heads of friendly regional governments, working within regional 
forums such as the Arab League, OPEC and the World Bank, and appearing as 
an accepted leader when speaking at the UN.  These ceremonies lend credibility 
to the fledgling government as an independent institution and not as the 
insurgents claim, a tool of the US.  government. Leaders should also be seen as 
pious Muslims and not live ostentatiously or break moderate Muslim codes of 
behavior.   
The US and Iraqi government have limited time.  Historical 
baggage of western occupation and colonial exploitation limit the duration that 
external military presence that will be tolerated.  Examples of prisoner abuse 
undermine US claims to legitimacy as a powerful defender of human rights.   
Iraq is the focal point for US foreign policy in the Middle East, and 
for Al Qaeda’s transnational strategy.  The diametric opposition of these interests 
ensures that the situation in Iraq will remain dynamic for the near term.  As the 
Sunni insurgency is demobilized, it is likely AQI will redouble their efforts to ignite 
an Iraqi civil war.  Therefore, strictly tracking the number of attacks will probably 
be a poor indicator of AQI’s status.  Instead, the number of insurgents crossing 
into Iraq, their level of financing, and the ability for AQI to find support within the 
Iraqi population will become critical.   
Iraq’s neighboring states of Iran, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Turkey 
all have stakes in Iraq’s stability as well as its form of government.  Should Iraq 
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descend into civil war, the conflict could spread into a larger proxy war between 
Saudi Arabia and Iran that would have significantly greater consequences.  
Internationally, Iraq’s long-term stability is critical to maintaining a smooth flow of 
oil on which the world economy depends.  It is therefore vital to stabilize Iraq, 
defeat the Sunni insurgents, and demobilize the Salafi-Jihadists. 
The insurgency in Iraq is a complex problem that hinges on military, 
political, economic, sociological and international factors.  To defeat the 
insurgency, the US and Iraqi governments must address both the indigenous and 
foreign elements as separate, but related issues.  To determine the efficacy of 
our operations, effects-based analysis requires collection and analysis of trend 
data on population security, political voting patterns, and economic recovery.  
This data will enable decision makers to better judge the progress toward 
meeting general stability goals.   
This thesis is based on unclassified data regarding AQI’s 
organization, resources, and operations.  As more detailed information becomes 
available, or the environment in Iraq changes, the counterinsurgency strategy 






















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
145
LIST OF REFERENCES 
 Abdul-Ahad, Ghaith, The New Sunni Jihad: A Time for Politics, The 
Washington Post, 27 Oct 2005. 
 Abdul-Zahra, Qassam, “Annan Urges Reconciliation in Iraq Visit”, Washington 
Post (12 Nov 2005). 
 Abu-Maysarah al-Iraqi (Media Section of AQI), Al Qaeda Claims 4 Iraqis 
Perpetrators of Amman Blasts, Threatens Israel, web Release Reported By 
Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) (released 1643 GMT 11 Nov 2005, 
Accessed 14 Nov 2005). 
 Abu-Maysarah al-Iraqi (the Media Section of AQI), Message posted on Global 
News Network forum (25 Sep 2005), and claimed responsibility for assassinating 
a National Guardsman in Ba'qubah, FBIS Report in Arabic 26 Sep 05, FOUO. 
 Al Jazeera Arab World News, ”World Outrage at Amman Blasts”, Al Jazeera 
Online News (Posted: 1947 GMT 10 Nov 2005, Accessed 15 Nov 2005). 
 Al Jazeera, “Al-Zarqawi Declares War in Iraqi Shi’a”, Arab World News (14 
Sep 2005). 
 Al Jazeera, Today’s Encounter, Al Jazeera TV Interviews UK’s Jack Straw, 
Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS -  Aired: 1630 GMT 09 Nov 2005, 
FBIS Report Filed: 10 Nov 2005). 
 Amnesty International, Iraq In Cold Blood: Abuses by Armed Groups (3 Aug 
2005). 
 An Open Letter to the Senate Judiciary Committee, Signed by 12 Senior 
Professional Military Leaders of the US Armed Forces, 
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/us_law/etn/gonzales/statements/gonz_military_0
10405.pdf 
Anti-Defamation League, Terrorist Organizational Symbols, Updated 2005, 
Accessed 1 Dec 2005 , http://www.adl.org/terrorism/symbols/al_qaeda_iraq.asp 
 Arquilla, John & David Ronfeldt, “Netwar Revisited: The Fight for the Future 
Continues” ,in Networks, Terrorism and Global Insurgency, Robert J. Bunker ed, 
(NY, Routledge, 2005). 
 Asprey, Robert, War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History (Volume I), 
William Morrow & Co - Authors 1994, Guild Backprint.com Edition (2002). 
Associated Press, Rumsfeld Won’t Set Iraq Timetable”, Associated Press (21 
Nov 2005). 
 Atran, Scott, "Genesis of Suicide Terrorism." Science vol 299 no 5612 (7 Mar 
2003). 
 Baker, Peter, Bush Estimates Iraqi Death Toll in Iraqi War at 30,000, The 
Washington Post (13 Dec 2005). 
146
 Barton, Frederick, Accelerating Economic Progress in Iraq, Testimony before 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 20 Jul 2005, CSIS. 
 Baxter, Sarah, “Iraq Terror Chief Recruits Britons”, Times Online (12 Dec 
2004). 
 Baylis, John, “Revolutionary Warfare,” in John Baylis; Ken Garnett; and Phil 
Williams, eds. Contemporary Strategy, Vol. I:  Theories and Concepts, New 
York:  Holmes & Meier (1987). 
 Baylouny, Anne Marie, “Alhurra, The Free One: Assessing US Satellite 
Television in the Middle East”, Strategic Insights, Vol IV, Issue 11 (Nov 2005). 
http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2005/Nov/baylounyNov05.asp 
 Beckett, Ian, Modern Insurgencies & Counterinsurgencies: Guerrillas and 
their Opponents Since 1750 (London, Routledge, 2001). 
 Behner, Lionel, Iraq: Insurgency Goals, Council on Foreign Relations (20 May 
2005), 2 Marc Sageman, Understanding Terrorist Networks (Philadelphia, 
Univ of Penn Press, 2004). 
Blanchard, Christopher, Al Qaeda: Statements and Evolving Ideology, 
Congressional Research Service Report to Congress, (4 Feb 2005). 
 Bowman, Steve, Iraq: US Military Operations, Updated May 18, 2005, CRS 
Report for Congress, Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of 
Congress. 
 Brinkley, Joel, “American Envoy Says Syria Assists Training Terrorists”, 
Washington Post (13 Sep 05). 
Brisard, Jean-Charles, Zarqawi: The New Face of Al-Qaeda (New York, Other 
Press, 2005). 
 British Army Field Manual Vol V, Operations Other Than War, 
Counterinsurgency Operations. 
 Bulloch, Gavin, Military Doctrine and Counterinsurgency: A British 
Perspective,  Parameters, US Army War College Quarterly (Summer 1996). 
Burke, Jason, Al-Qaeda: The True Story of Radical Islam (New York, IB 
Tauris, 2003). 
Burns, John, “Tape in the Name of Leading Insurgent Declares ‘All-Out War’ 
on Iraqi Elections and Democracy,” New York Times (24 Jan 2005). 
Burns, John, Iraqi Court Releases Video of a Much Subdued Hussein (13 Jun 
2005) 
 Byman, Daniel & Kenneth Pollack, “Democracy in Iraq” Washington 
Quarterly, 26:3, (Summer 2003). 
Callwell, C.E., Small Wars (Lincoln NB, U of Nebraska Press, 3rd ed, May 
1996). 
147
 Carroll, Jill, “Next Job, Keep the Rebels Out”, Christian Science Monitor (21 
Nov 2005). 
 Cha, Arianna, “From a Virtual Shadow, Messages of Terror”, Washington 
Post (02 Oct 2004). 
 Coll, Steve & Susan Glasser, “Terrorists Turn to the Web as Base of 
Operations”, The Washington Post, (7 Aug 2005). 
 Collier, Paul & Anke Hoeffler, Greed and Grievance in Civil War, World Bank 
Study, 21 Oct 2001. 
 Comras, Victor, “Al Qaeda Finances an Funding to Affiliated Groups”, 
Strategic Insights, vol IV, Issue 1 (Jan 2005). 
 Cordesman, Anthony & Patrick Baetjer, Iraq’s Evolving Insurgency, Center for 
Strategic and International Studies Working Draft: Updated as of 20 May 2005 
(provided by author). 
 Cordesman, Anthony, Iraq and Foreign Volunteers, Center for Strategic and 
International Studies (CSIS) (18 Nov 2005). 
 Crenshaw, Martha, The Logic of Terrorism: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of 
Strategic Choice, In Walter Reich (ed.), Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, 
Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind (NY: Cambridge University Press, 1990). 
 Cucullu, Gordon, “The Mythology of a Clean War”, Military.com (29 Nov 
2005). 
 Dana Priest & Josh White, “War Helps Recruit Terrorists, Hill Told”, 
Washington Post (17 Feb 2005). 
 Deady, Timothy, “Lessons from a Successful Counterinsurgency: The 
Philippines, 1899-1902”, Parameters: US Army War College Quarterly (Spring 
2004), 57-59, http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/05spring/deady.pdf 
 DSCINT, 1 Jun 2005. 
 Fall, Bernard, The Theory and Practice of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency, 
Naval War College lecture notes (10 Dec 1964), 1. 
Fattah, Hassan, Iraqi Factions Seek Timetable for US Pullout, New York 
Times (22 Nov 2005). 
 Feikei, Omar & Saad Sarhan, “Shiite Muslim Clerics Counsel Restraint”, The 
Washington Post (16 Sep 2005). 
Fishback, Ian, Letter to Senator John McCain, Sent: 16 Sep 2005, Reported 
by The Washington Post (8 Oct 2005). 
 Flags of the World, updated 2005,-08-06, accessed 01 Dec 2005 
http://www.crwflags.com/fotw/flags/iq%5E%7Dzarq.html 
 Ford, Christopher, Speak No Evil: Targeting a Population’s Neutrality to 
Defeat Insurgency, Parameters Summer 2005). 
148
 Gambil, Gary, “Abu Musab al-Zarqawi: A Biographical Sketch”, Terrorism 
Monitor, Vol II, Issue 24 (16 Dec 2004). 
Gerges, Fawaz, The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global (New York, 
Cambridge Univ Press, 2005). 
 Glasser, Susan & Steve Coll, The Web as Weapon, Zarqawi Intertwines Acts 
on the Ground with Propaganda Campaign on the Internet, The Washington Post 
(9 Aug 2005). 
 Global Issues Report, Militant Websites Post Video Justifying the Killing of 
Iraqi Civilians, (14 Jul 2005). 
 Gonzalez, Alberto, United States Attorney General, Al Qaeda Manual, US 
Dept of Justice, Seized by the Manchester (England) Police Dept, accesses 10 
Nov 2005, http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/trainingmanual.htm 
Graham, Bradley, Enemy Body Counts Revived, The Washington Post (24 
Oct 2005). 
 Graham, Bradley, Zarqawi Hijacked Iraqi Insurgency, Washington Post, 28 
Sep 2005. 
 Gray, Peter, “The Myths of Air Control and the Realities of Imperial Policing”, 
Aerospace Power Journal (Fall 2001), 133. 
 Griffith, Samuel, Mao Tse-Tung: On Guerrilla Warfare (Chicago IL, Univ of 
Chicago Press, 2000). 
 Guevara, Che, Guerrilla Warfare (Lincoln NB, U of Nebraska Press, 1998). 
 Guiora, Amos, Unholy Trinity, Intelligence, Interrogation and Torture, (Case 
Western Reserve Law School, 2005). 
 Gunaratna, Rohan, Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror (Colombia 
Univ Press, NY, 2002). 
 Gwynn, Charles, Imperial Policing, London, Macmillan (1934). 
 Hafez, Mohammed, Manufacturing Human Bombs: Strategy, Culture, and 
Conflict in the Making of Palestinian Suicide Terrorism, (Kansas City, National 
Institute of Justice University of Missouri, Oct 2004). 
 Hafez, Mohammed, Why Muslims Rebel: Repression and Resistance in the 
Islamic World (Boulder, Lynne Rienner (2003). 
 Hammes, Thomas, The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century (St 
Paul MN, MBI Publishing, 2004). 
 Hamzeh, Nizar, “Lebanon’s Islamists and Local Politics: A New Reality”, Third 
World Quarterly, vol 21, no 5, (Oct 2000). 
 Hashim, Ahmed S., “The Insurgency in Iraq”, Small Wars and Insurgencies, 
vol 14, no 3, (Autumn 2003), 8; Andrew Krepinevich, “How to Win In Iraq”, 
Foreign Affairs, (Sep-Oct 2005). 
149
Henderson, Simon, A Bedouin on a Camel, Washington Institute for Near 
East Policy, Policy Watch 1036 (05 Oct 2005). 
 Hoffman, Bruce, “Insurgency & Counterinsurgency in Iraq”, Special Warfare, 
vol17, no.2 (Dec 04). 
 Human Right Watch, Leadership Failure: Firsthand Accounts of Torture of 
Iraqi Detainees by the US Army’s 82nd Airborne Division, vol 17, no 3(G), (Sep 
2005). 
 JAG Memos introduced into Congressional Record by Sen Lindsey Graham, 
25 Jul 2005, Memos originated from all the Armed Services Judge Advocate 
General offices. 
 James Russell – Class presentation to NS4801-International Terrorism, 
Winter 2005. 
 James Russell, NPS Professor 2005, evolving theoretical concept. 
Jenkins, Brian, Strategy: Political Warfare Neglected, San Diego Union-
Tribune (26 Jun 2005). 
Joes, Anthony James, Resisting Rebellion: History and Politics of 
Counterinsurgency (Louisville KY, U Of KY Press, 2004). 
 Jones, Ronald, Terrorist Beheadings: Cultural and Strategic Implications, 
Carlisle Papers in Strategic Security, Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army 
War College, (Jun 2005). 
 Kagen, Frederick, Blueprint for Victory, The Weekly Standard, (28 Oct 2005). 
 Kagen, Frederick, The New Bolsheviks: Understanding Al Qaeda, American 
Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research (Nov 2005). 
 Kaplan, Robert, “The Coming Anarchy”, Atlantic Monthly, 273 2 (Feb 1994). 
 Katzman, Kenneth, Al Qaeda: Profile and Threat Assessment, (Congressional 
Research Service, 17 Aug 2005), 2. 
 Kellogg, Davida, International Law and Terrorism, Military Review (Sep-Oct 
2005). 
 Kepel, Gilles, Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam, (Cambridge Mass, Belknap 
Press of the Harvard Univ Press, 2002). 
 Kepel, Gilles, The War for the Muslim Minds: Islam and the West, (Cambridge 
Mass, Belknap Press of the Harvard Univ Press, 2004). 
 Knickmeyer, Ellen & Jonathan Finer, Insurgents Assert Control Over Town 
Near Syrian Border, Washington Post (6 Sep 2005). 
 Knickmeyer, Ellen & Naseer Nouri, “Insurgents Kill 160 in Baghdad”, 
Washington Post (16 Sep 2005). 
 Knickmeyer, Ellen, “Bomber Bloodies US. Toy Giveaway, The Washington 
Post (25 Nov 2005). 
150
Knickmeyer, Ellen, “Talabani Offers Amnesty to Insurgents: New Iraqi 
President Reaches Out to Sunnis, Names Jafari as Prime Minister”, The 
Washington Post (8 Apr 2005). 
 Krepinevich, Andrew, “How to Win In Iraq”, Foreign Affairs (Sep-Oct 2005). 
 Krepinevich, Andrew, Are We Wining in Iraq?, testimony before House Armed 
Services Committee, (17 Mar 2005). 
 Langohr, Vickie, “Of Islamists and Ballot Boxes: Rethinking the Relationship 
Between Islamists and Electoral Politics”, International Journal of Middle East 
Studies, 33 (2001). 
 Lasseter, Tom, Officers: Military Can’t End Insurgency, The Philadelphia 
Inquirer (14 Jun 05). 
 Lawrence, Thomas Edward, 27 Articles The Arab Bulletin (20 Aug 1917). 
 Lederer, Edith, UN Extends Troops In Iraq for One Year, The Washington 
Post (9 Nov 2005). 
 Levitt, Matthew & Julie Sawyer, Zarqawi’s Jordanian Agenda, Jamestown 
Terrorism Monitor, Vol II, Issue 24 (16 Dec 2004). 
 Looney, Robert, A Plan for Revitalizing the Iraq Economy, Strategic Insights, 
Vol IV, is 8 (Aug 2005). 
Lumpkin, John, “Insurgents Infiltrating Iraq Have Cash”, Associated Press, 
(21 Oct 2004). 
 Lynn, John A., Patterns of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency, Military 
Review (Jul-Aug 2005) 
Lynn, John, Patterns of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency, Military Review 
(Jul-Aug 05). 
Machiavelli, Nicolo, The Prince, (Bantam Classics, 1984) Chapter XX. 
Mayer, Jane, Outsourcing Terror: The Secret History of America’s 
“Extraordinary Rendition” Program, The New Yorker, (Issue 2005,-02-14, posted: 
2005-02-07). 
Mayton, Joseph, Zogby International: How to Win - and Lose - Hearts and 
Minds, The Washington Examiner (28 Nov 2005). 
 McAdam, Doug, et al,. "Introduction: Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and 
Framing Processes - toward a Synthetic, Comparative Perspective on Social 
Movements." In Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political 
Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings, edited by McAdam, 
et al, 1-20. New York: Cambridge University Press, (1996). 




 Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI) Bulletin 917, Abu-Mus’ab al-
Zarqawi: Collateral Killing of Muslims is Legitimate (7 Jun 2005). 
 Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI), Special Dispatch: Al-Hayat 
Inquiry: The City of Al-Zarqaa in Jordan - Breeding Ground of Jordan's Salafi 
Jihad Movement (07 Jan 2005). 
 Morgan, David, An Evolving View of Warfare: War and Peace in the American 
Military Profession, Small Wars and Insurgencies’, Vol 16, No 2, (Jun 2005), 149-
150. 
Murphy, Caryle and Khalid Saffar, Insurgents Reluctant TV Stars, The 
Washington Post (5 Apr 2005). 
 Murphy, Dan, “US Strategy in Iraq: Is it Working?”, Christian Science Monitor 
(21 Jun 2005). 
 Musharbash, Yassin, “The Future of Terrorism: What al-Qaeda Really 
Wants”, Spiegal Online (12 Aug 2005). 
 Nagl, John A.,. Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife: Counterinsurgency 
Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam (Univ of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2002). 
National Security Council (NSC), “National Strategy for Victory in Iraq” 
(Washington D.C. US Government Printing Office, Nov 2005). 
 National Security Council, “National Strategy for Victory in Iraq” (Washington 
D.C. US Government Printing Office, Nov 2005). 
 Negroponte, John, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Letter from 
al-Zawahiri to al-Zarqawi (Updated, 11 Oct 2005, accessed 12 Oct 2005). 
 New York Times Editorial, Iraqis Getting Together, New York Times (24 Nov 
2005). 
 O’Hanlon, Michael & Nina Kamp, Iraq Index, Brookings Institution, Updated 
21 Nov 2005, http://www.brookings.edu/iraqindex. 
 O’Neil, Bard, Insurgency & Terrorism (New York, Brassey’s Inc Maxwell 
MacMillan Permagon Publishing Corp, 1990). 
 O’Neil, Bard, Insurgency & Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse, 2nd 
edition, revised, (Dullas VA, Potomac Books, 2005), 74. 
 Palestinian Information Center, “HAMAS Condemns Amman Bombings: Al-
Zahhar Condemns Amman “Criminal” Actions Targeting Innocent People”, 
Reported by Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), (Published 10 Nov 
2005). 
 Pape, Robert, “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism”, American Political 
Science Review, Vol 97 no 3 (14 Jul 2003). 
 Pape, Robert, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism (NY, 
Random House, 2005). 
152
 Perl, Raphael, Terrorism and National Security: Issues and Trends, 
Congressional Research Service Issue Brief for Congress (3 Nov 2005). 
 Peterson, Scott, “New Iraqi Strategy: Stay in Hot Spots”, Christian Science 
Monitor (23 Nov 2005). 
 Pew Global Attitudes Project, American Character Gets Mixed Reviews: US 
Image Up Slightly, But Still Negative ( 23 Jun 2005). 
 Pillar, Paul, Perceptions of Terrorism: Continuity and Change, in Boyne, 
German and Pilar, Law Vs War: Competing Approaches to Fighting Terrorism, 
Conference Report, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College (July 
2005). 
 Prados, Alfred & Christopher Blanchard, Saudi Arabia Terrorist Financing 
Issues, (Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 4 Mar 2005). 
 Pumar, Enrique, Social Forces and the Politics of Transition: Lessons from 
the Cuba Experience, ASCE (1997). 
 Putnam, Bill, Information Wars: Are the Iraqis Getting the Message?, 
Strategic Insights, Vol III, Issue 12 (Dec 2004). 
 Radu, Michael, “Contemporary Insurgent Warfare”, in Psychological 
Operations and Political Warfare and Long-Term Strategic Planning, edited by 
Janos Radvanyi, (NY, Praeger, 1990). 
 Raphaeli, Nimrod, “The Sheikh of the Slaughterers’: Abu Mus’ab Al-Zarqawi 
and the Al Qaeda Connection”, Middle East Media Research Institute, Inquiry 
and Analysis Series No 231 (01 Jul 2005). 
 Reuters, “US Impatient with Saudis over Charity Funds”, (23 May 2005). 
Reynolds, Paul, Iraq Referendum: Milestone Not Destination, BBC (25 Oct 
2005). 
 Robberson, Tod, “Iraqi Insurgency on a Deadly Comeback”, Dallas Morning 
News (25 May 05). 
Robbins, James, Marriage on the Rocks: Is Al-Qaeda Wearing Out Its 
Welcome, National Review Online (22 Aug 2005). 
 Roy, Oliver, The Failure of Political Islam (Cambridge Mass, Harvard Univ 
Press, 1994). 
 Rumsfeld, Donald, Testimony Before HASC, 23 Jun 2005. 
 Salah, Tantawi Considers Al Zarqawi Faction “Mischief Makers”, Al Hayat, (5 
Jul 2005). 
Salaheddin, Sinan, Sunni Clerics Urge Iraqis to Join Security Forces, AP NY 
(02 Apr 2005). 
 Schelling, Thomas, Arms and Influence, (New Haven, Conn, Yale Univ Press, 
1966). 
 Schmitt, Eric, “Don’t Aid Zarqawi”, New York Times (3 Jun 2005). 
153
Sharp, Jeremy & Christopher Blanchard, Post-War Iraq: Foreign 
Contributions to Training Peacekeeping and Reconstruction, Congressional 
Research Service Report for Congress (01 Nov 2005). 
 Sprinzak, Ehud, Rational Fanatics, Foreign Affairs, (Sep/Oct 2000). 
 Staniland, Paul, The Best Offense is a Good Fence, The Washington 
Quarterly (Winter 2005-6). 
 Stanley, Trevor, “Abu Mussab al-Zarqawi: The Osama bin Laden of Iraq”, 
Perspectives on World History & Current Events (PWHCE). 
 Tabor, Robert, War of the Flea, (Washington, Brassey’s Inc, 2002). 
 Taft, William Howard IV, Comments on Your Paper on the Geneva 
Convention, Memo written by the Legal Advisor to the US Dept of State, (William 
Howard Taft IV) to the Council to the President, (John Yoo), 2 Feb 2002. 
 Tarnoff, Curt, Iraq, Recent Developments in Reconstruction Assistance, 
Congressional Research Service, Report for Congress (12 Aug 2005). 
 Thompson, Robert, “Squaring the Error”, Foreign Affairs (Apr 1968). 
 Thornton, Rod, The British Army and the Origins of its Minimum Force Policy, 
Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol 15, No 1 (Spring 2004). 
 Trabeisi, Habib, Al-Qaeda Takes Jihad to the Media Four Years After 9/11, 
Middle East Online, (2005-09-08 2005). 
 Tugwell, Maurice, “Terrorism as a Psychological Strategy”, in Psychological 
Operations and Political Warfare in Long-Term Strategic Planning, edited by 
Janos Radvanyi, (New York, Praeger, 1990). 
UN News Service, Iraq: UN Envoy Calls for All to Vote in Upcoming Elections, 
UN News Centre (2 Dec 2005). 
 United States Marine Corps, Small Wars Manual (1940). 
 United States Marine Corps, Small Wars Manual (2005). 
US Department of Defense (DoD) Report to Congress, Measuring Security 
and Stability in Iraq (13 Oct 2005). 
 US Department of State, Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs): Fact Sheet, 
Office of Counterterrorism, Washington DC, 11 Oct 2005, 
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/fs/37191.htm. 
US Department of State, “Iraq: Weekly Status Report” (23 Nov 2005), 
http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/rpt/iraqstatus/. 
 Washington Post News Photos (16 Nov 2005). 
 Wiktorowicz, Quintan, Framing Jihad: Intra-Movement Framing Contests and 
al-Qaeda's Struggle for Sacred Authority, International Review of Social History, 
vol 49 supplement (12 Dec 2004). 
154
 Wiktorowicz, Quinton, A New Approach to the Study of Islamic Activism, IIAS 
Newsletter #33 (Mar 2004). 
 Wiktorowicz, Quinton, Anatomy of a Salafi Movement (Rhodes College, Dec 
2004). 
 Wiktorowicz, Quinton, Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach 
(Bloomington Ind, Indiana University Press, 2004). 
 Wong, Edward, “Mosque Attacks Kill 70 in Iraq; Hotel is Hit Too”, New York 
Times (19 Nov 2005). 
 Wong, Edward, Bombers Kill at Least 65 Inside Two Shiite Mosques, New 
York Times (18 Nov 05). 
Wong, Edward, Iraqi Constitution Vote Split Along Ethnic and Sect Lines; 
Election Panel Reports No Major Fraud, New York Times (23 Oct 2005). 
Wong, Edward, Iraqi Official Says He Received Call From Resistance Leader, 
New York Times (25 Nov 2005). 
 World Affairs, “Reflections on Counterinsurgency in Thailand“ vol 146 (Winter 
1984-85). 
Zogby International, Business Leader Attitudes Toward Commercial Activity, 
Employee Relations, and Government in Post-Saddam Iraq, Zogby Center for 
International Private Enterprise, Thomas Peck, writer, (Dec 2004). 
155
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
Ft. Belvoir, VA  
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  
 
3. Professor Karen Guttieri 
Department of National Security Affairs 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 
 
4. Professor James Russell 
Department of National Security Affairs 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 
 
5. Tom Travis 
 Joint Center for Operational Analysis 
Headquarters, US Joint Forces Command 
Suffolk, VA 
 
 
